


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7 MAY 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-020

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ANGOLA

'Toxic Bombs' Said To Still Cause Losses in Bie
MB0605070389 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance
of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and
Central Africa 0500 GMT 6 May 89

[Text] Our Bie correspondent reports that the extremely toxic bombs dropped on villagers on 21 April by Cuban-manned MiG-23 planes are still causing irreparable material and human losses. The poisonous bombs have also polluted the (Vissema) river, thus creating countless difficulties to local residents.

West European Reaction to Gorbachev 7 Dec Troop Cut Announcement

40050382 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI [WORLD AFFAIRS] in Chinese No 3, 1 Feb 89 pp 18-19

[Article by Lin Zongren the column "The World Political Situation": "Western Europe Sees Cause for Concern Amidst the Good News of the Soviet Decision on Disarmament: A Cause for Celebration: Military Pressures on Western Europe Will Be Alleviated; A Cause for Concern: The Warsaw Treaty Organization Still Has a 2:1 Advantage Over NATO"]

[Text] When Gorbachev spoke at the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1988, he announced that the Soviet Union has decided on a unilateral troop reduction of 500,000 men and a large-scale cutback in the number of conventional weapons within the next 2 years. In addition, before 1991 the Soviets plan to withdraw from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and disband 6 tank divisions and some offensive units. Soviet troops remaining in Eastern Europe will be transformed into purely defensive forces. This is another major policy decision that the Soviet Union adopted after it decided to destroy intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The decision will have profound effect on East-West relationships, particularly between the Soviet Union and Western Europe.

Historically, Western Europe has been more sensitive than any place else to suggestions of Soviet disarmament, and the current Soviet decision on troop withdrawal even more directly involves Western European interests. Consequently, Gorbachev's UN General Assembly speech quickly raised a strong reaction in Western Europe, and the various West European governments issued statements about it one after the other. Mrs Thatcher expressed the opinion that this move "is an important step toward equalizing forces in Europe." Kohl said "it provides Western Europe with an opportunity to achieve a balance in conventional weaponry." Mitterand called it "beneficial to peace and the balance of power." Public opinion in the press also widely reported and commented on this unilateral troop withdrawal decision. Unlike the past, however, this time essentially nobody in Western Europe publicly expressed doubts about Gorbachev's sincerity, and there were very few who accused the Soviets of conducting propaganda.

There are several reasons why Western Europe welcomes the Soviet decision on disarmament. **First of all, this is a major, unilateral Soviet concession to Western Europe.** This Soviet decision on troop reduction will pare its military forces by one-tenth or more, and Western Europeans are surprised at the scale of the cutback. In recent years Western Europe has constantly felt severe pressure from the enormous Soviet military advantage, living in fear as though seated beneath Damocles' sword. After the United States-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty was signed, although the critical Soviet threat to Western Europe was reduced, the Soviet advantage in

conventional forces grew more prominent. NATO not only trails the Warsaw Treaty Organization in troop numbers, it also falls far behind in terms of first-strike capability. According to western statistics, there are 4 million Warsaw Pact troops in Europe, or about 113 divisions, compared to only 2.6 million NATO troops, or about 90 divisions. The Warsaw Treaty Organization has 52,000 primary fighting tanks and 37,000 cannons in Europe, compared to 22,000 and 11,000 NATO tanks and cannons, respectively. Consequently, after an agreement was reached on the issue of intermediate-range missiles, not only was Western Europe's sense of unease not alleviated, it actually increased somewhat. In order to improve this threatening situation, for the past year Western Europe has particularly emphasized that the Soviet Union must make a "large-scale reduction in its conventional forces, which are far out of symmetry with the West." Otherwise Western Europe must continue to "maintain sharp vigilance" and "absolutely not relax its defensive efforts." Although this Soviet decision on disarmament still falls short of changing either the military balance between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, or the Soviet Union's overall military superiority in Europe, it cannot but be a significant concession and a beneficial factor for European security.

Second, the Soviet decision on disarmament demonstrates that Gorbachev's new thinking has affected military strategy. One of the major reasons Western Europe has long maintained a wait-and-see attitude toward Soviet reforms and foreign policy revisions is the belief that up to now Soviet military composition has remained unchanged, and that the Soviet Union still maintains an offensive military force that "far exceeds what is necessary for defense." Western Europe stresses that "the large-scale concentration of conventional Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact's military superiority, and its capacity to launch a first strike or choose a large-scale offensive operation, are at the heart of the European security issue." Consequently, in West European eyes the major criterion for judging this new Soviet ideology is whether the Soviet Union eliminates the military plans, troop strength, and weapons systems that constitute its first-strike capacity and large-scale offensive capability. This time not only is the Soviet Union making cuts in troop strength on its own soil; it is also removing some troops from Eastern Europe, including one-third of the total number of tanks stationed there. In addition, the remaining troops will be transformed into defensive troops. This is one major sign that the Soviet Union is shifting from an offensive to a defensive military strategy. Western Europe naturally welcomes this "positive change" and wishes to encourage the Soviet Union to continue along this path.

Of course, when the Soviet Union consented to such significant concessions it had its own strategic considerations in mind, of which one important one was to improve relations with Western Europe. In the past year the Soviet Union has clearly revised its policies toward Western Europe. Politically, it is giving more serious

consideration to Western Europe's status and role, and economically it regards Western Europe as a significant source for imported funds and technology. Consequently the Soviet Union has become more active and is taking more initiative in the effort to improve relations with Western Europe. Dialogue and trade contacts between the two have intensified considerably. However, West European concerns about Soviet military superiority, particularly its fear of Soviet expansion in conventional military forces, have seriously impeded further growth in bilateral relations. This big step the Soviets have taken in adopting unilateral disarmament was intended to dispel West European fears in order to obtain the international climate the Soviets need to advance reforms and develop economically.

From our current perspective, this peaceful offensive has achieved significant results in Western Europe, particularly in alleviating the public perception of the Soviet threat. But from the perspective of West European office-holders, at the same time as they are welcoming the Soviet decision on disarmament, they still harbor doubts at heart because the move has raised new issues concerning West European security. For one thing Western Europe has no certainty that the Soviet Union will be able to carry through on its troop reduction commitment. It is especially difficult to assess the Soviet military attitude. Sergei Akhromeyev, the Soviet chief of general staff of the armed forces, tendered his resignation on the same day Gorbachev announced this unilateral troop reduction, and I'm afraid this was no coincidence. For another thing, even if the Soviet decision is fully implemented, the remaining conventional Soviet forces still possess an advantage over West European forces. In Great Britain Mrs Thatcher expressed the opinion that after the Soviet troop withdrawal "the Warsaw Treaty Organization will still have a 2:1 advantage over NATO, and difficult negotiations will be necessary to achieve a balance of conventional forces across Europe." Moreover, the decision on unilateral disarmament has placed the Soviets in the position of initiative in future negotiations. Western Europe "will find it very difficult to adopt a strong position." In addition, the success of this peaceful Soviet offensive has raised strong public opposition in Western Europe to the efforts just underway to enhance defensive forces to counter the Soviet threat. The Western European Union will now meet with even more resistance, and controversies between Western Europe and the United States, and even within Western Europe itself, over issues of modernizing short-range ballistic missiles, defense expenditures, and U.S. troops stationed in Western Europe, will intensify and grow more complicated. Right now Western Europe is seeking ways to deal with these issues. Plans will be made, and we will just have to wait and see.

PRC Participation in UN Disarmament Commission Session

Submits Working Paper

OW1105073789 Beijing XINHUA in English
0644 GMT 11 Apr 89

[Text] United Nations, May 10 (XINHUA)—China has called on the United States and the Soviet Union to take the lead in halting the test, production and deployment

of all types of nuclear weapons, and to drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals.

In a working paper submitted to the Disarmament Commission earlier this week, China recommends basic elements to be included in a declaration of 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade. The paper was made public here today as a document of the General Assembly.

The commission, currently meeting in New York, is trying, among other things, to formulate a draft declaration of principles governing the 1990s designated by the General Assembly as the Third United Nations Disarmament Decade.

Among the goals China suggests is an agreement by the two major nuclear powers as soon as possible to reduce by 50 percent the number of their strategic nuclear weapons.

Other goals include the conclusion at an early date of a convention on a total ban of chemical weapons, an early and productive conclusion to conventional disarmament talks in Europe, and averting an arms race in outer space.

The working paper calls for the adoption without delay of vigorous measures to check new tendencies in the arms race. These tendencies, it says, specifically include qualitative improvements in weapons, and the extension of weapons technology to new fields.

Because the question of disarmament concerns peace and security of all states, it should not be monopolized by a few big powers, China declares.

"All states, big or small, strong or weak, should enjoy equal rights to participate in the deliberation and settlement of problems relating to disarmament. No bilateral agreement on disarmament should jeopardize the interests of other states," the paper noted.

Statement on Arms Transfers

OW1205011389 Beijing XINHUA in English
0017 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] United Nations, May 11 (XINHUA)—Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Fan Guoxiang made a 9-point statement here today on the question of international arms transfer at the Disarmament Commission during its deliberations on conventional disarmament.

This is the first time that China has made known its positions on this issue at the United Nations in a comprehensive and detailed manner.

As member states have expressed different views on this issue in recent years, China's statement today attracted much attention from other delegations. The Disarmament Commission is going to publish a working paper containing the nine points which were submitted by China earlier in the week as an official document of the General Assembly.

The commission, currently meeting in New York, is a deliberative body of the General Assembly with the participation of all U.N. member states.

The 9-point position statement by Fan Guoxiang is as follows:

1. The question of international arms transfer should be addressed with a serious, discreet and responsible attitude. The transfer of arms must serve to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states concerned, and to contribute to the maintenance of their necessary and reasonable defense capability. No country should interfere in the internal affairs of others by means of arms transfer.

2. The international arms transfer should help the people in their just struggles against colonial domination, foreign aggression and occupation and for the realization or restoration of their inalienable rights to national self-determination and independence.

3. The international arms transfer should be conducive to preservation and enhancement of peace, security and stability in the regions concerned and the world at large.

4. Strict prohibition of all types of arms transfer should be applied to those states or regimes which, in violation of the United Nations charter and the basic norms governing international relations, subject other countries to aggression, expansion and military occupation and practice racism and colonial domination. The countries concerned should take vigorous measures to stop international arms transfer which is related to such illegal acts as drug trafficking and international terrorism and to strengthen international cooperation in this respect.

5. The question of the international arms transfer should be addressed in conjunction with the questions of reducing international tension, removing regional conflicts, checking arms race and realizing disarmament under effective supervision.

6. On the basis of compliance with the above-mentioned principles, rational regulation and limitation of international arms transfer could be made so as to promote stability at a low armament level and enhance world peace and security.

7. The biggest arms supplier countries bear a special responsibility in regulating and limiting international arms transfer, and they should be the first to take actions. The United States of America and the Union of

the Soviet Socialist Republics should take the lead in adopting concrete and effective self-restraining measures, including drastic reduction in their arms exports, so as to create favourable conditions for consultations and negotiations among all arms supplier and recipient countries on the rational regulation and limitation of international arms transfer.

8. The arms supplier and recipient countries, as well as other countries concerned, should be encouraged to carry out consultations and negotiations on an equal footing based on the principle of undiminished security of all the parties and other relevant principles as contained in the final document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and reach agreement on the rational regulation and limitation of international arms transfer.

9. The United Nations should play a useful role in rationally regulating and limiting international arms transfer. For instance, it should urge the biggest arms supplier countries to discharge their special responsibility and take the lead in adopting self-restraining measures, it should encourage all states to carry out consultations and reach agreement on the rational regulation and limitation of arms transfer and provide necessary consulting and technical services to them, and it should initiate studies and formulate necessary and effective measures against such arms transfer which should be prohibited.

USSR 22 Apr UN Call for Nuclear Arms, Foreign Bases Elimination Viewed

*HK1005085389 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 28 Apr 89 p 4*

["Weekly Commentary" by Lu Yao: "If Only All Nuclear Weapons Could Really Be Destroyed"]

[Text] At the United Nations arms reduction meeting held on 22 April, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Petrovskiy said: "The goal which the Soviet Union is striving to achieve is to destroy all nuclear weapons and to dismantle all military bases set up in other countries by the year 2000."

The moment this statement was made known, people were talking about it. Some said: It is worth welcoming. Others said: We must wait and see for a little while. Still others said: It is a deception, a propaganda ploy.

How then should we approach this Soviet move?

After the signing of the Soviet-American agreement on intermediate-range missiles at the UN Assembly held at the beginning of last December, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the Soviet decision to unilaterally cut its Armed Forces by 500,000 personnel, and its conventional weapons in large quantities. The decision immediately evoked strong repercussions in the international community. Why? This was in part because the move

was taken unilaterally and the West was not asked to take reciprocal actions, and in part because the cuts were deep, amounting to 10 percent of the total Soviet Armed Forces, and moreover, the cuts were simultaneously carried out in the country's European and Asian parts. After taking the two above-mentioned relatively major actions, the Soviet Union has now announced its determination to destroy all nuclear weapons by the end of this century. It is, therefore, only quite natural for people to make all kinds of analyses and speculation.

What people are concerned about is whether the Soviet Union is completely sincere when it is giving so much publicity to disarmament. Observers say: The move is taken with the international background moving toward relaxation, and out of the Soviet Union's own needs.

The Soviet Union has gained a high opinion from the world for the conclusion of the intermediate-range missile treaty and a 500,000 military personnel reduction. It seemed that the Soviet Union took the initiative more eagerly than the United States. Therefore, by making the most of the step of destroying all nuclear weapons and deepening the process of relaxation diplomatically, the Soviet Union intends to win plaudits from more people and seek a favorable position to alleviate the increasingly intensifying contradictions at home. The nuclear weapons accumulatively piled in the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals are strong enough to destroy entire mankind more than 10 times. Hence, people in the world perennially live under the threat of nuclear calamity. Under these circumstances, if the Soviet Union and the United States destroy all these nuclear weapons, this will naturally be a very good thing for which the people of the whole world will be overjoyed. In his book "Reform and New Thinking," ["Perestroika"] Gorbachev wrote: "Once a nuclear war breaks out, all living beings will disappear from the earth and mankind will be destroyed many times." This being the case, he appealed: "Say no to confrontation and yes to cooperation." This shows that the Soviet leaders have taken the serious consequences of a nuclear war into consideration. It is precisely with this "new thinking" that the Soviet Union has made "new breakthroughs" in the disarmament sector.

Nevertheless, we must also notice that the Soviet Union has its own reasons for making concessions with the United States and taking great steps in disarmament. For quite some time, the Soviet Union and the United States, posting intimidating but restrained postures, have been extremely antagonistic toward each other and their military expenditures have invariably stood high. According to calculations by the West, the Soviet Union's actual military spending is more than \$200 billion a year, constituting about 16 percent of its gross national product or one-third of the government's expenditures. For this purpose, the Soviet Union has prioritized the development of heavy and military industries at the expense of agriculture and civil industries, resulting in a lopsided development of the national economy and a sharp contradiction between domestic supply and

demand. If the military burdens are not lightened, it will be unable to quicken the pace of reform. Then, in the coming years, the Soviet Union will be unable to sit as equals at the same table with the United States.

Moreover, this Soviet move is also meant to drive a wedge in the relations between the United States and Europe. The United States and its West European allies are endlessly debating the issue of modernizing NATO short-range missiles, each having its own views. The current announcement of Soviet readiness to destroy all nuclear weapons by the turn of this century will greatly aggravate the contradictions between the United States and Europe. In Western Europe, the NATO member states, in particular West Germany, will all the more say plausibly and at length: Look! The Soviet Union is going to destroy all its nuclear weapons. Why on earth is our American brother still asking us to modernize short-range missiles? It is precisely because of this that U.S. officials were greatly dissatisfied with the Soviet way of saying things and denounced it as "political propaganda."

In all fairness, even though the Soviet Union made the announcement out of sincerity, it will be no easy job to destroy all nuclear weapons by the end of this century. This is easy to imagine. The Soviet Union and the United States finally concluded a treaty on intermediate-range missiles only after many years of making a fuss and dragging in a lot of people as well as crossing verbal swords. The amounts of nuclear weapons to be destroyed according to the treaty, made up just 6 percent of their nuclear arms arsenals. What about the remaining 94 percent of nuclear weapons? Moreover, the Soviet Union has always adhered to the defense principle of "rational and sufficient strength." What level is considered "rational"? How much military strength is considered "sufficient"? Outsiders are unable to work out these accounts.

For the sake of world peace, we sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will destroy all its nuclear weapons. We hope that what Petrovskiy said was not for the sake of propaganda.

Soviet 'Reasonable Sufficiency' Military Theory Viewed

HK0905135389 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
4 May 89 p 7

[Article by Guo Zhengping: "Theory of 'Reasonable Sufficiency' of Soviet Military Strength"]

[Text] In a report to the 27th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1986, Gorbachev put forward for the first time the idea of "limiting" the Soviet military strength "to reasonable sufficiency." Three years have passed. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expounded and proved this principle and has gradually put it into practice to form its new strategy.

Viewed from its direct meaning, the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" seems to mean only the building of the Soviet military strength, but in reality, it involves major issues including the Soviet military strategic targets, ways of strategic moves, and the building of strategic means. It is an expression of the "new ideology" in the overall Soviet military strategy.

At present, the Soviet Union has theoretically shifted from the previous emphasis on an absolute guarantee of national security to an emphasis on "common security," that is, "state security is inseparable from international security," and "a country's security cannot be guaranteed if consideration is not given to the security of other countries." For example, according to past Soviet security theory, the more medium-range missiles it deploys in central Europe, the better its security is guaranteed; but according to the current theory, such deployment cannot guarantee its security and if medium-range missiles are actually used, both the Soviet Union and Western Europe will suffer. Therefore, while preserving its strategic weapons, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the United States on complete destruction of medium-range missiles to reduce economic pressure. The Soviet Union has already put forward that "the building of the Soviet military strength must also be subordinated to the needs of economic construction," and therefore, it is necessary to change the past practice of "putting the building of national defense in the first place" and "meeting all the needs of the Soviet Army." The announcement made by the Soviet Union that it will cut 500,000 troops and cut its military expenditure by 14.2 percent can be regarded as a manifestation of this "reasonable" theory.

On the premise of this theory, the Soviet Union has officially put forward a "pure defense" military strategy and has used it as a standard to evaluate "sufficiency." Soviet Defense Minister Yazov explained that sufficiency means to "possess military strength needed for defense," and to "reduce the military strength of any side to a level at which it is only capable of defense and not capable of offense." To this end, the Soviet Union has clearly promised in talks on strategic weapons that it will reduce half of its SS-18 continental missiles which are chiefly for launching preemptive attacks. In disarmament talks on conventional weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union has expressed willingness to reduce by a big margin offensive weapons such as tanks, artillery, and armored cars. The Soviet Union has also announced the withdrawal of six tank divisions, landing troops, and

boat-bridge troops, from Eastern Europe in order to gradually change the establishment of its forces garrisoned in Eastern Europe from an offensive type to a defensive type.

Gorbachev put forward that "in the world today, no country can depend on military technical means alone to defend itself," and that "security problems can only be solved by political means." Therefore, in various disarmament talks, the Soviet Union advocated arms reduction in terms of quantity by a big margin. However, that the Soviet Union has put forward the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" does not mean it has given up its power policy at all. What the Soviet Union is trying to seek is arms parity at a low level in terms of quantity and arms development at a high level in terms of quality. At the 19th Conference of Representatives of the CPSU, Gorbachev stressed that from now on, the focus of Soviet Army building should be shifted to "quality targets." At present, the Soviet Army is energetically adopting measures in various aspects, including war preparedness training, establishment structure, development of new weapons, quality of officers, and research on military science, in order to improve the quality of the Army to compensate for the decrease in quantity and to ensure that the overall combat capability of the Soviet Army will not be weakened. Proof of this is that the Soviet Union is stepping up the deployment of the SS-25 mobile continental missiles, building new-type aircraft carriers, energetically developing long-distance cruising missiles, laser weapons, and other high-tech weapon systems of a new generation.

What is worthy of attention is that there exists a relatively strong feeling of resisting the implementation of the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" in the Soviet Army. It is disclosed that in explaining the principle of "reasonable sufficiency," leading members of the Soviet Army and Soviet military publications have particularly stressed that "threats of war launched by the imperialists have not been weakened" and they propagated that "peace and security are precisely ensured by military strategic parity." Yazov said that the degree of "reasonable sufficiency" will "depend on actions to be taken by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." What he implied is quite clear. For many years, the Soviet Union has implemented an offensive military strategy and has maintained enormous armed forces. It is not easy at all to bring about a fundamental change in this situation. Whether or not the "reasonable sufficiency" theory can be implemented in the Soviet military forces remains to be seen.

THAILAND

U.S. Alleges Thai Role in Libyan Chemical Weapons Plant

Letter to Foreign Ministry

BK1105015489 Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
10 May 89 pp 1, 17

[Text] Yesterday, a correspondent reported from the Foreign Ministry that last week, before U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle's visit to Thailand, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Daniel O' Donohue, acting on behalf of the U.S. Government, submitted a letter through the Foreign Ministry's Political Department to the Thai Government. In the letter, the United States accused Thailand of having been in collusion with and having supported Libya in the establishment of a chemical weapons plant on the grounds that Thailand allowed an estimated 1,000 Thai workers to work at the plant construction site. The U.S. letter also stated that in addition to supplying labor to carry out construction, Thailand had also sent equipment to Libya to support the production of chemical weapons.

A Foreign Ministry official disclosed that as a matter of fact, the U.S. Embassy had previously submitted a number of similar letters to the Thai Government, urging Thailand to withdraw Thai workers from the above-mentioned chemical weapons plant construction site because the United States planned to drop bombs on it. The United States wants to blow up the plant on the grounds that it would pose a serious danger for the United States and many other countries. However, the letter said that the United States would inform Thailand in advance of a specific date and time if it bombed the chemical plant so that Thai workers could be evacuated in time.

The correspondent went on to say that Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan had already been informed of the letter and the decision on what Thailand should do next would depend on government policy. It would be very difficult for the government to make a decision in this matter because Libya has reportedly expressed its stand that if Thailand wants to withdraw its workers from the plant, it would have to take back all Thai workers in Libya—totaling about 25,000—also.

Libya Threatens To Expel Workers

BK1105012589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
11 May 89 p 1

[Text] Libya has threatened to expel all 75,000 Thai workers if the Thai government tries to evacuate some 300 Thais working in an alleged chemical weapons factory south of the country's capital, Tripoli, a high-ranking government source said yesterday.

Government spokesman Suwit Yotmani told THE NATION that Prime minister Chatchai Chunhawan was very concerned about the 300 Thais at the chemical complex which faces possible US bombing.

The sources said the US government has repeatedly asked Thailand to evacuate the 300 Thai workers from the suspected chemical weapons complex at Al Rabitah, about 80 kms south of the Libyan capital. The United States has threatened to bomb the area but has promised it would inform Thailand before launching an attack.

The sources said Libya informed the Thai ambassador in Rome, Nitsai Wetchachiwa, recently that any attempt to evacuate the 300 Thai workers from what Tripoli claims to be a pharmaceutical plant would prompt Libya to retaliate by expelling all Thai workers in the country.

According to Libya the number of Thais working in the country is 75,000. The Thai Labour Department said last December the number was 25,000, though the sources now confirm the higher Libyan figure. Most of the workers were brought to the country by job agencies and not through the Labour Department.

Meanwhile, Lt Gen Charan Kunlawanit, an aide to Foreign Minister Sitthi, told THE NATION that the Foreign Ministry had warned the prime minister that the government should be as flexible as possible in dealing with the issue to guarantee the safety of all Thai workers and at the same time maintain its stand of not supporting violence and international terrorism.

But the sources doubted how flexible Thailand could be now that the issue has gained increased publicity.

It is estimated that Thais working in Libya send home about Bt [baht] 10 billion yearly.

It is also feared that the annual Bt100 billion worth of Thai exports to the Middle East might be affected if Bangkok takes steps to break the impasse.

Charan said the Foreign Ministry was counting on the guarantee from the US administration that it would inform Thailand and give sufficient time to evacuate Thai workers from the factory before any attack.

Suwit Yotmani said the prime minister will discuss the problem with Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila, National Security Council chief Suwit Sutthanukun and Interior Ministry soon.

Foreign Ministry Declines Comment

BK1105081589 Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
11 May 89 pp 1, 16

[Text] Reporting on progress in the issue concerning the U.S. Government's letter sent through the Thai Foreign Ministry to the Thai Government accusing Thailand of having supported Libya in the establishment of a chemical weapons plant at Al Rabitah by allowing a number of Thai workers to work at the plant construction site, and urging Thailand to withdraw all Thai workers from the site, our correspondent points out that high-ranking officials of the

Foreign Ministry have declined to comment on this development saying that it is too delicate a matter, the ministry is unable to deal with the issue itself, and a decision can only be made by the Thai Government.

However, the Foreign Ministry regards this issue as an important matter because the total number of Thai workers working in Libya is not some 25,000, as previously reported, but as many as 75,000 according to figures released by the Office of the Libyan People's Representatives. This has prompted Director General of International Organizations Department Kasit Phirom to send out letters inviting officials from various government agencies concerned, namely the Foreign Ministry, the Labor Department, and the National Security Council, to attend a meeting at the International Organizations Department at 1400 on 15 May. The meeting will focus on the issue of whether Thailand should withdraw Thai workers from the Libyan chemical weapons plant, what impact such a withdrawal would have, and whether a plan should be worked out for the evacuation of Thai workers. The meeting is aimed only at gathering information and mapping out tentative guidelines in resolving the problem. The information will be presented to officials at higher levels for a decision.

A high-ranking official of the Foreign Ministry disclosed that most of the Thai workers working at the construction site have already been moved out and only some 300 still remain to work in the production section of the plant. These remaining workers are the ones which United States is pressuring Thailand to pull out. Earlier, the United States was successful in pressuring West Germany to withdraw German chemists from the plant.

At approximately 1300 Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sittithi Sawetsila told reporters at the National Assembly that he has not yet received a report on plans to protest to the United States over the matter of the Libyan chemicals weapons plant.

Yesterday afternoon our reporter called the International Organizations Department, seeking an interview with the department director general about the 15 May meeting. However, the director general refused to answer the phone. He told his secretary to inform our reporter that there was not going to be such a meeting and that he did not want to comment on the issue for fear that it may create further confusion.

U.S. 'Pressure' Over Libyan CW Plant Criticized
BK1205072589 Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
12 May 89 p 2

["Window of the World" column by "a Thai Citizen":
"How Long Will the Threats Continue"]

[Text] Normally I am very careful about any criticism of the United States because the United States has been a valuable friend of Thailand and its people for centuries.

I used to see only the sincerity the American people showed toward the Thai people in return for the latter's sincerity toward them.

During this decade, however, some actions by the United States have raised doubts about my positive attitude toward the United States.

My negative attitude began when the United States hurt the Thai people's feelings during the Indochina War.

After its defeat, the Americans returned home to lick their wounds and left behind all kinds of problems for Thailand to solve.

The Thai people and the Thai Government have tried very hard to improve their economy. Now that we are beginning to make economic progress, our great friend the United States has started applying various forms of pressure on our country. All Thai people know this fact very well.

Today the U.S. Government is applying new pressure by trying to force Thailand to withdraw Thai construction workers from Libya.

If Thailand does not comply, it will send its planes to bomb the Libyan plant as it did to Libya earlier.

It would not care if Thai workers died.

The reason the United States has cited for intimidating Thai workers selling their labor in Libya is that Thailand is supporting Libya in the construction of a chemical weapons plant.

Damn it....!!

I apologize for the expletive—although I do not think it is strong enough.

Nearly 100,000 Thai workers are earning their living in Libya. This means they are the hope of their family members at home in Thailand who could number more than a million.

The United States cannot deny their intention to bully these poor Thai workers.

Even children can tell that the U.S. action is aimed at bullying innocent Thai workers selling their labor honestly.

The Thai construction workers are simply selling their labor; what Libya uses the completed site for—be it to manufacture chemical weapons or nuclear weapons—is Libya's business.

This is not a minor issue. I only hope that the Thai Government will not be as soft as wax and will stand up for the Thai workers who are selling their labor in Libya because they are not fortunate enough to be welcomed in the United States.

BULGARIA

Article Reviews NATO Missile Modernization *AU0205142689 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 29 Apr 89 p 4*

[Nencho Khranov article: "Talks Instead of Modernization"]

[Text] Recently the issue of modernizing the U.S. "Lance" short-range missiles, deployed in the FRG, acquired special political importance. The issue is directly related to the East-West dialogue, the Vienna talks on conventional weapons, and the opportunities for real disarmament and more security in Europe.

The proposal of the Warsaw Pact member countries to conduct separate talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe clearly outlined the alternative of the modernization plans, and emphasized the opportunity of the old continent to follow up the elimination of the medium- and shorter-range missiles with the elimination of another category of weapons—tactical ones.

A polarization within NATO itself has emerged on the eve of the Brussels summit, which will take place at the end of May. The problem is not simply confined to the consequences of modernization on the political and military-strategic spheres. The problem reflects the wandering about of the NATO strategists in everything related to the issues of disarmament and to working out their own concept of the future. Let me cite the opinion of the FRG daily the KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER, which noted: "NATO is losing ground in the competition for initiatives in the area of disarmament. No new missiles are needed, but rather an ability on the part of NATO to respond to the changes that are taking place in the East, with its own new thinking.... The NATO members must cooperate in replacing confrontation by a system of cooperation and global security."

Let us analyze the arguments of the main advocates of modernizing short-range nuclear missiles in the United States, UK, and NATO Headquarters. One of the main arguments is USSR superiority in that area. However, an obviously impure game is being played here with a view to deceiving the public. The "tactical nuclear weapons" concept is deliberately replaced with "shorter-range nuclear missiles." Tactical missiles, as has been pointed out by the most authoritative military experts such as Marshal Akhromeyev, are only one of the three components of the tactical "nuclear triad." The strike air force and nuclear artillery also belong to this category. NATO's intelligence centers and specialists know very well that while the Warsaw Pact has an advantage of about 1,500 tactical missiles, equality exists in artillery systems, and in the area of the strike air force NATO is 1.5 times superior to the Warsaw Pact. Generally, equality exists in the three components of the "triad"—each of the two alliances has a bit more than 10,000 units of weapons.

Why then is attention drawn to the fact that NATO has fewer nuclear tactical missiles? This is done in order to show that modernization, which will increase the range of these missiles 4 times, is necessary. Thus, an additional goal becomes clear, namely, to circumvent the INF Treaty. At the insistence of the United States this treaty applied to the USSR "Oka" missiles, known as the "SS-23," which have a range of 500 km. The modernized "Lance" missiles are supposed to have a range of 480 km. Where is the logic of this decision? The USSR missiles must be eliminated, while new U.S. missiles of the same range, and more modern ones at that, must be deployed in Europe? Obviously, the goal is to obtain combat nuclear superiority through a flank movement.

Sally Jacobson, AP commentator in Brussels, wrote in this context: "Some NATO countries are concerned that the modernization program could mean the development of a new category of nuclear weapons with a much longer range. They are concerned that this development would create the impression that the allies are trying to circumvent the INF Treaty."

The other argument that is noisily used is that the USSR has already modernized its tactical missiles. What is the truth? The USSR has two types of such missiles—the first produced in 1965 with a range of 300 km, and the other, produced in 1975 with a range of 70-100 km. According to responsible Soviet military circles nothing has been done to modernize the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons since 1 January 1987 or is being done.

However, what is the situation in NATO? Practically the entire arsenal of NATO's aircraft has been renewed in recent years, with the introduction of the "F-16" and "Tornado" modern fighter-bombers. In addition the replacement of the old type nuclear shells for the 203.2 mm howitzers with new ones has been completed.

The third argument that NATO circles frequently invoke is that the modernization will check the Soviet superiority in the area of conventional weapons. Let us ignore the speculative approach toward this "superiority." They are talking about a modernization which is expected to end in 1995. At the same time the Vienna talks, which began in March, aim to decrease military confrontation and sharply decrease the armed forces and weapons within the shortest possible time. The Warsaw Pact member countries have a comprehensive program on achieving this goal and are ready to contribute to its implementation. The significant reductions of armed forces and weapons announced by the USSR and other European socialist countries are proof of this good will. Their defensive military doctrine clearly shows that the NATO concept on nuclear containment is obsolete and that it does not correspond to the modern political realities in Europe and the world.

The logical question emerges of who is afraid of future talks on tactical nuclear weapons, and why? Isn't it precisely the calm and businesslike atmosphere at the

talks, and the process of listening to and studying different positions that could clear the road toward removing the imbalances and comprehensively resolving the issue of tactical strike weapons, by gradually eliminating them? This is how the British daily *THE INDEPENDENT* explains this issue: "If the West agrees to the talks, the USSR will do the same thing it did at the INF talks, namely, will strive to totally eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, and under the pressure of the world public opinion it would be difficult to reject the 'third zero.'"

Who will lose by the removal of nuclear weapons from Europe?

Indeed, we can explain the differences on this issue by the polarization in the NATO member countries and public opinion in these countries on the issue of modernizing the "Lance" missiles. Western observers maintain that nine countries have serious objections. The citizens of the West European countries clearly understand that "modernization," which in practice means the creation of new and most modern systems of tactical nuclear weapons and their subsequent deployment in Europe, will prompt a new stage of the nuclear arms race and will not only diminish the effect of the INF Treaty, but will also create a new nuclear threat.

Now, when the new political thinking is producing real results, and when possibilities are revealed for nuclear and conventional disarmament and for resolving disputed international problems by political means, there is no need to produce and deploy new systems of nuclear weapons. The lesson of everything positive that has been achieved in East-West relations clearly shows that talks are needed for radically reducing the tactical nuclear weapons of the two military-political alliances. These weapons are a part of the huge nuclear arsenal that must be reduced now, also by using the asymmetrical approach. As long as the talks on the reductions continue, one must not increase or modernize either tactical missiles or air force nuclear tactical means or nuclear artillery. This position of the USSR is also the position of its allies.

The great concentration of tactical nuclear weapons, especially in central Europe and on the southern flank, along the line of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is a serious threat for the stability of all European peoples. The initiatives on creating a zone of reduced weapons and increased confidence, and nuclear-free zones in central Europe, the Balkans, and other regions, from which all nuclear weapons will be withdrawn, have great political importance. The great goal—peace, security, and confidence on our continent—requires a lower level of military potential and confrontation. The talks and the elimination of the tactical nuclear weapons that they could produce are one stage toward this goal.

Soviet, U.S., Bulgarian Envoys to Vienna CFE/CSBM Talks Interviewed

AU1205093189

[Editorial Report] Sofia Domestic Service (Khristo Botev station) in Bulgarian from 0600 to 0800 GMT on 12 May devotes its daily "Good Day" program to the subject "Small States in Big Politics." The program is simultaneously broadcast from studios in Vienna and Sofia and largely deals with Bulgarian-Austrian relations and the role of small states in international relations. Reception is extremely poor and the program is partially unmonitorable.

A 20-minute segment of the program is devoted to the progress at the Vienna disarmament talks and contains 3-minute reports on a recorded 3-minute interview with "General V.M. Tatarnikov, leader of the USSR delegation to the Vienna talks, and Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, leader of the U.S. delegation to the talks," and a 3-minute live interview in the Vienna studio with Ambassador Lyuben Petrov, leader of the Bulgarian delegation to the talks.

At 0657 GMT a recorded interview with Gen V. Tatarnikov on progress at the Vienna talks is carried. The general speaks in Russian but after a few words the recording fades into a summary of the interview, read in Bulgarian by the announcer. According to the report, Tatarnikov outlines the differences between the positions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO at the disarmament talks and describes the Vienna talks as "unprecedented and completely different from past talks on disarmament in central Europe." "Despite the initial differences, the representatives of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact make no secret of their intention to attain success at the talks." The Soviet general later stresses the differences on one of the initial issues: "the contents of the initial agreement. As you know, the NATO member states propose to start disarming in three classes of weapons: tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers—and everyone knows that the Warsaw Pact has an advantage in these kinds of weapons." The announcer says that the Soviet general also discussed the "nature of offensive strike weapons" and other issues discussed at the talks.

At 0659 GMT the reporter in the Vienna studio announces an interview with Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, "leader of the U.S. delegation to the Vienna talks." After a few words in English the voice of the ambassador fades into a summarized 2-minute report in Bulgarian on the interview, read by the announcer. At this point reception is virtually unmonitorable. The announcer says that the U.S. diplomat stressed the importance of beginning disarmament in the areas of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. "Afterwards the leader of the U.S. delegation expressed satisfaction with the new Soviet proposal, described it as encouraging, and said that the West expects specific steps leading to cuts in (?military) zones." The talks that have been held so far "give grounds to expect positive

developments," with the correct way, according to him, being "step by step, without any haste." Ambassador Ledogar is said to have pointed out the "importance of the talks in the working groups" and to have described the atmosphere at the talks as "businesslike, with all conditions for positive developments being present. This is a very encouraging fact."

At 0702 GMT a live interview with Ambassador Lyuben Petrov, "head of the Bulgarian delegation to the Vienna meeting," in the Vienna studio, begins. He discusses the progress at the talks and points out that "it is necessary to reach at least some agreements by the end of the year" and thereby establish a basis for achieving further agreement. He positively assesses Austria's contribution to the all-European process. The reporter in the Sofia studio says that "many listeners have questions for the ambassador." Petrov briefly answers a question on the importance of disarmament, after which he says that "his time is short, because he must take part in a meeting today." He then leaves the studio at 0705 GMT.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Delegation Head Vajnar Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference

LD2704164189 Prague CTK in English
1404 GMT 27 Apr 89

["Spring Session of Conference on Disarmament Ends"—CTK headline]

[Text] Geneva April 27 (CTK)—Head of a Czechoslovak delegation to the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament Vratislav Vajnar appreciated here today, reviewing the results achieved in the past three months, an ever increasing support for the Czechoslovak draft mandate which should direct the work of a committee for a nuclear test ban.

Vratislav Vajnar called on participants to promote talks on averting the arms race in outer space, and appreciated the efforts in preparing a convention on a ban and liquidation of chemical weapons. He stressed Czechoslovakia's readiness to take part in an international experiment of control of the chemical industry, and at the same time stated that no progress was made at the session in many key problems of the prepared convention on a total ban and liquidation of chemical weapons.

Interdepartmental Meeting on Implications of Chemical Weapons Ban

AU0505153489 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
4 May 89 p 2

[CTK report: "Consultative Meeting on the Chemical Weapons Convention"]

[Text] Prague—An interdepartmental consultative meeting concerning the convention on the general and complete ban on the development, production, storage, and

use of chemical weapons and on the liquidation of their stockpiles was held at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Wednesday [3 May]. It was attended by representatives of all interested sectors in the CSSR that will be affected by the convention once it goes into force.

The participants in the consultative meeting discussed the state of preparations of the draft text of the convention at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in conjunction with the Czechoslovak Government statement of 5 January this year on the issue of a ban on and liquidation of chemical weapons. They discussed the further course of action by the respective bodies and organizations with a view toward implementing the government statement in all its points and ensuring the CSSR's timely preparation for the conditions of the convention's verification mechanism. The convention provides for strict international inspection and for data exchange on a permanent international basis, which will completely rule out the possibility of the appropriate substances being misused.

As is known, the CSSR does not possess, produce, or store chemical weapons on its territory. However, it fully supports and actively contributes toward an early completion of the draft text of the convention, which will be important for our national economy, making it possible to use toxic substances for peaceful purposes in the civilian industries, agriculture, in research work, health services, and other branches.

'Difficult' Transition to Civilian Production

AU0305145589 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech
28 Apr 89 p 2

["lh"-signed article: "Swords Are Being Turned Into Plowshares"]

[Excerpt] The gradual reduction of engineering production was what caught our particular attention regarding the revision of the state implementation plan on prices that took effect 1 January and which the federal government discussed yesterday [27 April]. At a news conference held yesterday, journalists were informed that engineering production is being reduced in particular in connection with the changes in its organization and structure, and in harmony with our reducing the costs of arms production. Exports to the socialist states, especially the Soviet Union, and to developing countries that are unable to pay, are being reduced. Compared with the original projections of the 5-year plan, engineering and electrotechnical production that especially constitutes military production is being reduced by more than Kcs11 billion. This trend is accompanied by negative phenomena. Because the transition to civilian production takes a long time and is difficult, both the production dynamism of those branches and the increment of the national income will be lower. The transition is also having a serious social impact, for thousands of workers will have to be retrained for different occupations, in

quite a few cases the replacement work will pay less, and so on. The government has set up a Kcs700 million fund to overcome these difficulties. [passage omitted]

'Organizational' Changes Planned for Army
LD0305132589 Prague CTK in English
1332 GMT 3 May 89

[Text] Prague May (CTK)—Although Czechoslovakia will not reduce the absolute number of troops in the forthcoming few months, organizational changes will considerably affect the structure of the Czechoslovak People's Army, which has approximately 200,000 members at present.

The organizational changes will be made with regard to the fact that the Army must continuously ensure reliable defence of the country in an internationalist alliance with the Soviet Army and other Warsaw Treaty armies.

Seventeen garrisons will have newly set-up building organizations, which will fulfil exclusively government tasks in modernization of housing facilities and spas, in the realization of ecological projects, health facilities and others. Two garrisons will set [up] new railway organizations. Moreover, it is necessary to create a new mobilization system. As the number of reservists called out for exercises will be reduced, their more exacting and more effective training must be ensured.

The reorganization will concern a total of about 30,000 troops and civilian workers of the military administration. It includes redeployment of 4,000 officers to new garrisons. A certain number of career officers will have to obtain a new qualification.

Great attention will be paid to introduction of technical means and weapon systems of defensive character, mainly anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, engineering and other equipment. The planned limitation of sums earmarked for the defence is already reflected in lower orders to some plants.

The organizational changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army will be implemented in the years 1989-1990.

Army Officers Meet With FRG Peace Groups
AU0305105289 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
2 May 89 p 6

[CTK report in the "24 Hours Abroad" column]

[Text] A delegation of the Czechoslovak Peace Committee, which is made up of officers of the Czechoslovak People's Army, has been visiting the FRG since Saturday [29 April]. The members of the delegation are holding talks with representatives of the Darmstadt Signal work circle and other peace and social organizations. The Darmstadt Signal is an informal association of officers, soldiers, and civilian employees of the Bundeswehr. It

was founded in 1963, and its members are striving for a policy of the relaxation of tension, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and a defensive strategy for the Bundeswehr.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Genscher, Stoltenberg Visit to U.S. Viewed
AU0205134189 East Berlin DER MORGEN in German
27 Apr 89 p 2

[W. Gieseemann commentary: "On the Return of Ministers"]

[Text] It is said that when Bonn's Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Gerhard Stoltenberg left Washington after talks with their counterparts James Baker and Richard Cheney, they had been snubbed. They returned to Bonn, but they returned without the result of their trip that had been expected at home.

The two men went to the United States as personages who are doubtlessly West European politicians pursuing realpolitik. They know that a campaign for the 1990 Bundestag elections with nuclear ambitions could only lead to the total fiasco of the current coalition. They know that the majority of the FRG citizens who are eligible to vote do no longer believe in a threat from the West and thus in the need for an expensive concept of deterrence. Thus, they wanted to win their American partners in the talk over to the idea of making a decision on short-range nuclear weapons only in 1992.

However, obviously the Americans—or let us say, the Washington administration—do not see the issue of murderous short-range nuclear weapons as a reason to discuss elimination, postponement, or substantive reductions. Not even in the talks with the strong West European partners from the FRG "greater flexibility" was brought about "on the rigid fronts concerning the issue of new short-range nuclear missiles" (according to ASSOCIATED PRESS). The United States refuses to negotiate on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles and urges for a modernization of the Lance missiles that are deployed in the FRG.

An observer of the current situation can only draw the shocking conclusion: In Washington's view, negotiations on a third zero-option are unacceptable for Western Europe.

Who returns with such a message from Washington is probably uncertain if not even fearful. Apart from the opposition, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, which is clearly supporting the third zero-option, there are also important forces in the ranks of the coalition of the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union, and the Free Democratic Party who demand a complete renunciation by the FRG of short-range

nuclear missiles (for instance, Juergen Moellemann, FRG minister and chairman of the North Rhine-Westphalian Free Democratic Party).

Genscher hopes for a continuation of the talks with the United States and an agreement before the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May. Well—agreement about what, about the basic principles? Compromises concerning procedures do not solve the problem!

Another idea in this connection: There have been and are some former U.S. secretaries of state and defense who, looking back on their terms of office, express self-critical ideas that show realism and reason. One perceives a certain feeling of responsibility toward the course of events and a slight uneasiness about missed opportunities.

It would be too wonderful if those currently in office in the State Department or the Pentagon also were to be hit by such insights and feelings. However, obviously James Baker and Richard Cheney are under the obsession to prove their right to existence and ability to function with deterring gestures and semi-covert readiness for attack. It is a pity that they thus give up the opportunity to promote an election promise made by their President Bush. He said that he wants to be loyal to the principle of continuity in the constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union, which was announced by Reagan during the last stage of his term of office. These principles of dialogue also included the statement: One of the most important tasks is the elimination of nuclear weapons!

Defense Minister Kessler's Speech to Christian Military Policy Forum

AU0305131889 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German
29 Apr 89 p 3

["Statements by Army General Heinz Kessler at the Peace and Defense Policy Conference of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany" in Berlin on 26 April: "Peace Has To Be Achieved and Protected Every Day Anew Through the Work of All Citizens"]

[Text] First of all, I would once again like to express my thanks for the invitation and the friendly reception to this roundtable talk. It reflects our need to discuss the current conditions and requirements of the military protection of peace and socialism, and this is good. "Military service in socialism: What is its purpose, what is its use since in East and West the insight seems to gain ground that wars can no longer be won and deterrence—whatever one understands by this—is no safe guarantee of peace in the long run?" You are probably often faced with such questions, which today concern many people, many citizens of our country, not only Christians.

The basic idea, from which we should always proceed in answering this question, is the following: Our country, our state, our society, with its positive and negative

sides, with its indisputable successes and with some problems that have not yet been solved or not been solved in the best way, is not alone in the world.

At first glance, this seems to be a truism. However, if one thinks about how abstractly the question of "military service—yes or no" is sometimes asked, the conclusion suggests itself that the objective conditions of our external security, the dangers to peace and progress, which we have to face whether we want to or not, are not always duly taken into account by everyone.

Trend Toward Disarmament—and Countertrend

Therefore, dear friends, permit me to briefly outline a few aspects of the military political situation, which, I think, we have to take into account.

As Erich Honecker has repeatedly stressed over the past few months, we still have to proceed from two basic trends when assessing the condition of our external situation: from the trend—which is gaining ground—toward detente in international relations, toward disarmament and peaceful cooperation, and from the opposite trend, the increasing resistance of those reactionary and militaristic forces whose plans do not include disarmament, who currently do not think of giving up their anticommunist goals, their claims to being a superpower, and their plans for hegemony. Concerning the first trend, you know about the progress achieved in the field of disarmament and confidence-building since the conclusion of the INF Treaty. The latest characteristic step in this direction was the start of negotiations on conventional disarmament and the negotiations on military confidence-building in Vienna. I would like to expressly stress that the decisive stimuli for these and other positive steps came and come from the Soviet Union and from other socialist states, not least from the activities and initiatives of our GDR.

Our main concern is not to permit a halt to the process of disarmament and detente which has gotten off the ground, but to accelerate its dynamism even more. The unilateral disarmament steps announced during the last few months and in the meantime already introduced show especially how serious the Warsaw Pact states are in this. After all, they involve scales of more than half a million soldiers, hundreds of thousands of weapons—including modern tanks and combat aircraft—and they involve reducing the defense expenditure of the Warsaw Pact states by an average of 10 to 15 percent by the end of next year, that is, by the end of 1990. All this is happening in our country without waiting for a new disarmament agreement.

In contrast to this, the behavior of most governments of the NATO member states concerning this basic issue of the future development of mankind remains contradictory. Eloquent support for peace and disarmament is opposed by efforts to push ahead their own armament in certain key areas and to produce ever more sophisticated means of destruction.

Obviously, this contradictory behavior is determined by the contradictory interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie. Certain forces of the rulers in the NATO countries are certainly aware of the danger of unlimited progress in the arms race. Therefore they want to control the course of events and protect themselves against a dangerous destabilization of the military political situation and also against the eruption of a conflict, which is not desired at the moment. Therefore, these circles make their governments enter negotiations and conclude agreements with the socialist countries on more mutual security and also on arms control and arms limitation in fields where the advance of the arms race seems to be unfavorable and risky.

There are also economic reasons for this. Today the economy of even the richest and scientific-technologically and industrially strongest NATO states is overtaxed by an unlimited arms buildup. This is proved in a particularly drastic way by the high U.S. budget deficit. Furthermore, solving such serious problems as the destruction of the environment or the sinking into increasing poverty of the developing countries is being blocked.

At the same time, however, the arms business continues to be a powerful attraction for the military-industrial complex, and even for enterprises and companies that make only part of their profit on the arms market. Expecting secure maximum profits, the corresponding forces again and again urge the governments of the NATO states to stick to the plans for the modernization of weapons and other technical means of combat, which have been worked out by the military and would be lucrative for the arms companies, and to further increase expenditure for armament despite the critical situation of the overall budget.

At present this is demonstrated in a particularly striking way by the plans to develop and construct new generations of nuclear carriers and other weapons systems under the seemingly harmless slogan of modernization. Thus, we have to keep a close watch on the contradictory, often mutually interlacing sides in the behavior of the rulers of the NATO countries. This was already pointed out by Lenin. On the one hand, there is the urge on the part of these forces to make as much profit as possible, on the other, there is the compulsion to preserve the system of capitalist profiteering, to adjust it to changing conditions. On the one hand, there is the urge to fight socialism, to weaken it, and to destroy it wherever and however possible; and on the other, there is the compulsion to coexist with this real socialism because of the international balance of power—not least the military balance of power—and to develop economic and political relations with the socialist countries.

It Is Necessary To Remain Vigilant in the Future, Too

Any further progress in reducing tensions, in eliminating conflicts, and in disarmament negotiations, thus requires us to do hard, patient, and steady work in the future, too.

This requires the mobilization of the people of all strata and classes, all ideologies, and all denominations in the world and presupposes—this is my deep conviction—a strong, reliably protected socialism. To the extent that such unilateral disarmament steps of the socialist states are therefore important and effective, just as purposefully we will make use of the new negotiations that have started in Vienna to come closer to a world with fewer weapons and more security—we have to remain vigilant and maintain our readiness for defense to the necessary degree.

The latest military political and military strategic guidelines of the NATO states give every reason for this. One can summarize NATO's line in one sentence: Armament continues to rank before disarmament. This is shown by all the recent official NATO announcements.

First: NATO sticks to the so-called dual concept of armament and negotiations, that is, to the intention of holding negotiations with socialist countries only from the basis of military strength. It is already becoming visible that this orientation will also form the basic idea of the overall NATO concept on security, arms control, and disarmament, which is, as is known, to be decided at the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May.

Second, the principle of so-called nuclear deterrence was reaffirmed—or more precisely, the principle of threatening with nuclear weapons to implement political goals. NATO and its strongest member countries—also the FRG, which does not have any nuclear weapons itself, but does possess nuclear carriers—consider nuclear weapons basically indispensable.

Today much is being said about the “danger of the denuclearization of Europe.” There arises the question of what is bad about the denuclearization of Europe. I think that no one who is sincere and serious about peace—regardless of his ideology or his position—can call the denuclearization of Europe a misfortune for the peoples of Europe.

Up to the last few days there have been fierce arguments in the FRG about the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons of NATO in Western Europe. The differences of opinion about this continue—even within the government coalition. Thanks to the struggle of the socialist states for disarmament and detente and thanks to the worldwide efforts of the peace forces of all ideologies, all denominations, and all strata, a great process of differentiation is also taking place in the FRG. Certain ruling FRG forces cannot neglect the desire and will of the people for peace and disarmament. In their formula of compromise they are trying to take this wish of millions of people into account. Now the following question arises and has to be further discussed: What is the use for us, that is, for the people in both German states and all over Europe, if agreement is reached on the formula to postpone the deployment of these tactical nuclear missiles—when at the same time no position is

taken against the production of these new nuclear weapons in America? I would like to have a sensible person explain to me logically why these missiles are being developed in America—as is known they involve ranges below the limit set by the INF Treaty, that is 480 or 470 km. What does America want to shoot at with these missiles?

Any logically thinking person must say: These are missiles that are ultimately destined to be deployed in Western Europe, in the FRG. Thus, on the one hand, we democrats, we who are for peace and struggle for peace, have to show how the peace forces have been able to force compromises; however, on the other hand we also have to show how aggressive NATO circles are trying to mislead the people.

Third, the military strategic concept of NATO, which was adopted in 1967-68, remains valid. This strategy of so-called flexible response and forward defense is passed off as defensive, but in reality it is an offensive strategy, a strategy of preventive strikes and attack. For instance, the NATO staffs conceive of the preparation and carrying out of surprise attacks with nuclear weapons or with non-nuclear precision weapons against important targets all over the territories of the Warsaw Pact states.

Furthermore, the leading military and political organs of NATO continuously call for an improvement of the potential of operational action by the NATO forces. Only recently NATO Secretary General Woerner stated that for NATO a renunciation of flexible response and forward defense and a renunciation of short-range nuclear weapons is out of the question under any conditions and at any time. The U.S. secretary of defense supplemented these statements, so to speak, by saying that he does not want to bear the responsibility in the eyes of the world for finally achieving another zero option.

Now I ask from the viewpoint of a simple person, no matter where he lives: What is it the U.S. defense secretary does not like about a third zero-option? Who would not be happy if we had reached a stage when there are no nuclear weapons on earth any more? These people, on the other hand, say that they are afraid that negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons would lead to a zero option! In this case, fear is facing fear. Our fear—and this is justified, moral fear—is the fear of these nuclear weapons. They, however, are afraid that the nuclear weapons will be eliminated! This is precisely what distinguishes the basic positions of the people who want to be left in peace, who want to have peace, no matter whether they are Christians, Communists, Jewish citizens, or people of another ideology, from the positions of the few who think that they can dictate their will to others with short-range nuclear weapons. All this is taking place in connection with a shrewd, sophisticated, demagogical, and intensifying baiting against the GDR. No matter what we do, what we achieve—it is dragged through the mud, even though these people would have

enough reason to mind their own business. This is also linked with provocative interference in the internal affairs of our country and of other socialist states, with interference in the internal affairs of even their own allies, and with interference in the affairs of the Third World countries.

We must not overlook the fact that in the FRG the dark forces of Nazism and fascism are rearing their heads again in connection with this striving. They have even started to enter the parliaments of West European states. We saw this in West Berlin, and we saw this in Hessen. The mass media have just reported that in Bavaria these fascist groups are calling for the removal of the memorial sites in the former Dachau concentration camp. This is an outrage. They want to prevent young people from drawing consequences from visiting such memorial sites and developing their moral and political activities so that something like this will never again happen on German soil.

We must take this very seriously. So far these forces have restrained themselves. Now, however, they consider the time ripe for rearing their heads. Therefore, these developments have to be nipped in the bud. We must say this also to those who think that they have to teach us democracy and we must show them what is happening under their eyes.

Principles of the Warsaw Pact

As all the meetings and measures since the adoption of the document on our military doctrine have shown, our Warsaw Pact defense alliance unanimously agrees on the following principles:

1. The Warsaw Pact states will develop the defensive character of their armed forces even more clearly, restructure them accordingly, and will thus show how word and deed correspond. However, they will continue to maintain all forces, means, and possibilities necessary to react and neutralize the certainly existing ability to attack of the NATO Armed Forces.
2. Each reduction in numbers of the forces and means in the field of defense increases the demands in respect of quality made on the staffs and troops, the demands in respect of their combat strength, and their ability to use the available means and resources in all fields of national defense as efficiently as possible.

Will for Balance at Lower Level

The USSR, the GDR, and all Warsaw Pact states have committed themselves to not starting any war, neither a nuclear nor a conventional war, and to protecting our peoples and states against any kind of imperialist aggression. Therefore, we are also striving for a state of military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at an ever lower level by means of arms limitation and disarmament. It is our standpoint that each side should have

only those military forces and means that are sufficient to ensure its own defense, but that are, on the other hand, insufficient to execute a surprise attack and comprehensive offensive operations.

The GDR military doctrine is based on these common principles, as are the doctrines of the other fraternal states. There are also those stipulations and tasks for the GDR's national defense and every individual sector which result from our position in Europe and our specific responsibility in the coalition.

At present it is not as if war were imminent in Europe. We are all happy about this, in particular since the peace-loving peoples and the states of the socialist community have contributed quite a lot to this. However, for this to remain so, to make peace increasingly secure, to make sure that an aggressor would be repelled at any time and everywhere at our borders if he crosses them, national defense has to continue to work excellently, and in particular the Army and the border troops must have a high level of defense readiness.

Our justified view that a war between NATO and the Warsaw defense coalition cannot be won by either side, must not be taken as a guarantee against the unleashing of such a war by NATO. It is not the case that this makes the machinations of the forces in the NATO bloc who are interested in expanding their power and the development of ever more sophisticated weapons systems there no longer important. The NATO staffs are still planning scenarios for military conflicts with the Warsaw Pact. They are still practicing in large-scale command, staff, and troop exercises every detail of all phases of escalation of a military conflict, from a political crisis to the beginning of military combat to the limited use of means of mass destruction. Consequently, our side has to ensure a degree of combat strength and combat readiness at all times that is sufficient to ensure successful resistance under all conditions of a conceivable aggression, that is, to ensure that the aggressor will be denied success.

Christian Democratic Union of Germany [CDU] Commitment to National Defense

Already before the national Armed Forces were established, the CDU, dear friends, declared its commitment to national defense with the words of then CDU Chairman Otto Nuschke.

"These national Armed Forces," Otto Nuschke said in 1952, and this has proved true word for word, "are used to defend the peace and the independence of our homeland, for nothing else, not for any attack, not for joining any campaigns of conquest. They will be trained in the spirit of friendship among peoples and in respect for the freedom and independence of other peoples. This is the character of these Armed Forces." These were the words of Otto Nuschke, a well-known, exemplary, outstanding, and experienced democrat.

At the military political conference of the CDU Main Executive Committee in Burgscheidungen in March 1981, I had the honor of delivering the main lecture. At that time your chairman Gerald Goetting stated: "From decades of struggle for peace we Christian Democrats have gained the experience that peace has to be achieved anew every day and has to be consolidated in the conflict with its imperialist opponents. The protection of peace is not only the task of the Armed Forces—it is the task of every citizen, it is the task of all of us." "The best education for peace is—in our view—the education for deeds for peace. Deeds for peace, however, mean under our conditions deeds for strengthening socialism, because a further increase in the strength of socialism is the best and safest guarantee for a lasting peace."

These clear and guiding ideas were affirmed and delivered at other conferences and particularly at the 16th CDU Congress in Dresden in October 1987; they form the guideline of the actions of thousands of CDU members. The state and army leadership highly values their contribution. It has also made concessions to citizens of the republic with religious convictions—no matter which religious community they belong to—who want to avoid service under arms. Of course, the state and society cannot exempt anyone completely from doing his constitutional duty.

The use in the national economy of construction soldiers and construction pioneers as well as the temporary use of soldiers liable to military service from other branches of service and special troops—as well as the reduction of the Armed Forces by 10,000 men and the reduction of the defense expenditure by 10 percent—will contribute to the successful continuation of the unity of economic and social policy and thus to the economic and political strengthening of the GDR. All these steps taken by our Republic and its allies will also encourage—at least we hope so—the peace forces in the NATO states, and in particular in the FRG, to make their governments imitate such praiseworthy actions, such concrete steps on the path toward arms limitation and disarmament in a nuclear-free world and, in general, a future without wars and the danger of war.

NATO Urged To Follow Warsaw Pact Initiatives *AU0305101889 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 29-30 Apr 89 p 2*

["W.M." editorial: "Deeds Must Be Followed by Deeds"]

[Text] The GDR is acting for peace. It is doing everything to promote the process of disarmament. Yesterday we started to implement the decision made by the National Defense Country on reducing the National People's Army, unilaterally and independent of negotiations, by 10,000 men, 600 tanks, and 50 airplanes by 1990. On the eve of 1 May the first conscripts were released into reserve. In addition, as Erich Honecker

announced, in the future 11,500 army members, after a short period of military training, will work for 15 months of their active military service in key sectors of the national economy.

Our goodwill steps meet with great attention at the international level and are assessed as an expression of the readiness to help to reduce military confrontation in the heart of Europe through our own specific contributions. The GDR is taking seriously what it announced, Lower Saxony's Minister President Ernst Albrecht, who recently visited our republic, said to journalists. The GDR shows that it is ready to do its share on the path of disarmament.

And the other side? It is truly time for it to follow our deeds with its own. Albrecht said that NATO now has to take the initiative. One can only agree with this statement.

It is necessary to continue the disarmament process, which started with the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, without a break and to extend it to other areas. However, this is opposed by the U.S. attempt to stop disarmament with new nuclear missiles on FRG soil, which have a range of almost 500 km, and to start a new arms race. Therefore, renouncing the modernization of missiles and being ready for negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons now is the key issue.

As long as news about ever new projects for an arms buildup come from the West and NATO does not show whether it, too, is capable of and ready for goodwill and corresponding deeds, we have to remain vigilant and ready for defense. The safety of socialism and its achievements must not be endangered in any way. It will be reliably ensured under any conditions. Like our advance moves for a comprehensive mutual reduction of military confrontation in the heart of Europe, this is part of our historical obligation to make sure that war will never again start from German soil.

Commentary Sees 'Tactical Maneuver' over SNT Talks

AU0505180589 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 3 May 89 p 4

[Bo Adam article: "Hectic Weeks Within NATO. The New Quarrel Over Nuclear Weapons—a Tactical Maneuver or an Expression of Profound Conflicts of Interest?"]

[Text] FRG citizens hardly agree more on an issue than they do on the dubiousness of nuclear armament. Nine out of 10 voters want negotiations instead of missiles. This issue does not directly have anything to do with local or EC elections. However, that did not prevent Chancellor Kohl in a difficult situation—2 days prior to land Diet elections in Hamburg and the Rhineland Palatinate (!) in 1987—from suddenly demanding the third zero-solution for nuclear weapons, very much to

the surprise of his foreign minister. Following the election defeat, the chancellor's official statement was quickly dropped and was never mentioned again. Now the Bonn Government does not intend to negotiate on a zero-solution either; it only wants to negotiate on a reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.

Yet the current NATO quarrel cannot be reduced to such showpieces of bourgeois understanding of democracy. Essentially, the differences are about how the Western alliance should respond to the socialist states' disarmament proposals, because these are supported by the majority of the people in practically all the NATO members. The discussion on short-range nuclear weapons has developed a dynamism of its own which makes it a test case for the alliance's basic capability to ensure peace. Nobody can make it convincingly clear to the West European (and, by the way, also East European) citizens why NATO continues to arm after the INF Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles has initiated nuclear disarmament, after the Warsaw Pact has unilaterally started to reduce its conventional armament, and after negotiations are now being held in Vienna on further reductions to achieve both sides' inability to attack.

To understand what is inexplicable we must know that so far the responsible people in Brussels, Washington, and elsewhere have not revised their war scenarios—neither the concept of "forward defense," nor the "in-depth attack" on enemy territory, nor the principle of the nuclear first strike. Here, short-range nuclear weapons play a decisive role. During the recent Wintex-Cimex maneuvers in the FRG the use of these weapons was "rehearsed" once again—on the seventh and last day of the last war in Europe. NATO circles call this a "nuclear warning shot."

Warsaw Pact Ready for Talks

Those who stick to such theoretical models cannot want to remove the tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Accordingly, those countries in the Atlantic alliance which hope to escape in the event of war are opposed to the affected countries on the continent. In these latter countries a growing number of responsible politicians see in the Warsaw Pact's readiness for negotiations an opportunity to get out of the home-made dilemma of assured nuclear self-destruction.

Is a compromise at all possible between these two positions? A dubious compromise is! An example in this respect would be the notorious NATO two-track decision which made deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles a prerequisite for talks. This time a linkage could be established between the deployment of new missiles and progress in the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament—and then it would be up to the disarmament opponents within NATO to prevent such progress.

A real breakthrough would only come about if NATO were to be ready to thoroughly reconsider its overall strategy. However, several weeks prior to the Brussels summit there are no indications that it is.

Kessler, Lushev Expect NATO Response to Warsaw Pact Initiatives

LD0305145889 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1425 GMT 3 May 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—During a meeting in Berlin today Army Generals Heinz Kessler and Petr Lushev expressed their expectation that NATO will answer the unilateral prior concessions made by the states of the Warsaw Pact as well as their offer of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons with constructive measures.

Heinz Kessler, GDR minister of defense and member of the Central Committee Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the combined forces of the participating states of the Warsaw Pact described the unilateral disarmament initiatives of the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the other socialist states as well as the offer of negotiations—made by the committee of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states during their most recent session in Berlin—for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons as significant steps for the implementation of the joint peace strategy.

The talks also focused on the creative implementation of the joint military doctrine and its strictly defensive character. It is a question of guaranteeing a level of combat strength and combat readiness that will ensure the defense capability of the socialist community of states, the two sides stressed.

Petr Lushev and the chief of staff of the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact member states arrived in the GDR today. During their visit to the GDR, which will last for several days, the Soviet guests will visit units and installations of the component forces of the National People's Army.

Further Reportage on Withdrawal of Soviet Forces

GSFG Chief of Staff Briefs Press

LD0505124789 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1207 GMT 5 May 89

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—Lieutenant General Valeriy Fursin, first deputy commander in chief and chief of staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, briefed the press in Jueterbog, Potsdam area, today on the forthcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops and arms from the GDR. He gave domestic and foreign journalists details of the preparations of the troop units scheduled to return home. The 25th Tank Division, the 32d Tank Division, two independent tank training regiments, and eight independent battalions will be withdrawn from the GDR in 1989.

Further Report

LD0505151889 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1339 GMT 5 May 89

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—The return of the 32d Soviet Tank Division, stationed in Jueterbog (Potsdam area), to the USSR is imminent. A total of 180 journalists from 25 countries and Berlin (West) were briefed on this today in the 288th Tank Regiment of that division.

At the regiment's club Lieutenant General Valeriy Fursin, first deputy commander in chief and chief of staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), explained details of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and arms from the GDR. Much has already been carried out. Rail transportation has been arranged and containers and cars ordered. The return of individual units and hardware to the USSR has already begun over the past few weeks. So far more than 1,000 tanks and an independent airborne battalion have been withdrawn. A part of the GSFG installations is now being prepared for handing over to the GDR.

The withdrawal of the 25th and 32d Tank Divisions, of two independent tank training regiments, as well as eight independent battalions is to take place by August. It is planned to complete all the GSFG reduction measures by the end of 1990.

At the same time this means giving the remaining units and troop formations a markedly defensive character. For example, in the mechanized infantry divisions, the tank regiments have been detached and the number of tanks reduced by 40 percent. Individual tank regiments are to be reformed into mechanized infantry regiments. In the restructured divisions the resources of the anti-tank and antiaircraft, defensive installations, and pioneer equipment are to be increased for that purpose. They are to be allocated exclusively for the solution of future defense tasks.

All these steps for the implementation of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine show the determination of the USSR and its allies to make a real contribution to the strengthening of world peace, Lt Gen Fursin underlined. At the same time everything is being done to maintain combat readiness at the required level for the protection of socialist achievements.

Lt Gen Fursin thanked the GDR party and state leadership for its great practical help in fulfilling these tasks.

Following this information the journalists had the opportunity of briefing themselves about the unit's history and the tank soldiers' preparations for returning to the USSR. On the training ground they watched tank crews preparing their combat vehicles for transportation. They saw T-64 tanks, which are among the most modern in the Soviet Army due to their heavy arming and armor-plating, high firing power, and maneuverability.

Officers and soldiers provided information about technical details of the tank, of which 300 are to be withdrawn from this division alone.

DPA Reports Briefing

*LD0505143989 Hamburg DPA in German
1316 GMT 5 May 89*

[Excerpts] Jueterbog (DPA)—Within the framework of its troop reduction in the Warsaw Pact states, the Soviet Union has already withdrawn more than 1,000 battle tanks from the GDR since the beginning of March this year and has transported them to the USSR. This was said today by Valeriy Fursin, first deputy commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), to journalists from 25 countries in the Altes Lager garrison near Jueterbog (Potsdam area). The official date for the commencement of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR continues to be 11 May.

The tank withdrawal should be seen, in the words of the general, in connection with the restructuring of the armed forces into a "structural nonoffensive capability." Ten thousand soldiers and, by the end of next year, a total of 4,000 tanks are due to be withdrawn from the GDR, it was explained further. Fursin gave no data on the number of Soviet tanks that will remain in the GDR after 1990.

Journalists who wanted to have more precise figures on the GSFG structure were answered by the general: "I propose that we talk about that next time." Fursin and other officers were speaking to 180 representatives of the press, who were able for the first time to view a Soviet garrison in the GDR.

The 288th Tank Regiment stationed here is one of the units that is being disbanded in May. Preparations for this are in full swing. In the military area journalists were able to inspect T-64 tanks, among others. Records show that this regiment, which has a long tradition, was part of the troops that invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968.

While soldiers and officers willingly answered questions about day-to-day army life and other questions, the Soviets continued to be guarded about the number of their troops on GDR territory as a whole. According to Western figures, the GSFG totals some 380,000 soldiers. The Soviet side hinted during the tour that Soviet publication of these figures could be expected during the next few weeks. [passage omitted]

The 32d Tank Division stationed in Jeuterborg will be the first to return to the Soviet Union, starting 11 May. By mid-August the 25th Tank Division, which is stationed in Volgelsang, Neubrandenburg area, and some training regiments and pioneer units, together with their weapons and combat equipment, should be withdrawn and disbanded. In the barracks the Soviet side stressed

several times that following the unilateral disarmament measures by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states similar steps are now expected from the NATO countries.

Soviet 32d Tank Division Departs

*LD0305191889 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1830 GMT 3 May 89*

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—Members of the 32d tank division of the Soviet forces were today seen off from the GDR by workers and soldiers in Jueterbog, Potsdam Bezirk. The tank troops were returning home to the USSR in accordance with the Soviet disarmament initiative announced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 43d UN General Assembly last December.

Divisional commander, Colonel (Sergey Dokuchayev), said in an address that the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from the GDR and other socialist countries was a sign of honest goodwill. He added that NATO should also assess the move as such and reduce troops and weapons to a lower level as well.

NATO Missile Modernization Plans Criticized

*AU1105085889 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 9 May 89 p 2*

["G.P." article: "Only the Tip of the Iceberg?"]

[Text] In the run-up to the Brussels summit, politicians are busy paying visits to the capitals of the NATO states. On the surface these "consultations" are dealing with the question of whether NATO should "modernize" the Lance short-range nuclear missiles that are deployed in the FRG, that is to say, replace them with nuclear missiles whose range is four times greater, or whether NATO should agree to the negotiations offered by the Warsaw Pact states on a step-by-step reduction of those missiles that are not included in the INF Treaty. Washington and London are pressing for an early deployment and reject any plans of a third zero-option, while Bonn is trying to delay its agreement to the stationing of new first-strike weapons on FRG territory at least until 1991-92. The time that one gains should be used for negotiations on step-by-step reductions of tactical nuclear weapons with a range under 500 km.

It is therefore all the more surprising to read in the latest issue of the Hamburg magazine STERN that the deployment "has already been decided. The chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Wolfgang Altenburg, in a technical journal disclosed that Bonn has already agreed to it." Is somebody trying to stealthily create a situation in which the facts have already been established?

The public is to be left in the dark about it, as it is to be left in the dark about the fact that the "modernization" of Lance missiles is only the tip of the iceberg. Referring

to a secret study worked out by the Bundeswehr leadership, STERN noted "that the new short-range missiles are only part of a gigantic armament program of the West." This program involves "almost the entire range of nuclear weapons and their launching systems" and ranges from the development of the new "Midgetman" intercontinental missile and the "Stealth" strategic bomber to modifying the nuclear-powered submarines so that they can carry D5 missiles, and even equipping the B-52 bomber with wide-range cruise missiles.

Considering the plausible proposals of the Warsaw Pact, NATO's arms race can hardly be attributed to a "lacking readiness on the part of the East." This arms race does not only "flatly contradict all political formulas of cooperative or mutual security," as FRG Rear Admiral Schmaehling put it, but even denies the peoples' desire to have all these hellish nuclear devices sent to hell.

SED, French Socialists Discuss Disarmament in Europe

Meet in Paris

AU0205184089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 28 Apr 89 p 5

[Text] Paris (ADN)—On Wednesday [26 April] a 3-day exchange of views between a delegation of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], headed by Otto Reinhold, member of the SED Central Committee, and a delegation of the French Socialist Party [PSF], headed by Gerard Fuchs, member of the Executive Bureau and national secretary of the PSF, concluded in Paris. According to a joint press release, the two delegations discussed questions of security and disarmament in Europe. The SED delegation reported on the economic and social development of the GDR and its further prospects. A PSF delegation will visit the GDR this year.

Further on Talks

AU0305105089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 29-30 Apr 89 p 5

[Text] Paris (ADN)—On Friday [28 April] Otto Reinhold, member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] and rector of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the SED Central Committee, and Maxime Gremetz, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party [PCF], met for an exchange of views and experiences in Paris. The partners in the talk briefed each other on the policy of their parties and discussed questions of international development. It is of utmost importance to intensify the cooperation of all forces of peace, reason, and realism in order to preserve the positive trends in the world and to prevent a new round of the arms race, which opponents of disarmament and detente want to start under the excuse of modernization. It was stressed that the traditionally good relations between the SED and the PCF will be further deepened in the future.

Security Roundtable Talks With UK Conclude LD0405205189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1700 GMT 4 May 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The participants in the third roundtable talk between the GDR and Great Britain have spoken in support of the further activation of frank political dialogue. At the conclusion of the 2-day discussion between parliamentarians and scientists, businessmen and journalists, the heads of both delegations, Professor Dr Max Schmidt, director of the Institute for International Politics and Economics, and John Roper, deputy director of the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, agreed on Thursday in stressing the usefulness of the exchange of opinions.

During the roundtable discussion, views on current questions of European security policy, on the expansion of political-economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation in the creation of a common European home, on the status and perspectives for East-West economic relations and on economic and domestic political developments in the GDR and in Great Britain were exchanged. The most recent developments in arms control and disarmament in the conventional and nuclear area were discussed with special attention.

Prof Max Schmidt underlined that differing views on the role of so-called nuclear deterrence had become clear on the British and GDR side. At the same time, however, the conviction was expressed that the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" must be increasingly respected on the way toward achieving mutual non-offensive capability.

Honecker Backs DPRK Call for Korean Peninsula Nuclear-Free Zone

SK0705081789 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0810 GMT 7 May 89

[Excerpt] Pyongyang May 7 (KCNA)—Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and chairman of the State Council of the GDR, answered questions put by Kim Chong-suk, editor-in-chief of MINJU CHOSON, on a visit to the GDR on April 24.

Referring to the Korean people's struggle for peace and peaceful reunification, he said:

The German Democratic Republic has long since followed with deep interest and sympathy the many-sided efforts constantly made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

We fully support your country's policy to reunify Korea peacefully without outside interference and your people's efforts to ease the military tension in this region.

We estimate the DPRK's proposals to convert the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, hold tripartite talks involving the DPRK, the United States and South Korea and adopt a non-aggression declaration with South Korea as constructive ones and as ones that accord with the demand of times. The DPRK made those proposals and unilaterally cut down armed forces. This shows that the demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea along with their weapons is more urgent. This will create conditions favorable for a useful political dialogue to debate on matters of concern for both sides and for the convocation of a political consultative meeting of leadership-level people in the North and the South. [passage omitted]

POLAND

Polish UN Envoy Supports Disarmament Efforts
LD1105124489 Warsaw PAP in English
1157 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] New York, May 11—Poland has expressed support for disarmament efforts and the U.N.'s activities in this field.

During a plenary debate of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, Poland's permanent representative to the U.N., Ambassador Eugeniusz Noworyta stressed the extremely great significance of Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in New York for the creation of a more peaceful and secure world.

In Poland's opinion, the Soviet-American agreement on eliminating medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles is the first step in the direction of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Poland is convinced that the disarmament process will be boosted this year on such key issues as a 50-percent reduction of Soviet and American potentials of strategic offensive weapons while strengthening the ABM Treaty and arriving at a convention on a chemical weapons ban. At the same time one should raise the issue of battlefield nuclear weapons. Specific proposals on this important matter are contained in the declaration of states-parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

Referring to the policy of "openness" regarding data on the manpower of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty, the Polish ambassador recalled that Poland intends to cut its Armed Forces by 40 thousand soldiers, 850 tanks, 900 artillery guns, 7 thousand armoured vehicles, 80 combat planes and other technical equipment by 1991. Poland stressed the significance of a ban on nuclear weapons testing.

ROMANIA

'Firm Stand' Asserted on Disarmament, CFE Talks
AU0405134289 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
0930 GMT 4 May 89

["Romania: Firm Stand for Disarmament, Security and Confidence in Europe"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 4/5/1989—On the resumption of the works in the two bodies of negotiation in Vienna—on the conventional armed forces and weapons in Europe and on the establishment of a new string of confidence measures in the continent, Romania reiterates the determination to further contribute to the attainment of the targets pursued by the two meetings.

As is known, in the first round Romania advanced "The Considerations and Proposals of Romania, of President Nicolae Ceausescu on the Issues of Disarmament, Confidence and Security in the Continent." Along with those of other states, the respective considerations and proposals contributed to a great extent to orienting the negotiations toward concrete, substantive issues related directly to the European peoples' quiet and security. Reiterating on that occasion as well its outlook on the need for a complex and unitary program of disarmament, nuclear above all, Romania pointed to the imperative requirement of measures in the conventional domain that should pursue drastic, substantive cuts, by at least 50 percent by 2000, starting of course with the most heavily armed states. The attainment of the fundamental target of negotiations, that is the enhanced stability and security in Europe through tangible reductions of conventional armed forces and weapons, requires that the negotiations address in the current stage to all categories of armed forces and weapons, except for those that are specifically excluded under the covenanted mandate. Likewise, considering the desideratum of actually halting the arms race, Romania envisages a similar 50 percent reduction of the military expenditures, so that the European peoples may really have guarantees that the diminutions in one domain or another of arming will not be "compensated" by development in other domains, by the development of even more sophisticated destructive means.

Therefore, Romania thinks that the avoidance of a qualitative race in the domain of conventional armed forces must not be achieved by mere quantitative ceilings, but by all participant states' pledging not to use the released financial means for other military purposes. Likewise, with a view to step up the negotiations, the opportuneness was highlighted of considering [word indistinct] measures, both as regards the armed forces and weapons under negotiation and in other domains.

At the first round of conventional disarmament negotiations, Romania, along with other socialist states, cautioned about the complex evolutions in the continent,

determined, among other things, by the sticking to the obsolete doctrine of "nuclear deterrence," by stands and attitudes partial to the modernization of the medium-range nuclear missiles, the emplacement, sooner or later, of new systems of such weapons. The fact that such options, in obvious contradiction with the targets of halting the quantitative and qualitative arms race, with the cause of peace and security in the continent, are far from meeting with the approval of the European peoples, is proved right by the current controversies within the NATO, the ever more insistent request of some Western governments for the renunciation of the respective plans, for the beginning of negotiations with the Warsaw-Treaty states. This is the very idea advanced by Romania on the opening of the Vienna negotiations. It spoke up on that occasion as well, precisely by virtue of the complementary, unitary character of the various preoccupations in the domain of disarmament—for the creation of a special negotiation body on the medium-range nuclear missiles. Of course, this entails the renunciation by the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty alike of any action of modernization, of qualitative improvement of the arsenals in existence.

Although with participation confined to the states in the two political-military alliances in Europe, the CFE negotiations are not, according to the mandate, and must not be, as stressed at their very beginning, negotiations between military blocs but among independent and sovereign states with joint common interests and objectives of security. Therefore Romania thinks that they should proceed in a democratic, constructive manner, and take account of the legitimate interests and the preoccupations of equal, equitable security for all states in the continent, whether they belong to military alliances or not.

As for the negotiations on confidence measures, Romania also produced concrete, constructive proposals, showing care for securing detente, stability and collaboration in the continent. Along with other European states, it speaks up for the development of the previously agreed measures of confidence and a passage to a new stage, of actual limitation of the objective conditions that would allow for a surprise attack in Europe.

Commentator Discusses 'Romanian Program' for Disarmament

AU0905201189 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 5 May 89 p 6

[George Nicolescu article: "Ensuring Peace Through Achieving Disarmament—the Realism and Clear-sightedness of the Foreign Policy Promoted by Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu"]

[Text] The basic issue of our time is halting the nuclear arms race and proceeding to completely eliminate nuclear weapons in several stages. It is necessary to forego nuclear tests, to halt the program for the militarization of outer space and the modernization of short-range missiles—by

NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries—under appropriate international supervision, and it is necessary to renounce the political concept of "safeguarding peace" through nuclear deterrence, or, in other words, the concept of a war of domination. Nicolae Ceausescu

Safeguarding peace, halting the arms race, and moving to a genuine and effective process of disarmament as the only means capable of reducing and then eliminating the serious threat of weapons hovering over humanity is, in Socialist Romania's concept that was firmly emphasized by President Nicolae Ceausescu in his speeches at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] and the National Council of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, not only a simple desire, but a vital requirement and an extremely urgent imperative. Although lately certain positive steps have been taken on the road to disarmament and toward the solution of certain conflicts by political means, these developments have not brought about any radical change in the world, and detente and disarmament have not become a reality of the international situation. The fact that the aberrant arms race continues in an unhampered way—last year alone a further 1,200 nuclear warheads were added to the tremendous nuclear arsenals available—that nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons are going through an accelerated process of modernization and improvement, that nuclear testing continues at quite a high rate, that enormous sums of money are invested in projects for the militarization of outer space, that signs of the policy of force and threat of force, of blackmail and domination against certain states have not stopped, and that a number of conflicts are still latent in various parts of the world can but cause concern and worries. These are enough reasons to believe that the danger of war persists and, in the nuclear era, any world conflict would inevitably turn into a devastating nuclear war.

At this crucial point for the prospects of humanity, the voice of Romania and its president once again resounds clearly and responsibly, constituting a fervent call for uniting the efforts of all states and peoples to defend peace, halt the arms race, and proceed to a genuine and effective process of disarmament—the fundamental issue of our time. "On behalf of the Romanian people," President Nicolae Ceausescu recently said, "we call upon all states and peoples in the world to strengthen cooperation to achieve disarmament and safeguard peace, so as to end the 20th century by completely eliminating the numerous serious and complex problems concerning mankind, and to enter the third millenium with better prospects and without fear of a nuclear disaster."

It is the inestimable merit of the party secretary general and country's president to have enriched political science by revealing a renewing principle of great theoretical and practical importance for approaching the problem of disarmament, namely the principle that no kind of security reasons may justify the constant escalation of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race today.

Our party's and state's leader has repeatedly emphasized with clearheadedness and great persuasive ability that in the current stage of the international situation we have to fully renounce the anachronistic and obsolete concept according to which nuclear weapons contribute to strengthening the defense capability and security of states, and to safeguarding peace. Given the fact that the destructive capability accumulated on earth exceeds the bomb dropped on Hiroshima approximately 1.5 million times over, international security and the security of each state decreases proportionally, and a nuclear conflagration would question the very existence of humanity and life itself on our planet. Therefore, the cardinal problem of humanity continues to be halting the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, and moving toward disarmament and ensuring a lasting and genuine peace. The Romanian concept on the essence of peace starts from the firm conviction that only under conditions of genuine peace can we ensure the necessary prerequisites for the free and independent development of all peoples, and only thus can we create a favorable atmosphere for strengthening friendship and fruitful cooperation among all nations in the world.

Presenting an original complex and comprehensive program for disarmament, Romania started from the desire to put an immediate halt to the arms race both on earth and in outer space, and to establish equal security for all states. It also proceeded from the need to create the necessary conditions, so that the great achievements of science and technology, and of the human genius may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of progress and the well-being of all nations. The merit of the Romanian vision on disarmament is that it points out the prospects for gradually proceeding toward the goal of general disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament. Instead of the treacherously calm balance engendered by armaments, Romania insists on ensuring the only balance that can safeguard peoples' security—a balance based on constantly reducing arsenals along with adopting measures aimed at generating confidence between states. Such a process can be achieved with the participation, on a fully equal footing, of all states, without diminishing, of course, the responsibility resting on the shoulders of those countries possessing big military arsenals and potentials. Our country believes that world stability must be built on disarmament, but the edifice can be a lasting and stable one only if it is the joint work of the whole of mankind.

In its guidelines, the Romanian program naturally gives priority to nuclear disarmament and to the unconditional prohibition and gradual elimination, by the year 2000, of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction in the states' arsenals and all nuclear weapons in Europe and in the world. Welcoming the Soviet-American accord on the elimination of intermediate- and short-range missiles, Romania believes that it is a first step on the road to disarmament, a beginning that has to be continued and deepened. In this context, our country advocates the conclusion, as soon as possible, of the

proposed accord between the USSR and the United States on a 50 percent cut in offensive strategic weapons, a sustained and constant process of eliminating all nuclear weapons from Europe and the world, the cessation of any kind of tests with such weapons, and it advocates a halt to all actions toward militarizing outer space, and the utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes alone for the benefit of all peoples.

The complex and comprehensive nature of the Romanian program for disarmament is clearly obvious through its demand for the definitive elimination of another weapon of mass destruction from the arsenals on our planet—chemical weapons. In this sense, in our country's view it is urgently necessary to formulate and apply a program of measures on banning—along with nuclear weapons—the utilization of chemical weapons, and on eliminating available stocks. Together with the elimination of these weapons, Romania proposes a ban on the production of any kind of chemical weapons.

In line with the same realistic approach, the substantial reduction of troops, conventional weapons, and military expenditure are given priority in Romania's concept and specific program for disarmament. In order to adopt effective measures in this area, our country believes that it is imperative for the member states of the two big opposed military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—to begin substantial negotiations, with the participation of all European states, conducive to a cut in states' troops and conventional weapons of at least 20 percent by 1990, 30-35 percent by 1995, and 50 percent by the end of the century. The same tenure of realism and concreteness is also characteristic of the proposals for reducing the tremendous military spending today, which has reached the astronomical figure of more than \$1 trillion. The adoption of such measures is viewed by our country as a vital requirement for achieving a concrete and effective process of disarmament that would bear in mind ensuring a balance of weapons at the lowest level under strict international control. The positive effects that this would entail are obvious both regarding the elimination of the threat of war and the development and bestowing of a richer and more concrete content on the relationship between disarmament and development.

Romania is paying particular attention to the situation in Europe, a continent where the biggest nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world are located and where the two main military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—are facing each other. The European Continent has turned into the "depot" of weapons and ammunition of the world where the two opposed military blocs possess a terrifying military potential: more than 90,000 tanks, almost 180,000 cannons and launchers, more than 15,000 planes, more than 8,000 fighter helicopters, more than 480 submarines, 600 ships, and more than 7.2 million troops.

Despite these impressive arsenals of destruction, as is known, NATO circles advocate the modernization and improvement of short-range missiles under the pretext of "compensating" for the nuclear weapons eliminated through the INF Treaty. The statements made at the recent 40th Anniversary of the Creation of the Atlantic Alliance was a telling example of this, a fact that could, in one form or another, render the Soviet-American accord meaningless. With the same intent of "compensation," other projects on "modernization" aim at deploying, on a wider scale, nuclear cruise missiles on certain ships or planes. Because of this tremendous military concentration—the biggest ever known in the history of our continent—which poses a serious danger in itself—Romania has been for and continues to favor proceeding from words to deeds, and to the formulation and application of specific measures aimed at reducing troops, conventional weapons, and military expenditure on our continent. At the same time, our country believes that it is necessary to adopt new measures to increase confidence and security in Europe, and it is necessary to prolong what was agreed upon at the all-European meeting in Stockholm, and to renounce any action toward the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles, and any escalation of the arms race. This means Romania favors measures designed to eliminate the current division of the continent and to build a united Europe of peace and cooperation based on the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of all states, and of the social system in each European country.

The creation of nuclear-free zones, in the Balkans as well as elsewhere, the elimination of foreign military bases, renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of other states, the reduction of the weight of the military activity of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the creation of conditions for their simultaneous elimination, and the cessation of military maneuvers in international waters and demonstrations of force at the borders of other countries are further important guidelines of the Romanian program for disarmament designed to improve the world political atmosphere and to assert the trend toward detente and cooperation. "We must look with confidence to a future of humanity linked to the need to eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to independent development, and to ensuring the peace and progress of all nations in the world," President Nicolae Ceausescu emphasized recently. This fervent call on all peoples and realistic forces of the present-day world to unite their efforts to change the dangerous trend of events and promote a new way of thinking and action at the world level incorporates the unshakeable confidence in the triumph of reason and the deep conviction that the future for which we aspire is fully possible. All this requires not weakened, but united and intensified efforts by all peoples, and a consolidated broad front of struggle to build a world free from the specter of war and the burden of weapons, a world of peace, progress, and prosperity.

SCINTEIA Views Recent Disarmament Meetings
AU1005132589 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1248 GMT 10 May 89

["SCINTEIA" on Recent International Meetings on Disarmament]—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Romanian daily SCINTEIA of 10 May refers in a commentary to the recent international meetings in Geneva and New York: the session of the preparatory committee of the third conference on the application of the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, and the first preparatory meeting for the fourth conference of the countries parties to the non-proliferation treaty.

The newspaper underscores that the conclusion in 1971 of the first of these treaties was a positive measure as regards the prohibition of the militarization of seas and oceans, its provisions being observed and this juridical instrument functioning efficiently in general. Nevertheless, the commentary stresses, the fact—unanimously highlighted by the non-nuclear states—cannot be overlooked that now more than ever before negotiations should further be imposed to covenant new disarmament measures, to prevent the arms race on sea-beds and ocean floors. Or there is a reality that since the treaty came into force the arms race not only that has not lessened but continued at high rates the big powers stockpiling nuclear weapons of various types able to destroy the whole mankind several times over and annihilate life of our planet. A reason for worry is the fact that seas and oceans are used to an ever larger extent for military purposes, that missiles are launched, new weapons, nuclear included, are tested and wide-scope military manoeuvres are held in international waters—which directly threatens the independence and security of the neighbouring states, international peace and security.

Come into force on 5 March 1970, the newspaper goes on, the non-proliferation treaty was in no way conceived as an instrument whereby the world should be divided into nuclear and non-nuclear countries but as a starting point for further concerted efforts toward achieving general and complete disarmament. It is true that of late some understandings have been reached between the USSR and the U.S.A. on nuclear arms reduction. In Vienna, within the CSCE framework, negotiations started on conventional arms reduction between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. As a matter of fact, as regards the proportions and rhythm of nuclear arming, the results of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and weapon control are infinitesimal, and so mankind continues to be exposed to the dangers generated by the arms race.

Romania, "SCINTEIA" points out, has declared for faster negotiations on the elimination of the danger of a devastating conflagration and the ensurance of a future

of peace and collaboration among peoples. In Romania's opinion, the disarmament process should simultaneously include all categories of weapons—nuclear, chemical and conventional. It is only in this way that an ever more stable balance of forces can be ensured at the lowest levels, as well as equal security for all states. It is only in this way that such a situation can be avoided in which one weapon or another is used for blackmail or pressure on other states.

More than once Romania has underscored the importance of the non-nuclear states' receiving guarantees from the nuclear ones. It is clear that the states which undertook not to manufacture or get nuclear weapons have the right to demand the nuclear states to pledge that never shall they use or threaten with the use of nuclear weapons or, generally, of force against the non-nuclear states.

In the spirit of its policy of peace, collaboration and understanding worldwide, Romania took part in these two meetings inspired by the wish to make a constructive contribution to turning the above-mentioned international treaties into major political instruments apt to open broad prospects to the efforts toward stopping the arms race, the nuclear one first and foremost, toward achieving disarmament and ensuring peace—the cardinal problems of our days, the newspaper winds up.

YUGOSLAVIA

NATO Shows 'No Enthusiasm' for Warsaw Pact Proposals

LD1604160489 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1450 GMT 16 Apr 89

[Text] Belgrade, April 16 (TANJUG)—The Western military and political alliance is showing no enthusiasm at all over the proposals of its Eastern competitor from Berlin, where last week's ministerial session of the Warsaw Pact produced a new idea for negotiations by calling first for a reduction in the numbers of tactical nuclear weaponry in Europe, and then for its full elimination.

The idea was received with reserve at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels—this is a "birthday gift we did not need at all," a high NATO official commented, fully aware of the fact that the West has in fact now been placed before a difficult choice: on account of its own interests it cannot accept the initiative of the East but can at the same time not afford the luxury of rejecting it.

The difficulty lies in the differing interests and emotions of the central European countries (at least those belonging to NATO) on whose territories the main destructive battle would be fought were the two military giants ever to launch an open confrontation.

Although the Warsaw Pact's latest proposal is, (probably) like no other before, measured and open to every possible approach, the Western alliance's number-one man has reacted as if what was concerned was a case of passing the buck. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner has said nothing new had come from Berlin and demanded that the East start by reducing its own stocks of this type of missile before the West could accept negotiations on achieving any sort of balance at a lower level. According to Woerner, the Warsaw Pact possesses fourteen times as many short-range missiles as the West and there exists no hope for negotiations with a ratio of that sort.

It is true, however, that the proposal from Berlin does contain a call for talks on a subject which is of much interest to the Western allies. After the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of all missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,500 kilometres, what remains in dispute are stocks of strategic (intercontinental) missiles, which are controlled solely by the two superpowers, and shorter-range rockets (i.e., under 500 kilometres).

The West's main argument for dissatisfaction with the Berlin proposal and its accusation that "There is something shady behind the proposal" seems to lie in the preconceived idea that it represents a "propaganda trick," i.e., that the East is counting on the existing differences among the Western allies in regard to shorter-range missiles, and throwing a "bone of contention" among them.

The United States and Great Britain are staunch advocates of modernizing missiles of the lance type to provide (in the existing conditions of a partial missile disarmament) what would allegedly be an "efficient deterrent."

The Federal Republic of Germany's and Belgium's opposition to the plans to modernize the missiles—which, it is claimed, will be "out of date" by 1995—is based on the argument that it would only further accelerate the arms race.

Together with some other NATO members, these two countries support the holding of parallel talks on cuts in conventional forces and weaponry and those on reductions in stocks of tactical nuclear and chemical arms.

Western experts say that it would be "stupid for the West to launch itself into new cuts of its (nuclear) potential" as long as there exists an "imbalance in conventional weaponry."

Thus, NATO will, as it says, "study the Warsaw Pact's proposal carefully," which means that it will, in the short term, neither accept nor openly reject it. A reply will be provided after the Western alliance's summit, which will be held in Brussels on May 29 and 30, and will most probably be: "Not at present."

AFGHANISTAN

Rebels Accuse Kabul Regime of Using Chemical Weapons at Jalalabad

BK0605025889 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu
0200 GMT 6 May 89

[Text] In Afghanistan, a fierce battle is reportedly raging around the besieged city of Jalalabad. The mujahidin say that the Kabul regime has used chemical weapons to thwart their attacks.

Meanwhile, the security forces have been ordered to remain on full alert in and around Kabul in view of mujahidin attacks. Similar alert orders have been issued in Khowst, Qandahar, and Jalalabad as well.

INDIA

Foreign Minister Suggests Alternative System of Global Security

52500030 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
19 Mar 89 p 5

[Text] India on Saturday called for the creation of an alternative system of international security to establish a nuclear-weapons-free and non-violent world, reports UNI.

Minister of State for External Affairs K. K. Tewary told participants at a "national debate" on India's action plan to "eliminate nuclear weapons by 2010" in the Capital that such an alternative global security System should not be based on the doctrine of deterrence.

This could be accomplished by striving to outlaw nuclear weapons by working towards an international convention banning their use and finally by their complete elimination, he said.

This would undermine the very conceptual basis of the nuclear arms race, Mr Tewary stressed.

The second "concrete step" in that direction would be to seek gradual multilateralisation of the global disarmament process. Such an alternative security Doctrine would, above all, call for strengthening of the multi-lateral system under the United Nations, he said.

Besides, the potential of new strategic concepts such as "reasonable sufficiency" espoused by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the "doctrine of non-provocative defence" called for by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, could be explored to achieve objectives of global demilitarisation and creation of a comprehensive security system, he said.

Dissolution of military alliances and elimination of military bases and facilities of the great powers beyond their frontiers could be ways of promoting a new "defence-oriented" security doctrine, the Minister said.

Multi-lateral disarmament efforts should transcend what were narrowly defined as "security" issues, he said.

The ultimate quest should be for strengthening international economic cooperation and redressing existing inequalities of the world which, in turn, engender conflicts and erode political stability.

The tenuous process of the revival of detente could easily be reversed if its scope was not comprehensive enough and it does not encompass, as its objective, a more equitable management of the world economy, Mr Tewary said.

'Our ultimate safety lies in seeking not only a world free from nuclear weapons and the heavy burden of armaments but also a world based upon the principles of justice, equity and respect for diversity', he said.

British Defense Secretary Evaluates Soviet Initiatives

George Younger Interviewed

52000039 Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Apr 89 p 3

[Interview with British Secretary of State for Defense George Younger by A. Burmistenko, London correspondent of TRUD: "Disarmament and Glasnost"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Burmistenko] In his speech to the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly, M.S. Gorbachev set forth a whole series of concepts aimed at establishing new international relations. In particular, he called for a turning away from the principle of excessive armament and toward the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense and, in this connection, he reported on the significant unilateral reductions of the strength of Soviet Armed Forces and arms. I would like to ask you, sir, to give us your assessment of the speech of M.S. Gorbachev to the United Nations.

[Younger] The speech of Mr Gorbachev was an extremely encouraging sign of a new and more constructive approach to international problems and we welcome this. We also welcome the measures that President Gorbachev announced at the United Nations on the reduction of the size of the Soviet Armed Forces and on the withdrawal of part of these armed forces from Eastern Europe. This is a significant first step on the way to the elimination of the inequality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in conventional systems of arms and we hope that with time this will lead to a more defensive nature of the Soviet Armed Forces. NATO, in turn, has always made it clear that its armed forces are fully defensive in size and structure. We welcome any indications of true changes in the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces so that they will meet only the requirements of "reasonable sufficiency."

But I must also emphasize that even after the announced reductions the Warsaw Pact will still be superior to NATO in the proportion of approximately 2.4 to 1 in such systems as tanks and artillery, which have the capability of taking and holding territory. Even after the reductions, the Soviet Union alone will have a considerably larger number of tanks and artillery systems than all NATO countries in Europe combined. This superiority is the focus of concern of the West in security matters and is a major source of instability in Europe. One of the main objectives of the negotiations on conventional arms in Europe will be the elimination of the remaining—of great concern to us—lack of balance between the East and West.

[Burmistenko] In addition to the measures mentioned in the speech of M.S. Gorbachev, the Soviet Union recently announced the reduction of its military budget by 14 percent and the withdrawal of part of its tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe. Is it not time for Britain

to respond positively to all of these steps through its own initiatives and to announce its own practical contribution to the reduction of the military presence in Europe—in nuclear as well as conventional arms?

[Younger] In recent years, we were pleased that the Soviet Union responded to such Western initiatives as the agreement on zero-intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles for both sides, which also led to the signing of a mutually advantageous treaty. I would also like to note that NATO unilaterally reduced the number of its nuclear battlefield weapons in Europe by one-third in the last 10 years without a corresponding reduction on the part of the Soviet Union, which continued to modernize its nuclear arsenal. In the area of chemical weapons, Great Britain gave up its stocks in the 1950's and the United States declared a moratorium on the production of such weapons in 1969. In the course of almost 20 years, the Soviet Union was the only power in Europe that stockpiled these terrible weapons.

But the task today is the successful holding of new negotiations, especially in Vienna, on conventional arms. The West has already proposed major reductions of armed forces to equal levels in the East and the West. We would like to achieve a 50-percent reduction of the number of tanks and artillery systems in Europe. We would like to attain a situation in which the arms of any country will not exceed 30 percent of the total number. And we would like for these reductions and "ceilings" to be combined with other measures aimed at reducing the threat of sudden attack and the concentration of arms. We hope that the Soviet Union will respond positively to these detailed proposals.

[Burmistenko] Of particular interest to the readers of our newspaper is the question of the conversion of military industry to the production of peaceful output. In his speech to the United Nations, M.S. Gorbachev declared the willingness of the Soviet Union to develop and present its internal plan for conversion. Does the British Government intend to take the necessary steps and support the restructuring of its defensive enterprises for the production of civilian output?

[Younger] We do not encounter the same problems that the Soviet Union does, because our defense industry as a whole does not belong to the state and amounts to a significantly smaller part of the national economy. In addition, our defense industry is accustomed to responding to the requirements and demands of market forces: contracts, to the extent possible, are awarded on a competitive basis and industrial companies are constantly running into the prospect of losing their share of military business. As a result, many companies executing military contracts also have major subdivisions for civilian production and for them everyday business practice involves the necessity of maintaining a balance between the needs of the military and civilian markets.

Thus, we do not see the need for direct government control over the conversion of defense companies. Industry itself will have to adapt to any necessary corrections, just as firms in the civilian sector of the economy adapt to changes in civilian demand. In the time since World War II, in fact, our enterprises in the defense industry experienced a tremendous number of changes and by and large they coped with them successfully with minimal state interference.

[Burmistenko] NATO and the Warsaw Pact recently published data on the correlations of personnel of armed forces and different classes of arms. How do you relate to these correlations and how important, in your view, are such manifestations of glasnost in the military area for the strengthening of trust in Europe?

[Younger] The West always stressed the importance of openness in military affairs. In Great Britain, for example, we annually publish detailed information on the size and composition of our armed forces. Other Western countries do the same thing and in November of last year NATO published data on its own armed forces and estimates of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries so as to present the factual side of the matter to the public.

In previous negotiations on arms control, the lack of analogous information from the Soviet Union and other East European countries was often a major obstacle. The publication of the Warsaw Pact data at the end of January was a useful step, although we have reservations about the figures themselves. As we develop trust at the new negotiations in Vienna, we will propose the comprehensive exchange of information, supported by a system to verify the accuracy of this information. The last time we made this proposal, the Soviet Union rejected it. We hope that the Soviet Union will now accept it.

USSR's General Tatarnikov Comments

52000039 Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Apr 89 p 3

[Commentary by Major General V. Tatarnikov, representative of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces]

[Text] In the interview, George Younger, British secretary of state for defense, gives high marks to the Soviet initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations on 7 December 1988 and shares his thoughts on a current and vital subject—glasnost in military questions and in the resolution of disarmament problems.

We, in turn, would also like to comment from the position of glasnost on some especially significant aspects of the interview with G. Younger, because in that interview disarmament problems and approaches to their resolution are illuminated from just one side.

This is particularly so with respect to the assertion that even after the unilateral reductions the Warsaw Pact will maintain a 2.4 to 1 advantage over NATO in tanks and artillery systems. Is this right? In the course of 2 years, the Warsaw Pact will reduce 12,750 tanks and more than 10,000 artillery systems. The correlation will remain approximately 2 to 1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact for artillery and 1.5 to 1 for tanks. But this advantage in tanks is offset by a significant NATO advantage (by a factor of 1.6) in antitank missile systems.

In addition, NATO for some reason does not count warehouse stocks of arms, where a large number of tanks and artillery systems are concentrated. This permits NATO to exclude more than 25 percent of its artillery pieces and mortars, thousands of tanks and other arms from the count. One cannot objectively assess the threat by choosing only those arms that are advantageous to NATO and this is what was done in the interview. Can it really be that strike aircraft and attack helicopters, in which the NATO countries have a substantial advantage over the Warsaw Pact countries, are less a threat to general security? A one-sided approach to the problems of security is inadmissible. Unfortunately, the NATO countries suffer from precisely this shortcoming in the Vienna negotiations.

We have frequently heard, and not only from the secretary of defense of Great Britain, that the NATO countries consider their armed forces purely defensive. But the facts say something else.

The doctrine of "flexible response," which guides NATO in its military policy, does not deny the possibility of inflicting preemptive strikes ("on suspicion"), including nuclear strikes. In essence, the concept of "nuclear deterrence" is based precisely on the admissibility of being the first to deliver a nuclear strike. If the armed forces of the United States or Great Britain are defensive, then why do these countries not obligate themselves, as the Soviet Union has done, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to be the first to initiate combat operations? This is the fundamental indicator of the defensive doctrine of a state.

It is clearly illogical to assert in words that the NATO doctrine is defensive in nature while in practice allowing in field manuals the "intentional escalation" of combat operations or "defense on forward lines," which provides, in particular, for the bottling up of the fleets of the Warsaw Pact countries at their bases.

As for the so-called "defensive" structure of the NATO armed forces, that is not the way things are. Structurally NATO divisions have significantly more offensive systems—tanks and armored personnel carriers—than do Soviet divisions. This superiority will be especially perceptible after the withdrawal of large numbers of tanks from our divisions and the giving of a defensive structure to them. G. Younger also "forgot" to point out the huge strike power of the NATO air forces and naval forces,

which are several times greater than the navy of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, NATO can in no way be called "particularly defensive" either according to the military doctrine professed by NATO or in accordance with the structure or size of the NATO armed forces.

The thesis of the British secretary of defense that the NATO countries unilaterally reduced the number of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe by one-third in the last 10 years is likewise not completely accurate and requires an explanation.

Beginning in 1979, as a matter of fact, the North Atlantic bloc has systematically modernized its nuclear arsenal in Europe. Under the pretext of "reductions," obsolete nuclear weapons were withdrawn from here and in their place new and more effective nuclear systems were delivered to Europe. Thus, the "Lance" missiles were equipped with upgraded nuclear warheads. New nuclear ammunition making possible an increase in the range and accuracy of fire were delivered to replace the obsolete nuclear shells for the 203.2 mm howitzers. The NATO aircraft fleet was virtually completely renewed through the introduction of up-to-date F-16 and "Tornado" fighter bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It is well known that new nuclear bombs have been delivered to European depots for them.

As a result of these replacements, the nuclear potential of the bloc has not been reduced at all. In practice, the "reduction" amounted to a qualitative upgrading of the nuclear potential. That is the truth.

We welcome the decision by Great Britain to renounce chemical weapons and we are moving in this same direction. But we were quite surprised at the statement of G. Younger that during the course of 20 years the Soviet Union was the only power stockpiling nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the United States did stop production of chemical weapons at the end of the 1960's, having established significant stocks and ensured itself superiority in this form of armament. Unfortunately, in this situation the Soviet Union was forced to take the necessary measures to strengthen its own security.

In 1987, the Soviet Union stopped production of chemical weapons and openly declared that stocks of chemical weapons in the USSR do not exceed 50,000 tons. This is approximately equal to U.S. stocks of chemical weapons. At the same time, the USSR demonstrated standard samples of chemical weapons and the technology for their destruction.

But the United States took a different course. In December 1987, it began the series production of a new and more sophisticated version of chemical weapons—binary. It thereby significantly complicates the process of working out an international agreement on the universal and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the

destruction of stocks and the industrial basis for their production. Such are the facts that, for some reason, the secretary of defense of Great Britain unfortunately failed to mention.

At the end of the interview, he declared that in the Vienna negotiations the NATO Countries proposed the "comprehensive exchange" of information and he asks: Will the Soviet Union agree to such measures?

Certainly the countries of the Warsaw Pact will agree to the exchange of information. And they are proposing a truly comprehensive exchange of information covering not only ground forces but also air and naval forces. Unfortunately, the NATO countries, especially Great Britain and the United States, are limiting themselves to half-measures: they would like to have the information selectively cover only ground forces. But what kind of "comprehensive exchange" is this when only one of the three branches of armed forces—ground forces—is covered?

What is the reason for this approach by the NATO countries? For everywhere they are making declarations about the openness and predictability of military actions. Why do they not want to open up air and naval forces? Clearly the essence is that the NATO countries have significant superiority in these components (strike aviation and fighting ships). And here, unfortunately, is where openness and the exchange of information stop. Nevertheless, we hope that Great Britain will indeed agree to a comprehensive exchange of information at the Vienna negotiations.

Oct 1988 Vladivostok Forum on Asia-Pacific Security

181600071 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 89 pp 138-141

[Report by Aleksey Alekseyevich Kirichenko, head of a department of the World Economy and International Relations Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences: "Vladivostok-88: Hopes and Prospects"]

[Text] In July 1986 M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivered a speech in Vladivostok which subsequently acquired great celebrity. The action program pertaining to an improvement in relations in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) which it put forward has subsequently been supplemented and amplified, having acquired comprehensive philosophical substantiation in the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons (November 1986) and in other of our country's initiatives, including the new proposals at the highest level contained in M.S. Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech (September 1988).

The active approach of the Soviet Union to problems of Asia and the Pacific proceeds from the fact that the development of regional processes and the establishment

of good-neighbor relations within a specific geographical framework should be an integral part of the process pertaining to the safeguarding of general peace. The Soviet concept of security closely links the achievement of accords at the global level with a normalization of the situation in individual regions and regards regional efforts as integral components of and necessary conditions for an improvement in the entire system of international relations. The combination of these two levels and their interdependence require a comprehensive approach to security issues. Under these conditions a stimulation of political dialogue and an extension of economic cooperation between the countries washed by the Pacific are an important factor of an improvement in the international atmosphere and new political thinking at the global level.

The domestic policy aspect of a stimulation of our country's position in the APR is material also. The Soviet Far East performs a particular role in the wide-ranging program of modernization and intensification of the national economy which is under way. With long-term interests pertaining to the safeguarding of peace in Asia and endeavoring to create propitious foreign policy conditions for the plans of economic development, the Soviet Union advocates the development of good-neighbor relations and the establishment of close economic cooperation with neighbors in the region.

Soviet policy in the APR is based, as can be seen from the initiatives which have been put forward recently, on a comprehension of both lessons of the past and present realities. "In formulating proposals acceptable to all we sought," M.S. Gorbachev declared, speaking in Krasnoyarsk, "the equivalent force in a balance of interests."¹ Problems of a solution of conflicts and knots of confrontation and a curbing of militarism were made paramount in our regional initiatives. One of the former is the lagging of international cooperation behind the rapid economic growth of individual countries.

Attention was paid in many countries to the Soviet leader's warning that the possibilities of making full use of the colossal potential of the APR for the purpose of general progress and peace throughout the world which exist currently could be lost if the sum total of the complex problems in this vast region is not worked on now. The attempts, however, of certain skeptics to question the sincerity and honesty of our intentions and proposals and portray matters such that the Soviet Union had under the cover of peaceable phases embarked on expansion have proven groundless.

Much has been done since the Vladivostok initiatives, which triggered a stimulation of the Asia-Pacific direction in Soviet foreign policy. We recall merely the most important events. The signing, ratification and practical steps pertaining to implementation of the Soviet-American agreement to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles based on the "double global zero" concept, as a result of which two classes of missiles east of

the Urals will be destroyed, and the partial withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, which began in accordance with realization of the Geneva agreements. The situation on the Indochina peninsula is normalizing. There has been a marked improvement in relations between China and our country, to which the withdrawal of some Soviet Army subunits deployed in the Mongolian People's Republic contributed to a large extent. Protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific have been signed. The exceptionally full exchange of visits by Soviet leaders and many states of the region, including the ASEAN countries, contributed to the successful implementation of foreign policy actions.

Of course, no one expected quick success in realization of the ideas and proposals put forward in the Vladivostok speech, and many of them are still to be implemented in practice. It was in this situation that the idea of a broad international forum to analyze the results of what had been achieved in the 2 years which had elapsed since the initiatives were put forward and exchange opinions on questions of regional development which remain urgent was born.

The international meeting "Asia-Pacific Region: Dialogue, Peace, Cooperation" was held in Vladivostok from 1 through 3 October 1988. Interest in the forum was so great that, in addition to the states of the region, representatives of many European and Latin American countries wished to take part. More than 200 well-known scholars, politicians and religious figures, diplomats, businessmen and figures of culture from 36 countries gathered in the "capital of the Soviet Far East". The meeting was covered by 80 Soviet and 35 foreign journalists.

At the opening ceremony Academician Ye.M. Primakov, chairman of the Soviet National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, read out greetings from the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the participants in the meeting, which noted the importance of the representative international conference in the biggest city on the USSR's Pacific coast—Vladivostok—which even recently was "closed" to foreigners.

Papers were read at the plenary session by I.A. Rogachev, deputy USSR foreign minister, and Academician V.I. Ilichev, chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Department. The first speaker emphasized the existence of two trends distinctly discernible in the Asia-Pacific region at the present time. On the one hand ways of a normalization of the political atmosphere had emerged, and the unblocking of chronic conflicts was under way (the Geneva Afghanistan agreements are being implemented, practicable prerequisites for a settlement of the Cambodia problem have emerged, military operations between Iran and Iraq have ceased and signs of a possible lessening of tension on the Korean

peninsula have appeared). What is particularly reassuring is that many countries are seeking ways of safeguarding their security primarily by political means, renouncing military-power methods of solving conflict situations.

At the same time the process of the deployment in the APR of nuclear weapons, including sea-launched cruise missiles, continues. Naval activity, the danger of which is increasing owing to the fact that the lines of confrontation between certain countries are determined by naval contact, is expanding.

I.A. Rogachev called the attention of the participants in the meeting to the importance of the new regional initiatives put forward in Krasnoyarsk, specifically, the Soviet Union's readiness not to increase in the APR any types of nuclear weapon and the proposal concerning consultations between the main naval powers on a non-increase in the region of naval forces and the prevention of incidents at sea and in the airspace above it.

Academician V.I. Ilichev dwelt on the main natural and economic characteristics of the Soviet Far East and analyzed the possibilities of the enlistment of this area in the process of the international division of labor based on the development of equal relations with all states of the APR.

Following the plenary session the participants in the meeting separated into three panels. The most populous was the first one, which discussed problems of security and disarmament and other questions of regional policy closely linked with the global task of the survival of mankind and the building of a civilized system of international relations. The course of the discussion showed that there is in the region an exceptionally diverse range of opinions and assessments of the causes of tension, sources of danger and methods of settling international conflicts. The composed and constructive nature of the discussion on problems of the development of relations in Asia and the Pacific made it possible to get a better idea of opponents' positions and map out points of contact of interests. The majority of the speakers supported the idea of the need for the creation in the region of a kind of negotiating mechanism for the solution of problems which had accumulated earlier and those which newly arise.

The role and significance of power methods as an instrument of conflict-solution were analyzed. Specifically, there was an ambivalent evaluation of nuclear weapons as a means of ensuring security in the so-called nuclear deterrence concept. It is still too early to speak of a concurrence of approach on this issue. However, a promising background, against which real changes in the direction of mutual understanding are possible, gradually took shape in the course of the discussions.

As the participants in the meeting observed, the Delhi Declaration, which calls for the conclusion of an international convention banning the use or threat of nuclear weapons, was an important contribution to the creation of an effective mechanism of the solution of regional problems. The interest of the participants in the dialogue was elicited by the proposal of J. Singh (India), director of the Defense Research and Analysis Institute, for the conclusion at the first stage of such a convention between India, the USSR and China, considering that these states have an extremely critical attitude toward the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

As expected, the participants in the discussion of regional military-political problems devoted attention to questions of a settlement of the conflict surrounding Afghanistan and Cambodia and dwelt on the positive changes in the direction of a normalization of the situation. M.S. Gorbachev's suggestion made in Krasnoyarsk for discussion on a multilateral basis of the question of a lessening of the military confrontation in the areas where the shorelines of the USSR, PRC, Japan, the DPRK and South Korea converge aimed at a freezing of and commensurate reduction in the levels of naval and air forces and a limitation of their activity was given high marks.²

The speeches of R.A. Scalapino, director of the University of California East Asia Studies Institute (United States), K. Randjbar, vice president of the Afghan Academy of Sciences, political commentator V.D. (Chopra) (India), Prof K. (Sayeki) (Japan), Prof D. Hellman (United States) and a number of other foreign and Soviet participants, granted a certain polarity of opinions and a dissimilar approach to the solution of international problems, evinced, as a whole, a sincere interest in the creation of a healthy atmosphere of international relations in the APR.

The work of the panel "Economic Development and Regional Cooperation" was, according to the comments of many guests, most lively and interesting. A number of specific issues directly related to the singularities of the development of Siberia and the Far East and the prospects of their participation in the system of the regional division of labor and the Soviet Union's place in the work of regional international organizations was discussed. The Soviet scholars P.Ya. Baklanov (USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Department Economic Research Institute, Khabarovsk) and V.I. Ivanov (USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO), practical organization executives I.Ye. Khotsialov (USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission), Ye.E. Obminskiy (USSR Foreign Ministry), N.G. Yakubov (USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations) and V.K. Lozovoy (Association for Practical Cooperation with APR Countries, Vladivostok) and others provided a comprehensive description of the economic position of the Soviet Far East and familiarized the foreign participants with the actual possibilities and prospects of its development.

The speakers emphasized that a notable feature of the restructuring and renewal of the Soviet economy taking place in the USSR is the particular attention being paid to the development of the country's Far East regions. It was for this reason evidently that the foreign participants in the meeting displayed the main interest in questions of the greater management autonomy which is being granted, the widening of the circle of economic partners from foreign countries, determination of the most priority areas of cooperation and formation of a concept of foreign economic relations which corresponds to the general strategic direction of the development of the whole economy of the Far East.

A big place in the process of discussion was occupied by the very approach to the problem of development of new areas, of the Far East specifically. And it was no accident that prominent representatives of the business world M.M. Earle (United States), S. Yoshida (Japan), (Dzh. Feyr) (New Zealand), E. Penalos (Colombia), E. Trigg (Canada), T. Sato (Japan) and others fully supported Soviet scholars' opinion that the fundamental changes in the USSR's economic potential and foreign economic relations on the Pacific coast are possible only given a concentration of efforts and resources on the development of areas which already have the prerequisites for this, specifically the Maritime and Amur regions. Also perfectly justified was our guests' interest in ascertainment of the legal and economic mechanism of the activity on USSR territory of joint ventures and the establishment of long-term economic relations.

At the center of attention was the idea expressed by M.S. Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk of the creation of special economically privileged zones for the entire Far East economic area and the proposal concerning the discussion of problems of the creation of special joint enterprise zones and the quest for conditions of economic dialogue acceptable to foreign partners. The new approaches to the prospects of economic development contained in Soviet scholars' speeches and underpinned by a frank analysis of the state of affairs in this field confirmed the seriousness of the USSR intentions concerning the establishment of extensive economic relations with countries of the region.

The interest displayed by the Soviet Union in the activity of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and its working groups and also other regional organizations appeared perfectly natural in this respect. Information concerning their important role in an extension of economic mutual relations in the Pacific was contained in the speeches of a number of foreign participants in the meeting.

In the course of the work of the third panel, which was chaired by B.M. (Diakh), chief editor of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, questions of cultural cooperation in the APR and the role of the mass media in strengthening peace, friendship and mutual understanding between peoples of the region were discussed. The

Soviet initiative of the creation of an international cultural and historical center for the APR was supported. It was decided to put international festivals and sports activities in various cities of the Soviet Far East on a regular footing.

The question of the increased role of human contacts between peoples was raised, perfectly legitimately. The expansion of tourism in the APR countries should contribute to a strengthening of mutual understanding and study of the unique diversity of their way of life and cultural heritage. The stimulation of contacts between scholarly and student circles and public organizations and an exchange of books, works of art and folk creativity would make it possible, as the participants in the discussions rightly observed, to do away with the old dogmas and cliches more rapidly. Many speakers said that they could not conceive of the development of humanitarian ideas without active support for antiwar movements in the region.

The Vladivostok forum had extensive repercussions throughout the world and, according to numerous comments, played an important part in the shaping of the new image of the Soviet Union and its people. Contributing to this were the candid atmosphere of the discussions, the meetings with inhabitants of the city and the visits to enterprises and organizations. The journalist S. Taoka, who had been moved by the good wishes of Vladivostok inhabitants, which, according to him, "typified people of every level in respect of the foreign guests,"³ described his impressions in the popular weekly supplement to the newspaper ASAHI.

The international meeting conducted in Vladivostok undoubtedly enabled many of the countries participating to really evaluate the possibilities of the Soviet Far East in the establishment of close cooperation with its neighbors in the region and to get a more graphic idea of the benefits and advantages (political included) to be derived from an extension of the regional division of labor and economic interdependence on an equal, non-discriminatory basis with the participation of all interested countries.

There are already many examples of the high evaluation of the Vladivostok forum's contribution both to the overall strengthening of an atmosphere of trust and to the search for specific directions and forms of the partners' interaction in the Pacific. Here is one. L.R. Shahani, chairman of the Philippines Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, who participated actively in the meeting, reported to his parliament on the undoubted benefit of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The organizing committee continues to receive letters from many of the foreign participants expressing gratitude and an awareness of the exceptional importance of such measures and a desire to participate in them in the future.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 18 September 1988.
2. See PRAVDA, 18 September 1988.
3. ASAHI SHIMBUN WEEKLY AERA, 1 November 1988, pp 30-33.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1989.

U.S. Work on 'Ethnic Weapon', EMP Effect Weapons Alleged
52000044 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
19 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by Tengiz Gamkrelidze, political observer of ZARYA VOSTOKA: "The Sleep of Reason Engenders Monsters: New Channel for the Arms Race; Mysteries of Secret Laboratories; 'Gene Wars'—Science Fiction or Reality?"]

[Text] Such a thing never occurred to the great Goya even in his darkest phantasmagorias. He called the series of his monsters "The Sleep of Reason Engenders Monsters." With what can one compare the monsters engendered by those who have forgotten about reason in our scientific and technical age? The appearance of weapons of destruction that, as scientists warn, "are capable of sowing chaos in the planet's ecosystem and of making life itself on it disappear," has become possible.

A militarized and over-armed world subject to the threat of mass destruction differs from the traditional notions of humanity about reason and a single family of earthlings living under the laws of humaneness and fairness. The nuclear age confronted everyone with the necessity of a revolution in minds and hearts. Being guided by the principles of the new thinking, the Soviet Union is prepared to renounce its status of a nuclear power and to reduce other arms to a minimum of reasonable sufficiency. It is prepared along with its socialist allies and all states to pave the way to a reasonable future for humanity.

But ominous specters arise along this way....

The Soviet-American dialogue unexpectedly and very rapidly spread from the political and military-political to the immediate military area. The world is seeing its visible results: the destruction of an entire class of missiles, the establishment of a verification system, increasing trust, and the striving for a mutually acceptable solution to the most important international problems.

For the first time in many years, the White House decided not to increase appropriations to the Pentagon, limiting the military expenditures of the United States to

the sum of \$300 billion. This, of course, is an enormous figure but it is symptomatic that there is not the usual "take-off" of expenditures for military needs. But the rosy hopes are hardly justified. It is a matter of a temporary measure taken only for a year "in the light of the urgent need to reduce the deficit." "After this, increases will be necessary," said G. Bush. In short, it is too early to speak of a change in Washington's philosophy of guaranteeing peace "from a position of strength."

There are still influential forces in the United States that would very much like for the new administration to take the course not of the further relaxation of tension but of confrontation in relations with the Soviet Union, not of expanding agreements on the reduction of arms but of their further increase.

Actions of this kind require disinformation. The WASHINGTON TIMES, the mouthpiece of the extreme Right, recently asserted that the USSR is continuing to produce bacteriological weapons and is even giving them to other countries.

What is behind these assertions? It is to justify the work under way in the United States in the area of bacteriological weapons and to create the impression that precisely the USSR is violating the 1972 convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons. In short, we "cannot be believed."

The Pentagon has the lamentable tradition of reacting with lightning speed to the destruction or prohibition of one kind or class of weapon by developing another even more sophisticated kind. The unsubstantiated version on the existence of such programs for America's "enemies" served as a justification for hundreds of research programs with biological weapons, in which about 150 government and private laboratories are involved. They still have the same "enemy image!"

In the creation of new types of biological compounds for military purposes that can "be used to destroy animals, crops and people," more and more attention is being paid to the latest achievements of gene engineering.

The U.S. Defense Department is assuring that the research is absolutely harmless, being conducted "exclusively for defense needs." But the paradoxical thing is that the larger the scale of the research, the more difficult it is to guarantee security measures.

This is shown by checks that the Pentagon performed in U.S. laboratories. Biological weapons can get out of control in all stages of their existence: in development, in warehousing, at the time of their destruction or even conversion. In the United States, there are well-known so-called "groundless" episodes of mass outbreaks of illness and theft of biological and psychotropic weapons by terrorists. Finally, it is possible that literal monsters—mutants—will appear.

That is not all. The scientific-technical breakthrough in the area of biology, which led to the appearance of biotechnology and gene engineering, also gave rise in the West to interest in bacteriological means of mass destruction. The danger arose of "a massed new biological arms race, which in the next decade will be quite capable to competing with the nuclear arms race." It is a matter of up-to-date methods for changing the hereditary structure of microorganisms, which seemed unthinkable just 10 or 15 years ago. Today, according to Pentagon specialists, it has become possible to create an "endless number of versions of that which can be called substances with assigned properties."

A "racial weapon" selectively affecting representatives of one particular ethnic group? Biological means that damage certain organs—the eye, for example—of enemy soldiers? Or, on the other hand, means that make one's own soldiers immune to fear? This is already ceasing to be fantasy, becoming a real but ominous phantasmagoria.

Finally, gene engineering can also be utilized to destroy specific species of agricultural plants and domesticated animals, if the objective is to undermine the economy of some particular country.

According to the World Health Organization, an air attack against a large city utilizing a bacteriological weapon such as anthrax, for example, can lead to the death of hundreds of thousands of people. And there are also pathogens for plague, tularemia, tropical fevers, encephalitis and other horrible diseases.

What qualities will these viruses or bacteria, deadly in themselves, have in a perfected form? And if new ones artificially created by man are added to them? Many scientists have come to the conclusion that the side subjected to a biological attack will be practically incapable of developing defensive systems against all possible forms of new pathogenic microorganisms.

There is also a danger in the fact that it is now becoming relatively inexpensive to obtain bacteriological weapons, whereby this is frequently already possible on the basis of chemical synthesis. In addition, their production can be organized so quickly that it is no longer necessary to stockpile reserves.

This is why the Soviet Union has so consistently advocated the total prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons.

There is another monster engendered by the disdain for the future of humanity. In the United States, work is essentially already being performed under the "Star Wars" program to create a nuclear microwave weapon. In it, the energy from the explosion of a specially designed nuclear device is used to produce a powerful directed stream of electromagnetic radiation. Devices of this kind, being exploded in space or on earth, are

capable of destroying the on-board equipment of missiles, warheads and artificial earth satellites and of disrupting communications systems, radar stations, power supply systems and other facilities.

The journal *SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN* presented data indicating that in the case of the explosion of a nuclear microwave device of only 1 kiloton force at a height of 30,000 km the area in which different facilities—electronics, computers, antennas, electric transmission lines, etc.—would be destroyed would be not less than 250 square km. And the journal *TIME* asserted that the explosion of a nuclear microwave device with a force of 10 megatons in space could turn practically all electronic and electric circuits and instruments within a radius of 3,000 km into a pile of "useless junk."

The possibility of the military application of the so-called electromagnetic pulse (EMP) was discovered back in 1962 during the testing of a nuclear weapon over Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. In less than a second after the explosion of a nuclear warhead at a height of 248 miles, fuses burned out, electric transmission lines failed and street lights were extinguished on the Hawaiian Islands 800 miles from the test site. It was later determined that these disturbances were evoked by a powerful electromagnetic pulse produced in the nuclear blast.

It is now known that the EMP disables radio equipment, the equipment of telephone stations, and computerized control systems. The more complex the electronic equipment, the more it is subject to the effect of the electromagnetic pulse. The EMP also affects man: it can produce third-degree burns, cataracts, loss of consciousness and even death.

In the Pentagon, they have long been thinking of using the pulse as a weapon, in particular against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The weekly magazine *U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT* makes no secret of the fact that the Pentagon is performing experiments with very powerful microwave systems capable of disabling the equipment of the adversary by "baking" their electronic stuffing, very much as a baby chicken is roasted in an ordinary microwave oven." The journal *SPECTRUM* notes that laboratory rats whose brains were subjected to microwaves went into convulsions and lost consciousness and memory. The journal asserts that a "microwave weapon that produces blindness, burns or deadly overheating in man can be viewed as a dreadful supplement to the existing arsenal."

It is dreadful, of course. The fact that it is based on the utilization of the latest achievements of science and technology does not change the essence of the matter.

This weapon, in the words of former U.S. Secretary of Defense Carlucci, "will change the appearance of the U.S. Armed Forces in the 1990's and in the period after that in such a way that it will give the maximum strategic edge."

This is what they continue to dream about at the Pentagon, which remains a kind of state within a state. The secretaries, just as the president, come and go but the Pentagon is continuing the race for new and more sophisticated arms, expecting that it will be maintained in the 21st century as well.

But those recent changes that mankind has witnessed could make the process of disarmament irreversible.

The most profound reasons for these changes are found in the nature of those powerful and menacing processes that have speeded up considerably toward the end of our century, in scientific and technical trends, in the arms race, and in the area of ecology and energetics. Foreboding phantoms still hang over humanity.

This gave rise to general alarm and also to an increase in responsibility—not just for one's own national affairs but for the fate of the entire world and all of civilization.

And the profound processes taking place in our society as well as the increasing pace of perestroyka are called upon to destroy the specters of yesterday, whatever fashionable clothes they may put on. Reason must reject the gloomy monsters of confrontation.

CANADA

Editorial Welcomes 'Conciliatory Atmosphere' in Vienna

52200006 Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
15 Mar 89 p A14

[Editorial: "Cold Warriors Starting to Smile"]

[Text] After 40 years of snarling at each other across the Iron Curtain that divided Europe after World War II, the cold warriors of East and West are risking some smiles.

The new conciliatory atmosphere is particularly evident in Vienna, where representatives of the rival Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations are discussing arms control. Specifically, they're talking about reducing the numbers of troops, tanks and artillery with which the Soviet Union and the Western allies confront each other in Europe.

It's not the first time such talks have been held. It is the first time that progress seems not just possible but likely.

As they opened the Vienna talks, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze struck remarkably similar notes. Baker's remark that "No state should possess capabilities designed primarily for an invasion" found its echo in Shevardnadze's call for "eliminating the potential for carrying out a surprise attack and launching large-scale offensive operations."

Even in the numbers game, the two sides are not that far apart. The Soviets propose reductions of 10-15 percent while NATO considers 5-10 percent cuts. But because each side counts its arms and forces differently, the gap isn't as wide as the figures make it sound. And there is agreement that the numbers of big guns—battle tanks, artillery and troop carriers—should be equal. In general, that means the Soviets cutting back to the NATO level.

If the talks continue to be as encouraging as they began. The end result may be defence of Europe that is non-offensive. Robert Neild, professor emeritus at Cambridge University, advocated such an approach in a background paper published recently by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

In Neild's view, the Vienna talks should aim at diminishing the capacity of the non-nuclear forces in Europe to mount an attack while increasing their ability to defend themselves. The resulting stalemate, he argues, would improve European security and East-West relations as well as braking the arms race.

Canada, an active participant in the Vienna talks, might well support such a goal—and not just because, if it were achieved, Canadian soldiers could come home from Europe.

For the peace and safety of the whole world, smiles are better than snarls.

Gallup Poll Shows Dip in Opposition to Cruise Testing

52200007 Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
6 Apr 89 p A13

[Text] Most Canadians still oppose the testing of U.S. cruise missiles in this country, according to a new Gallup poll released today.

Although 51 per cent of those surveyed said the American military should not be permitted to conduct the tests, support for the tests is growing.

Forty-four per cent agree with the Progressive Conservative government's decision to allow the flights, a six-point increase since a Gallup survey last year. Another 5 per cent said they didn't know whether the tests should take place.

In the 1988 poll, 54 per cent opposed the tests, 35 per cent said they should be permitted and 9 per cent didn't know.

The most recent round of testing of the unarmed missiles began over northwestern Canada in January and brought sharp criticism from opposition MPs. An advanced, "stealth" version of the U.S. weapon was launched in March.

In today's survey, opposition to the tests was highest in Quebec, where 64 per cent said they were against the tests and only 28 per cent were in favor.

Atlantic Canada gave the greatest backing to the tests—54 per cent, with 42 per cent opposed—while Ontario followed with 51 per cent support.

The tests were opposed by 49 per cent in the Prairies and British Columbia, and supported by 46 and 48 per cent, respectively.

The poll also revealed widely differing results from Canada's two largest cities, Metro Toronto and Montreal. While 52 per cent of those living in Metro Toronto favored continued testing, only 28 per cent of Montrealers said testing should go on.

Today's results are based on personal interviews 1-4 March with 1,024 adults.

DENMARK

Warsaw Pact Amphibious Forces Still Seen as Threat

36130061b Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 22 Mar 89 p 12

[Commentary by Michael Clemmesen, military affairs reporter for BERLINGSKE AFTEN: "The Dangerous Amphibious Forces and Little Denmark"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE AFTEN introduction]

[Text] Security. Even if the Warsaw Pact amphibious forces disappear, the threat against the Danish islands will not. The Soviet, Polish, and East German amphibious ships, and the assigned Soviet and Polish naval infantry, have for many years been a good tool in the secret defense debate. The units are useful when one wishes to illustrate the threat against Denmark for the politicians and the population. Because they are so obviously a part of "our" threat. And they are aimed at a politically sensitive area: Zealand.

It is not traditional to take the threat entirely seriously, it only means a threat against the Jutland mainland. In our defense history there has always been a long distance between a threat to Jutland and the nerves of the decisionmakers on Slotholmsgade and Christiansborg. But a threat to Zealand—meaning also *Copenhagen*—is quite another matter.

The misuse of this, our own politically useful threat, has now been turned about by circles friendly to the Armed Forces. Critics of our security policy ask, a little hypocritically, why did Denmark not ensure that these threatening forces were included in NATO's proposal at the recent disarmament negotiations in Vienna. It would have been reasonable to attempt to get this ostensibly large and goal-directed threat removed. It seems as though we knew that drawing naval forces into the negotiations now would make it difficult, to say the least, to reach a result which would improve the security of West Europe.

It is time to impart a little sobriety to the debate. That is most easily accomplished by thinking through what it would mean for the threat against Denmark if the three Warsaw Pact countries scrapped their amphibious craft and perhaps also deactivated their naval infantry units. That would mean that we would turn back to the situation before the 1960's when these forces were built.

If the ships are scrapped there would no longer be specialized material which could land assault units and supplies on an open beach without difficulty and improvisation. That does not mean that forces are prevented from landing from the sea, as Denmark and Norway learned less than 50 years ago.

The large mainland powers, Soviet Union and Germany, have a long tradition of crossing channels with available means. In the autumn of 1940 Hitler's Germany prepared to cross the English Channel using improvised means: river barges, etc. If Germany had won the "Battle of Britain" in the air, it is absolutely possible that such an "improvized" invasion could have been successful.

Even if the Warsaw Pact amphibious forces disappear, the threat against the islands will not thereby disappear. It existed before these units were assembled. In the 1950's we saw the threat against Zealand as a combination of airborne landings and landings from merchant ships.

Developments in later years, when compared with the impression which the debate must create, undermine the importance of the threat from traditional amphibious landings. The development of amphibious forces in East Europe has always been halfhearted. It has never lived up to what we expected. The forces were usually left out in the cold when resources and new material were allocated. For example, a large, modern minesweeping capacity has never appeared. It is necessary, among other things, if the total amphibious capacity is to be regarded as balanced.

This low prioritizing of amphibious forces stands in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union's high prioritizing of the country's parachute troops. They have been equipped with new armored fighting vehicles, and the units have a size and fighting power which far surpasses the West's parachute units. At the same time the development of transport aircraft and a steadily growing lift capacity has made it possible to transport units with their new heavy equipment. Furthermore the development and massive procurement of combat helicopters and special support aircraft means that they can give much greater "fire support" to an airborne landing than before. When one compares the Soviet Union's parachute and helicopter units with their amphibious forces, it is significant to note that there are about seven times more of the former than the latter. It should also be noted that ordinary infantry units routinely practice landings with helicopters.

That means in reality that a deactivation of East Europe's amphibious capacity would change the character of the threat in the eyes of the observer, but would not decisively reduce it. It would then take the character of airborne and helicopter landings, the object of which would be to capture airfields and—primarily—harbors, where the heavy materiel and additional units could be landed. The larger harbors will probably be primary targets, because they can receive the large Roll-On/Roll-Off ships, which are especially suitable as military transports. Only if there also is a decisive reduction in the Soviet Union's parachute and helicopter "storm trooper" units will there be a decisive reduction of the direct threat against the islands.

This not to say that the removal of amphibious units would not simplify the problems of defending the islands. Such a step would also advance new ideas for improving efficiency and deployment of the three services. Also, because of the security policy situation and signals, there may be a unilateral deactivation of amphibious units. As the offered withdrawals and reductions in strength, such negotiation would reduce the Warsaw Pact's ability to attack without significant preparations, and thus could contribute to a peaceful development in Europe.

One can, however, also assume another viewpoint on an eventual reduction of traditional amphibious craft and landing forces in the Warsaw Pact Navies. In the United States Marine Corps they are going over to a new "doctrine" for landing on a coast. They are building up the ability to land from "over the horizon," meaning from perhaps 50 nautical miles distance, using modern air-cushion vehicles and new vertical takeoff transport aircraft and helicopters with heavy lifting capacity. Thereby landings can be made in far more places, and despite the defender's sea-mines and modern guns and coastal missiles.

The Soviet Union is not behind the West in the development of heavy transport helicopters, and it now has a new generation of large air-cushion vehicles in the Baltic Fleet.

Thus there will not necessarily be a motive common to all civil and military authorities behind an eventual inactivation of the forces which have been described as so threatening.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DER SPIEGEL Views 'Wintex-Cimex' Exercises
AU0505100589 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
1 May 89 pp 23, 25-27

[Unattributed report: "Ivan is Coming—Let Him Have It;" How the Americans Practice for the Big Nuclear Strike in Europe]

[Text] Shortly before Day X the military command team and a mock government enter the government bunker in the Ahr Valley and thus guarantee themselves a certain chance for survival. Inside the bunker one can say that the military rules. The greater number of soldiers underground alone hardly permits a real participation in decisionmaking by the few officials from other ministries. On the one hand, the officials are not as well prepared, on the other, they are not even informed about many confidential and secret events in line with the principles of "need to know."

This is the uneasy description by the representative of an FRG Land of the apparent circumstances of the NATO "Wintex Cimex-89" command post exercise, which took

place in Europe from the end of February to the beginning of March, and, as has become known now, dealt with the nuclear destruction of large parts of Germany.

"The 'Atomal' stamp sifts the chaff from the wheat," the report continues. "A small, exclusive circle deals with the planning of nuclear operations, in which only a very few—and by no means all of the politicians or state secretaries present—are permitted to participate. Troublesome interjections, for instance concerning the effect on the civilian population, are undesirable. During the "Wintex" exercises in the past years, the effects of the excessive use of chemical and nuclear weapons on the civilian population were not permitted to be simulated either. Otherwise, too many people at the Land, district, and local level would have heard about how the military leaders of NATO and the Bundeswehr envisage the future war. Negative reactions from the population would have been unavoidable."

This time keeping the secret did not work, so negative reactions from the population are probably unavoidable; and now those top politicians in Bonn, who have long known what has been repeatedly simulated by NATO every 2 years and have kept quiet until now, are discovering their consciences.

Last Tuesday [25 April], before the Bundestag group of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, Chancellor Kohl expressed his annoyance about "Wintex-89": "A scenario that is completely unacceptable for us Germans." On the same day, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said before the Bundestag deputies of the Free Democratic Party: "I swore an oath to avert harm from the German people, and that includes the GDR."

This time the military simulated the third—and, at least for the Germans, last—big war in Europe in such a way that nuclear weapons were not used as political weapons, which are considered to exist exclusively to prevent war. The goal of "Wintex-89"—all NATO states except France and Greece participated in the exercises—was, much more: to test nuclear weapons as military means. NATO opened the nuclear fire and then did something which has never before been practiced in command maneuvers: It carried out a second, even stronger nuclear strike.

This is how the exercise began: The economic crisis in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Pact states is skyrocketing; there are already bottlenecks in food supply. The Gulf war flares up again. After a violent civil war Yugoslavia breaks up. Part of the country wants to join the West and plans its accession to the EC.

The Soviet Union mobilizes its forces; NATO, too, calls its reservists to the barracks. Soviet forces cross Hungary to invade Yugoslavia. Following the "rapid reinforcement plan," NATO flies soldiers stationed in the United States to the FRG. The Warsaw Pact (Orange) attacks.

The NATO front (Blue) holds for only a brief period. The Soviets use chemical weapons against the FRG and Great Britain. At least 40 attacks with chemical weapons contaminate air bases in the FRG in order to prevent the refueling, maintenance, and launch of NATO aircraft. The military calls on the U.S. President to permit the use of nuclear weapons.

The West Germans in the Ahr bunker hesitate; the mock foreign minister is playing for time. The mock chancellor, Waldemar Schreckenberger, who is notorious for his fickleness, had already delayed the orderly announcement of the "case of defense" by the "emergency parliament," represented by officials of the Bundestag administration, because he forgot to sign the necessary document and returned from the bunker to his state secretary's desk in the chancellor's office.

The NATO commander in chief for central Europe exerts pressure and changes the scenario. He lets the "second echelon" of the East with their conventional weapons forge ahead "1 or 2 days" faster than envisaged in the maneuver plan. In order to be on the safe side, mock chancellor Schreckenberger asks the real chancellor for permission to use nuclear weapons in a first strike.

Attempts to reduce tensions by political crisis management were made by the Americans only as a matter of form and then considered done. The leading power, the United States, did not want to deter Moscow from continuing the war with nuclear warning shots. This time it wanted to practice a nuclear war and, if possible in any way, limit it to Europe.

Clearly what former Bundeswehr Inspector General Wolfgang Altenburg repeatedly assured the deputies in Bonn's Defense Committee is not true, that: in any case the Americans would first of all shoot a nuclear warhead at Soviet territory as a warning before beginning the massive use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. NATO commander in chief in Europe, U.S. General John Galvin, however, wanted to start immediately with a major nuclear conflagration: 21 nuclear warheads, each having a destructive power of up to 100 kilotons of trinitrotoluene, seven times as much as the Hiroshima bomb, were to be fired. The only thing the European partners were able to do through negotiations was to reduce the number to 17 nuclear warheads.

The Americans categorically refused to drop more than one of the bombs on Soviet territory, and this one nuclear bomb was not permitted to be dropped by a U.S. carrier. A British "Tornado" plane had to detonate the warhead above the Kola Peninsula, where the Soviets have a fleet base. Under no circumstances does the United States want to provoke Moscow to carry out a counterstrike on American territory.

All other nuclear weapons, launched from FRG territory by means of airplanes and missiles, including the "Pershing II" (which are currently being scrapped thanks to

the agreement between the superpowers), devastate and contaminate the Western front yard of the Soviet Union: Poland, the CSSR, Hungary—and the GDR; three of the nuclear warheads detonate over the second German state. Considered, the Americans forego the use of FRG aircraft and missiles against the GDR. This task is fulfilled by its NATO comrades.

However, this did not end the war. It continued, according to the directions of the NATO commander in chief, in a very strange way.

Contrary to all probability, contrary to the military rule of thumb that locations of nuclear weapons attract to themselves nuclear attacks by the enemy, the Soviets did not retaliate with nuclear weapons. The aggressors from the East contented themselves with a conventional response.

Maneuver staffs in Western Europe, also in the Ahr bunker, openly criticized the NATO script: It does not make sense, it is too far from reality. This did not help. The Americans did not want to simulate the devastating Soviet counterattack with nuclear weapons because the Europeans' defensive strength might have abated before its time; it would not have been possible to carry out the second nuclear strike according to the script, it would not have been possible to complete the madness.

This second nuclear strike was planned in complete detail in the "Wintex" scenario, even though the East had not defended itself with nuclear weapons: The Orange troops advanced further into the territories of the FRG and Turkey. Now 25 nuclear warheads were to stop the attackers; planned was the use of, among others, Lance short-range missiles and cruise missiles, which are currently still stationed in the FRG, Italy, and Great Britain. Now, after the invasion of the Soviet troops, the Germans in the FRG were to be subjected to nuclear fire; at least two nuclear warheads were envisaged for the FRG and two for Turkey in order to stop the invasion there.

The German and Turkish mock governments protested. Mock chancellor Schreckenberger turned to Kohl for help a second time. Kohl decided: "Stop this nonsense."

Three days before the planned end of the exercise, the FRG refused to continue. Nevertheless, the war continued. The Americans—and this is one of the bitter lessons of "Wintex-89"—ignored the protests of the allies. Said Foreign Minister Genscher: "We were unable to prevent them from doing this."

There was great dismay about the war game in Bonn after DER SPIEGEL revealed the NATO exercise in its previous edition. The "lack of instinct" of the Americans reminded the chancellor of another scenario: In 1983 a U.S. maneuver also included the digging of mass graves in the FRG.

Bonn's basic criticism is directed against the layout and course of the maneuver:

- What is practiced is not the prevention of war but the waging of a nuclear war, up to its follow-on use [preceding term in English].
- The United States is not willing to fully risk the destruction of its own territory. It has chosen Europe as the battlefield, without taking into consideration at all in its planning the devastating consequences for the civilian population.
- A suicide program is planned for the FRG; it must participate in the destruction of the two parts of Germany.
- The superpower reduces its Allies' right to participate in things from decisionmaking to informal discussions. The Americans' allies are demoted to second-rank partners.

The astonishing thing is that the dismayed cry from the ranks of the ruling Christian-Liberal coalition comes pretty late. The planning of the "Wintex-89" maneuver dates back to 1986. Manfred Woerner, then defense minister in the Kohl cabinet and today NATO secretary general, participated in the preparations. His short-time successor, Rupert Scholz, now distances himself from this with a hardly credible reason: The Bonn Government noticed too late what was afoot. The Americans, Scholz criticizes, permitted decisions only by military members and technocrats, "who lack the necessary sensitivity."

The quarrel about the short-range weapons has achieved a new dimension after the "Wintex" exercise: The entire NATO defense concept has come under discussion. The Bonn Government wants to put the currently valid strategy of "flexible response" on the agenda again at the NATO summit in May, in addition to the disputed mandate for negotiations on short-range missiles, because, after all, the Bonn Government did not imagine having to deal with an imminent third World War as was shown during the "Wintex" exercises.

Hans-Jochen Vogel, head of the oppositional Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] said that imagining what Europe, the FRG, the GDR, and, not least, the Eastern neighbors "will look like after such a nuclear inferno prohibits simply moving on to the agenda." Foreign Minister Genscher, too, has called for clearing up the matter. The coalition has become aware of the fact that the games with nuclear fire, which people now know about, do not quite increase the acceptance of the modernization of short-range missiles.

After the event, even those politicians who must have known about the plans because of their work react with outrage: From the very start no one looked for a peaceful solution to the crisis; the script prescribed a forced

escalation. Crisis management will be tested on another occasion, at the "High Level Exercise" ("Hilex"). The opposition experts complain that the scenario has been planned following a long outdated slogan, which, according to Deputy SPD Bundestag Group Chairman Horst Ehmke, says: "Ivan is coming over the hill; let him have it."

For SPD Deputy Horst Jungmann the "Wintex" script dates "from the time of the cold war"; it has lost "any connection with reality" because of the political developments in the Soviet Union. However, an "ideological enemy image" is growing in the heads of the military; calls for more money, more soldiers, and more weapons are always justified by saying: "As the 'Wintex' exercise has shown...."

Objections to "Wintex" were also made by the Foreign Ministry. Even though, according to the "General Political Guidelines" of NATO, attempts have to be made to ease tensions through direct contact with Moscow before there is any use of nuclear weapons, "the military wanted to proceed to the hot area as soon as possible," in the view of Foreign Ministry State Minister Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer. Her summary: "The question arises of whether what was played out there is still the prevention of war."

The central issue of criticism remains the insight that the currently valid NATO strategy of flexible response means the nuclear destruction of Europe in the Americans' view. This has never been made as clear to the Europeans as during "Wintex 89."

Ehmke: "Whoever wants to drive the Germans out of NATO has only to carry out such games." Foreign Minister Genscher: "An alliance is only viable if all partners are included in the risk," but how remains the big question.

The coalition, too, has in the meantime raised the question of whether the NATO strategy can remain valid in the future; according to this strategy, the Western alliance uses nuclear weapons if the attack of the conventionally superior opponent cannot be stopped otherwise.

For years the phrase "nuclear weapons as late as possible but as early as necessary" has hidden the fact that the Americans and the Europeans, but above all the Germans, understand this strategy in totally different ways.

The Americans have a clearly justified national interest in initialing limiting a nuclear war to Europe. No U.S. president would be willing to have a nuclear war in Europe immediately escalate to a big nuclear conflict between the superpowers with intercontinental missiles and to risk New York City for Hamburg and Boston for Bonn.

The Europeans, however, and in particular the Germans, cannot accept in their own interest that the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, will pursue their conflict on European territory and at first spare their own territories as far as possible; as all NATO exercises show, this is, however, reality at present.

Through the SALT Treaty the United States and the USSR are neutralizing their big weapons arsenals. Therefore, as "Wintex-89" shows, the Europeans have to proceed from the premise that in the case of being ready for a nuclear escalation, the United States will do this with the least possible risk to itself. At first, Soviet territory will be spared nuclear attacks in the hope that if the USSR reacts with nuclear counterattacks, it will limit its retaliation in the same way, that means not direct it against the United States but against Western Europe.

The course of "Wintex" also shows that the FRG Government, like its predecessors, did everything to prevent a public discussion about the brutal truth of the NATO strategy and about the devastating consequences for the Germans; no one should know what the situation would really be like in the FRG and the GDR after the use of chemical and nuclear weapons. Referring to U.S. regulations on confidential material, important information is even kept from the Defense Committee deputies. Only the NATO staffs that are controlled by no one are to really know what is going on.

"The stamp of secrecy must not be used to make a political discussion of questions of life and survival in the FRG impossible," Horst Jungmann says angrily.

CDU's Dregger Queried on Bonn's Missile Stance
AU0505151189 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 5 May 89 p 8

[Interview with Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag floor leader Alfred Dregger by Stephan-Andreas Casdorff; date and place not given]

[Text] [Casdorff] The United States and Great Britain reproach the Federal Government for its position on short-range nuclear missiles, which—they say—is opportunistic, solely oriented toward the upcoming elections, and much too uncritical of the Soviet Union. What argument would you advance against this?

[Dregger] The German position, which is shared by many European allies is not only in Germany's, but also in the alliance's interest. I think it is stunning that it is interpreted as a sign of weakness or "Gorbimania," or consideration for election interests. First, we are not weak; we have made more unpopular decisions than any government before us. Irrespective of that, in existential issues—and the German people's external security in divided Europe is an existential issue—aspects of secondary importance do not play a role, at least not for us.

[Casdorff] Washington and London argue that the Soviet Union's superiority is even growing, and that the Soviet Union now has more than 1,600 systems, and modernized ones to boot. U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney concludes from this that no negotiations should be held. Why do you hold a different position?

[Dregger] Cheney's realization that the Soviet Union's superiority in short-range nuclear missiles—with ranges of less than 500 kilometers—is not 14:1 but even 18:1, is correct. Because of their short ranges these systems are almost exclusively directed against Germany. An effective counterthreat by the West to this Soviet potential of pressure would be land-based systems able to strike Soviet territory. However, the deployment of such systems is prohibited under the INF Treaty. This treaty only permits land-based systems with ranges of less than 500 kilometers, that are unable to reach the Soviet Union.

Before new systems are deployed on the Western side that are able to strike the GDR, Poland, the CSSR, and Hungary, just as Soviet short-range systems can hit West Germany, an effort must at least be made to reduce the short-range nuclear potential, in which the Soviet Union has its largest superiority, to equal minimum levels on both sides—levels that must be under NATO's current stocks. The two superpowers should be all the more prepared to do so, because none of the central European states that are threatened by the short-range systems are able to unleash war. The Soviet Union has signaled a readiness to hold disarmament negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons.

[Casdorff] If it comes to such negotiations, a third zero-solution surely cannot be totally ruled out. And here it is obvious what Great Britain and the United States fear....

[Dregger] There is no reason to fear anything like that. In Bonn on 1 March, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov agreed to common upper ceilings, instead of a third zero-solution, and I expressly thanked him for this at the first German-Soviet forum in Bonn.

That can be a basis for the Western disarmament initiative. Under the present circumstances—Soviet superiority in all fields—it should rule out a third zero solution as being currently nonnegotiable, but it should propose a drastic reduction in the entire short-range area to equal upper ceilings.

[Casdorff] And how about the new missile that is to be deployed instead of the Lance? What would happen if the Soviet Union were not to reduce its potential to the extent that you consider desirable?

[Dregger] Only after it has become clear by 1992 that the Soviet Union is not ready to do so, can a reorganization of the West's deterrence in the short-range nuclear area be decided upon. Then, in accordance with NATO's

general political guidelines, the longer-range systems—in the framework of the INF Treaty—should be preferred to shorter-range systems. That means the Western side should place emphasis on air-based standoff weapons, while the ranges of the remaining short-range systems should be extended to 490 kilometers, and nuclear artillery should be totally abolished.

[Casdorff] Washington and London have expressed concern that the Germans are all too ready to accept Gorbachev and his disarmament promises, but in turn increasingly ignore the threat. Do you share these concerns?

[Dregger] Being a convinced supporter of the alliance, I do not consider the Soviet general secretary's propagandistic abilities alarming. They are, in fact, remarkable, although the personality and appeal of this politician must not be reduced to this aspect.

What worries me is the lack of readiness of some of the Western allies to take notice of the strategic situation of a nation that is the only one in Europe to be divided, and across which runs the military border between East and West.

That this was not taken into account when nuclear disarmament was begun—in the intermediate- instead of the short-range area, and in the form of a zero solution instead of common upper ceilings, as originally planned—is the reason for the present difficulties of the alliance, as was predicted by us in time. It would be worse if this were to be continued in the decisions that we are facing now.

[Casdorff] NATO does not have to react to an international crisis or to an imminent danger of war. However, it intends to find a concept that is supported by all partners in response to Gorbachev, and this concept will be agreed upon at the anniversary summit by the end of this month. Do you think that the NATO partners will arrive at a consensus in the short time that is left?

[Dregger] I agree with you. There is at present no danger of war. However, there is a great danger that, owing to lack of consideration for the other's interests, the alliance will harm its basis of confidence. I said so in February, in talks with the political and military leadership of NATO and representatives of the United States and Great Britain in Brussels and elsewhere—by the way, on the basis of a concept that has been included in the official German position. I now repeat it publicly in the hope that it will contribute to working out a common alliance position that can be supported by all, even if—as we all hope—relations with the Soviets were to improve.

Foreign Minister Genscher Reiterates: Defer Lance Decision to 1992

LD0505121489 Hamburg DPA in German
1058 GMT 5 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) has reiterated the German position that the final decision on the system to succeed

the Lance missiles should not be made before 1992. Referring to the continuing discussions in the Western Alliance, Genscher said today on Deutschlandfunk that by that time there will be greater certainty about developments in the area of conventional disarmament.

The second round of talks on conventional weapons which opened in Vienna today is intended to solve the central problem of European security, and this must be included. Furthermore, negotiations on short-range missiles are not only in the interests of Germany but are also a "well-founded concern". It is also in the interests of Western security that the East should reduce its superiority in this field. Without negotiations, however, it would be difficult to achieve this, the foreign minister said.

According to government spokesman Hans Klein, the most recent letter from Genscher and Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) to the U.S. Government once again outlined the German position. To his knowledge, there are no "new proposals" from the German side. Klein said that he is also unaware of any new proposals from Washington.

Media Coverage of SNF Modernization Controversy Surveyed

5 May Broadcast

AU0505142089 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0505 GMT 5 May 89

[From the Press Review]

[Text] WESTDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG writes that the controversy within NATO over the modernization of short-range missiles may give the impression that we are threatened by a new cold war. Not between East and West, however, the Duesseldorf daily continues, but between Bonn and Washington. While governments between Paris and Ottawa are trying in a businesslike way to mediate and achieve a compromise, the representatives of these two partners in the alliance are continuing the fight with their gloves off. The response by U.S. senators and the tough Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to the FRG demand for negotiations with Moscow is the thundering threat to withdraw part of their troops from West Germany. Is this the right tone between friends and allies? Probably not. The threat is not new, but it shows that the crisis within NATO has been smoldering for a long time and that the controversy over the missiles is only its outward expression, WEST-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG notes.

The RHEINPFALZ of Ludwigshafen is convinced that, in the meantime, a turn has become visible in the missile controversy, and that in the end the FRG Government may not be seen as the loser, but as the initiator of a sensible compromise. The chancellor has so far proved his staying power in the style of Margaret Thatcher. Nevertheless, there are critical questions he ought to be

asked: By having attached so much importance to a single issue—namely avoiding a “missile-related election campaign”—even before NATO has adopted an overall concept, he is putting the alliance to a severe test. For a long time, the FRG Government has limited itself to claiming its interest in NATO. However, this does not make a concept yet, RHEINPFALZ notes.

“The situation will be very tricky,” STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN suspects. It is questionable whether Bonn is really well-advised to look for allies within NATO and build up a front, so to speak, against the leading power. However, Kohl and his cabinet are struggling for survival. Unlike the times of the rearmament debate, one is aware of the change in the overall conditions: This time a missile-related election campaign could hardly be won. Still, what we need is not a test of strength, but a compromise. Neither side seems to be trying very hard to seek this compromise. The U.S. demand for new conventional missiles does not seem to be the appropriate approach either: It would hardly be possible to torpedo the newly stimulated disarmament talks on nonnuclear issues in Vienna more specifically, STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN concludes.

The *NORDWEST-ZEITUNG* of Oldenburg notes: As tempting as it might be—for reasons of domestic policy—to accept some confrontation with Washington or London, it would be just as silly to carry alienation too far and weaken the West’s position in the negotiations on conventional armed forces, which are due to be resumed in Vienna today, Friday. Since Bonn has to carry the main burden of NATO’s European pillar, the FRG uses both shoulders: As in the past, the FRG has to insist on specific German interests in the process of disarmament policy, but it also has to be aware of its responsibility for the stability of the alliance. This was a quote from *NORDWEST-ZEITUNG*.

8 May Broadcast

AU0805144289 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0505 GMT 8 May 89

[From the press review]

[Text] Editorial writers today continue to discuss the differences between Bonn and Washington over the missile issue.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: Tensions between Bonn and Washington are nothing new in the 40 years of the alliance’s history. In such cases, the U.S. ambassador to Bonn usually considered himself a mediator. The ambassador who is currently in office apparently sees himself rather as his President’s counsel and even adds fuel to the fire by his pointed remarks, including even the well-known warning about a possible troop withdrawal. Perhaps he should study the scenario of the recent Wintex-89 NATO exercises. Then he would understand German apprehensions. In these exercises,

all nuclear missiles were launched from or targeted at central Europe. Only one missile was permitted to hit Soviet territory. It is no coincidence that it had to be fired by a British fighter aircraft. We must conclude that the United States intends to back down if a nuclear inferno were to break out. That is why the Germans are so persistent.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG comments as follows: What annoys Federal Chancellor Kohl about President Bush and his press spokesman is not so much the alleged indiscretion following the telephone conversation between the two chiefs, but Washington’s cool disrespect and refusal to accept him. The United States does not want to be forced by Bonn to accept a compromise until the next NATO summit by the end of May. It wants to continue to patiently discuss the question of whether and when negotiations on a reduction in short-range missiles should be resumed with the Soviets. Kohl cannot have an interest in that for several reasons. It would show how negligible his influence in Washington has become and, in addition, it would deepen the conflict with Bush and would increasingly put the blame on Bonn. Thus, the United States would further isolate the Federal Republic and would make a compromise more difficult. If the pressure of time that the May deadline represents were to be removed, agreement could be postponed up until the NATO Council of Ministers meetings by the end of this year. The front of continental Europeans could also disintegrate, because the United States is perfectly aware that the backing for the Federal Government’s position is not as great as Bonn pretends. However, by this affront Bonn has also been put under pressure. After the coalition had vigorously intensified its demand for speedy negotiations, Kohl and Genscher indicated very quickly how much they are interested in a compromise that could be sold as a success, while relieving Bonn of the responsibility for the differences within the alliance. Washington has exploited this weakness. Superpowers do not like to be confronted by medium powers.

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG expresses a certain understanding for the U.S. position and writes: Nonetheless, we cannot reject Washington’s concerns. If we now accept disarmament talks on short-range weapons, and Gorbachev offers a third zero solution, the coalition will not be able to withdraw, given the next Bundestag elections. It will be impossible to insist that a conventional balance be achieved, because the opposition has practically abandoned this position. There are indications that Gorbachev will offer a zero solution. The denuclearization of Europe will shake NATO—in this case the withdrawal of U.S. troops is not without logic—and it will strengthen Moscow’s position as a European hegemonial power, even more so because Moscow does not give up its nuclear option, the long-range missiles. The risk that problems would be resolved by threats and limited conflicts would grow. Yet the danger that the old continent would become the target of nuclear weapons would not be banned.

9 May Broadcast

AU0905101889 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0505 GMT 9 May 89

[From the press review]

[Text] The press continues to discuss the differences within NATO about the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles.

The Koblenz daily RHEIN-ZEITUNG writes: Instead of seriously agreeing on a common strategy toward the Eastern innovator, Gorbachev, the Western allies are fighting in public. It is incredible how the new U.S. Administration is brutally trying to make the Bonn Government toe the line. Equally incomprehensible are the rude methods with which Mrs Thatcher, supported by a chauvinist British press, attacks Kohl and Genscher overtly and covertly. George Bush will have to make up his mind whether or not he trusts the Germans. Regarding the alliance, the following holds true: crises come and go, but NATO will continue. Hardly ever before have German interests been as identical with pan-European interests as they are now. Kohl and Genscher can therefore afford to remain firm.

The daily DIE WELT comments on the European initiative that U.S. President Bush is planning, and mentions two reasons for it: First, the United States will lose its leadership role if it leaves the diplomacy of motion to Gorbachev. Second, a situation is developing in East Europe which requires political solutions for the continent. The missile quarrel has clouded the great scene with egoism, fear, and resentment for too long. The world that we live in today is different. In reality, the communist camp is in a serious systemic crisis. Gorbachev is trying to find relief from some of his burdens. The West and its centers—the United States, West Europe, and Japan—are economic giants. If they are led with courage and resolve, they can bury the cold war on their terms.

SCHWAEBISCHE ZEITUNG, published in Leutkirch, stresses the following aspect: Behind the German-U.S. missile quarrel, a more fundamental issue is coming to the fore increasingly clearly—the issue of the U.S. troop presence in the Federal Republic. U.S. politicians and U.S. Ambassador Walters in Bonn think about it loudly. The U.S. troops might be withdrawn, if the Federal Government rejects the deployment of short-range missiles or even seeks to achieve a third zero solution. In the past, such considerations have always been considered as threatening. The Social Democrats recently have been reacting entirely differently. Are they pursuing a certain anti-Americanism that some people are finding smart, or have they lost track of one of the bases of the Federal Republic's existence and order? The security and freedom of the Federal Republic and its Western neighbors depend decisively on the presence of U.S. troops and weapons.

FRG, 'Anglo-Saxon' Attitudes to SNF Talks Compared

AU0805145889 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG in German 6-7 May 89 p 4

[Dieter Schroeder commentary: "Moving Away From the Alliance"]

[Text] This summer, when NATO will look back over 40 years of existence, it can consider even the current crisis in the alliance to be a success of its policy. The paradox is easily explained: After 40 years the Soviets have finally recognized that the policy of arms buildup, which was pursued from Stalin to Brezhnev, cannot split NATO and cannot drive the Americans out of Europe, that tensions strengthen the alliance and do not weaken it. A lesson of this failed policy was the threatening of Europe with SS-20 missiles, which, after serious debates, led to the counterarmament with intermediate-range missiles in the West at the beginning of the 1980's.

It was this escalation which obviously made Gorbachev recognize the fruitlessness of the policy pursued so far and start a process of thinking which seeks security by means other than military means. In reality, lack of security for the Soviet empire comes from within and not from without. The system, which cannot meet the economic, intellectual, and liberal needs of the people between Magdeburg and Valdivostok, is struggling against dissolution—not only in Eastern Europe, but also at the ethnic fringes of the USSR.

Dissolution in the East Bloc

The first results of the process of recognition among Gorbachev and his followers were glasnost and perestroika in the country and the double zero option for intermediate-range missiles abroad. Parallel to this, there is the process of self-determination in Eastern Europe, which is not hindered by Soviet tanks—clearly seen only in Poland and Hungary at first, but in the long run also unstoppable in other countries. Moscow can no longer afford an invasion like the one in Prague in 1968. The dissolution of the bloc has started.

Thus, what the West has always desired but for what it has never dared to hope has occurred. However, this process has a reverse side, too. The easing of tensions also makes the Western alliance loosen up. This is a natural process, which need not trouble anyone at first. If the development in the Soviet empire advances and becomes irreversible, this will also make the developments emerging in the Western camp irreversible and in the end will lead to the replacement of the post-war order in Europe.

In this case, it will be unavoidable to newly define security policy. It is only the question of whether this time has already come, whether the success of Gorbachev's policy can be considered secure. The Americans seem to doubt this more than Genscher, and recently

also Kohl. The other question is whether we can do something and what we can do to help Gorbachev to finally enforce his policy. In this respect, too, Kohl and Genscher seem to be more confident than the Americans. The speedy conclusion of the double zero option, the unilateral, even if still insufficient, disarmament steps of the Soviets, and the beginning of the talks on conventional disarmament in Vienna seem to support their attitude. It pays to talk to the Soviets. Should one first counterarm with short-range missiles—after all, the planned modernization is nothing else—in order to disarm later on? Why not make an attempt to fix common ceilings by means of negotiations, since a balance through counterarmament cannot be reached anyway, because of the Soviets' enormous superiority in this field?

Perhaps Washington and London could have been won over to this idea, if Bonn had not expected a bit much of them: First, it pushed through the postponement of the decision on modernization to the beginning of the 1990's, and then it quickly added the demand for an early start to negotiations on short-range missiles. In view of the mood in the FRG, the Americans and the British fear that such negotiations could quickly lead to a third zero option and to the elimination of all short-range missiles. In the FRG fewer and fewer people are scared by this idea, in particular since these missiles primarily threaten the Germans.

However, the Americans and the British, but also many French, even though their government is still keeping quiet at the moment, see their fear of Germany's "special path" confirmed, of Bonn's moving away from the Western alliance, which seems to be dictated by newly discovered "national interests"—interests behind which they suspect the old ones—when Genscher extends his oath of office to protect the German people from harm to the citizens of the GDR. The dissolution of the post-war order seems to be a bit fast for them, in particular since the new European "peace order" which Genscher is talking about is not yet quite visible.

There are also military reasons why the Anglo-Saxon NATO guardians find things moving a bit too quickly: The "strategy of inability to attack," which is now also professed by the Soviets, is still far removed from reality in view of their enormous superiority in short-range systems and conventional armed forces. One can accuse Margaret Thatcher of many things, but not of a lack of logic when she sees Bonn's policy as the beginning of moving away from the strategy of deterrence and flexible response, and when she fears the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the old continent as a result. Because both deterrence and the presence of the Americans are inconceivable once there are no nuclear weapons.

Not Being Afraid of Negotiations

The question is only whether one really needs nuclear battlefield weapons and short-range systems for this

purpose. Nuclear artillery could be eliminated unilaterally, since it only serves self-deterrence; and the short-range missiles could be replaced by other nuclear systems owned by the Americans. Of course, this conjures up another age-old specter of NATO, that of decoupling Europe from the United States. However, it has lost much of its effect since the Americans themselves started to call into question deterrence, flexible response, and the coupling of Europe to the United States.

Thus, it is not of much use to play through old rituals and to try to preserve outmoded dogmas at the NATO summit at the end of May. Considering all caution toward the irreversibility of the process in the Soviet Union, it is certainly necessary to think about NATO's future, its policy, and its strategy, and about what remains as the common point of the West. The "overall concept" must not be limited to disarmament, but must take into consideration the changing world. If the West has a goal, it need not be afraid of negotiations with Moscow. However, Bonn must not forge ahead so quickly that it loses the Americans, because nothing works without them. President Bush, on the other hand, must recognize that a purely defensive policy only increases the danger of losing the Germans and part of the Europeans.

Defense Minister Stoltenberg Cites Need for Defense, Deterrence

AU0705155489 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
6 May 89 p 4

[Ruediger Moniac report: "Stoltenberg: Defense Capability Continues To Be Vital"]

[Text] Bonn—New Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, from the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], has clearly spoken in favor of maintaining the Bundeswehr's combat strength. In an address to the 103d conference of the Association of House and Land Owners in Wiesbaden, Stoltenberg stated: "Those who believe that the capability to ensure defense is no longer required at a time of important changes in East-West relations are mistaken. They are dangerously mistaken. We must distinguish between hopes and realities."

Nobody knows whether the changes that have been initiated in the East bloc will lead to a lasting and far-reaching new orientation of the foreign-policy and military concepts of the Soviet Union and its allies, he stressed. For this reason, the capability to ensure defense "continues to be vital for us."

Referring to the current discussion about NATO's efforts to draft a comprehensive concept on security and arms control, where the modernization of the "Lance" missiles also plays a certain role, Defense Minister Stoltenberg emphasized certain principles that are indispensable for him. One of these principles is the FRG's incorporation in the Western alliance. In all current and

future negotiations with the East, it must be clear that it is Bonn's firm intention to "preserve the spiritual and concrete cohesion of the Atlantic alliance."

The second principle on which Stoltenberg bases his policy is the need to maintain deterrence, which requires conventional and nuclear weapons. He told all who—openly or indirectly—advocate a third zero option: "It is particularly nuclear weapons that, over the past 3 decades, have proved to be the political weapons that prevent war; for peace' sake, we must prevent their complete elimination."

Stoltenberg stressed the FRG's unreserved willingness to carry out arms control and disarmament: "However, this must never harm our security and stability."

Stoltenberg called on the Soviet Union to stop the arms race in the sphere of land-based short-range nuclear missiles, which it has not given up "so far." To reduce its "overwhelming superiority" in this sphere would be an "important confidence-building contribution to creating essentially better preconditions for arms control talks between the East and West," the new defense minister pointed out.

A few days prior to a meeting on Tuesday [9 May] at which Chancellor Kohl wants to discuss issues concerning the future of the Bundeswehr with the CDU/Christian Social Union Bundestag group, Stoltenberg stated on Friday [5 May]: "We must and will ensure that the relationship between the tasks and the means of the Bundeswehr is correct."

Besides social benefits, as granted to every other citizen, the Bundeswehr soldiers are entitled to "respect and support from all of us," Stoltenberg stressed. The Bundeswehr not only ensures peace in freedom, but it also protects an economic order that has proved its superiority over the centrally planned economy in the past few years.

SPD's Bahr Warns of NATO 'Crisis' over U.S. Call for SNF Modernization

AU0705143689 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 7 May 89

[Text] According to the disarmament expert of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Egon Bahr, NATO will plunge into its deepest crisis since its founding if the United States continues to insist on the exclusion of the nuclear weapons that are deployed in Europe from disarmament talks. Bahr told Sueddeutscher Rundfunk today that in his view it will possible to reach a compromise on the missile controversy at the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May if reason prevails. Following such an agreement, talks on short-range nuclear missiles in Europe could start in the fall or at the beginning of next year. Bahr described the West's fear of negotiations and Soviet disarmament proposals as evidence of its incapacity and of its lack of a concept.

GDR, FRG Doctors Reject Missile Modernization AU0905134989 Hamburg DPA International Service in German 1244 GMT 9 May 89

[Text] Frankfurt—Doctors from the GDR and the FRG jointly called upon their countries' heads of state and government to reject "any modernization" of short-range nuclear missiles. Their use would destroy "our fellow citizens in both German states," the German representatives of the organization International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) write in their appeal. "We, the physicians, know on the basis of our expertise that there is no effective treatment following the use of nuclear weapons," they say in their letter, which was published in Frankfurt on Tuesday. It is addressed to the Federal president, the Federal chancellor, and the chairmen of the GDR State Council and the GDR Council of Ministers.

SPD Chairman Vogel Warns About 'Cheating' Public on Missiles

AU0905110389 Hamburg DPA International Service
in German 1024 GMT 9 May 89

[Text] Bonn—SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel has warned the Federal Government about "grossly cheating" the public on the missile issue. He told journalists in Bonn on Tuesday [9 May] that prior to and during the NATO summit at the end of May, the government must not accept formulas that leave open the beginning of negotiations and make them conditional on further conditions. He said that the impression of a show fight was increasingly being created. However, the government was perfectly aware that the overwhelming majority of the people want negotiations to accelerate the continuation of the disarmament process, said Vogel.

Commenting on the U.S. threat of a troop withdrawal, the SPD leader said that the U.S. soldiers would stay as long as was in both sides' interest. He said that if the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament achieved results, such troop reductions could of course take place. Vogel did not rule out the possibility that during his visit to Bonn in June, Soviet party-state leader Mikhail Gorbachev will submit an offer for a "third zero solution."

The SPD leader said that the distrust about the Germans that has re-emerged in the United States is a serious problem. He added that, as had become clear during the quarrel over German chemical supplies to Libya, the distrust on the other side of the Atlantic was deep-seated. In this context, a certain disappointment at Federal Chancellor Kohl's position was also playing a role, said Vogel.

Response to U.S. Threat of Troop Withdrawals Over SNF

Kohl Stresses 'Mutual Assistance'

AU0905113789 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG in German 9 May 89 p 6

["CAS" report: "Kohl Calls for Mutual Assistance"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—Chancellor Kohl has reacted with great reservations to the announcement by leading U.S. representatives that the United States will remove troops from the FRG if the Germans insist on talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles. After a meeting of the Christian Democratic Union Executive in Bonn on Monday [8 May], Kohl pointed out that it is not his task to comment on these views, but he wanted to stress that the Bundeswehr also contributes to defending the Americans and that there is only "one security and one peace." The chancellor spoke of "mutual assistance" that is imperative to preserve "our freedom and our peace." The FRG would like the "U.S. friends" to stay in the country to ensure this.

Clarifying his position on a third zero option, Kohl again referred to a passage in his government statement which says that land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear systems must continue to exist in order to ensure NATO's strategy of deterrence. Kohl also referred to his conversation with President Bush, but only in a general manner. He did not want to mention any details, despite Washington's indiscretions. However, Kohl stressed that the talk was characterized by an "unusually friendly and cordial" atmosphere.

The chancellor also made it clear on Monday that he wants to achieve a compromise by the time of the NATO summit at the end of May and that he wants to make a decision by this date. Considering the current state of talks, "we will achieve this," Kohl stated. He did not want to comment on the Canadian proposal to set up a working group to discuss details of the German demand and which might continue to meet after the Brussels summit. What is important now is that one does not establish inflexible positions by means of press releases which do not facilitate talks, the chancellor stressed. We "must talk with each other," Kohl pointed out. [passage omitted]

SPD's Vogel Dismisses Threat

AU1005150789 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 10 May 89 p 2

["hls" report: "Vogel Does Not Believe in U.S. Troop Withdrawal"]

[Excerpts] Bonn, 9 May—The chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], Vogel, stated on Tuesday [9 May] that he considers the "psychological problems" that have emerged in the United States in connection with the controversy over the "so-called

modernization" of the "Lance" systems to be "serious." He does not believe, however, that the United States will carry out its threat to withdraw troops if the FRG Government rejects new missiles. "The troops will remain in Europe as long as this is in the interest of both sides and in the United States' very own interest." The United States itself accords importance to its military presence on the coast on the other side of the Atlantic and in the Pacific, he stressed. In addition to that, a U.S. soldier who is deployed in the FRG costs the United States only "half the amount that a soldier deployed in the United States costs." Referring to the current controversy within the alliance, Vogel stated: "What the West needs is new thinking, not new weapons." During his recent visit to Moscow, Gorbachev asked him: "Do you think I should suggest another zero option?" This shows who is taking the initiative in disarmament policy. [passage omitted]

Vogel called on the FRG Government "not to agree to formulas" prior to the NATO summit and the brief visit to Bonn by the U.S. President "that leave the start of negotiations open or make it conditional on other aspects." This would be tantamount to a "gross deception." The overwhelming majority of the Germans in the FRG and of the Europeans (Vogel referred to a decision by the European Parliament) are in favor of a Western initiative. [passage omitted]

NATO's Altenburg Rejects Criticism of 'Wintex' Exercises

AU1005143889 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 10 May 89 p 2

["fy" report: "Altenburg Annoyed About 'Wintex' Debate"]

[Text] Bonn, 9 May—"Disarmament talks on short-range nuclear weapons should not be a question of yes or no, but a question of correct timing. It is not a question of whether such talks should be held, but a question of when they will be held." This view was expressed by the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Altenburg, in an interview with FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in connection with the controversial issue concerning the inclusion of short-range missiles in the disarmament process. The general expressed concern about the fact that details of the strictly secret "Wintex" exercises, during which procedures for permitting the use of nuclear weapons are practiced, leaked to the public. As a result, the question has been raised within NATO whether such exercises can be repeated in this form and with the usual participation.

The highest-ranking NATO officer was referring to the public debate about numerous details of the maneuvers. It had become known, among other things, that in the course of the exercise, which takes place every 2 years—this year it was held between 24 February and 5 March—the permission to conduct 30 nuclear strikes was practiced, with the aim of involving all NATO states.

According to reports, two of the 30 nuclear strikes were also planned on FRG territory, but were not practiced during the exercises. The only "nuclear strike" on Soviet territory—the target was located on the Kola Peninsula—was "launched" by the British against opposition from the United States.

Altenburg criticized the fact that during the "Wintex" exercises and also afterward the impression was created in the political discussion that realistic scenarios of a possible conflict are being developed during the "Wintex" exercises, and that a decision is then made as to whether nuclear weapons are used, what kind of weapons and how many weapons and, above all, where they are used. All this is not a subject of the exercises, Altenburg stressed. The only thing that is practiced and examined is whether all participants, including the European NATO commander in chief (SACEUR) and the governments of the NATO member states, are capable of applying the different methods concerning the permission to use and the use of nuclear weapons in a technically perfect manner, whether they are able to handle electronic communication, and whether they are able to master the individual steps that are precisely stipulated. Short scenes are practiced consecutively for this purpose which have nothing whatsoever to do with the realistic scenario of an armed conflict and the way it develops, Altenburg stated.

Genscher Missile Stance Alarms CDU/CSU
*AU1005155189 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 10 May 89 p 2*

["fy." report: "CDU/CSU Embittered in Genscher's Shadow; Cheated Out of Credit at Home in Dispute over Modernization?"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—In the Christian Democratic Union [CDU]/Christian Social Union [CSU] Bundestag Group alarm and bitterness over Foreign Minister Genscher are being increasingly clearly articulated. The reason is his course in the question of the modernization of short-range missiles. In a session of the Bundestag Group Presidium, several deputies expressed concern that Genscher might make this issue a main "election issue" and use it as a "political anchor" to prevent his party from falling below the 5-percent limit. They are especially concerned that Genscher is increasingly openly aiming at a third-zero solution. A question that is of fundamental importance for the FRG's security must not be allowed to be used and abused in the election campaign, it was stated.

The concern about "fundamental positions" on the FRG's security is apparently not the only reason for the sensitivity about Genscher, however. There is also the assessment that the federal chancellor and the CDU could again win the approval of voters on the right-wing and left-wing fringes by resolutely representing alleged "national" interests in the controversy with the Americans over the issue of modernization. "We can score

here," it was stated. Apparently, the heated reaction to Genscher has also been caused by the concern that Genscher could reduce the CDU's domestic gains from the modernization dispute. Minister Klein, government spokesman and CSU deputy, warned the Bundestag Group against "making Genscher greater than he is" by additionally stressing that he is pushing through his course against the wishes of CDU/CSU. Bundestag Group Chairman Dregger said that it is important to continue to maintain a component of nuclear deterrence in Western Europe. However, the West has to take the initiative in the disarmament efforts, take Gorbachev at his word as regards his disarmament proposals, and clarify how serious he is about them, he said.

The CSU Land Group also criticized Genscher vehemently. Mrs Geiger and Mrs Spranger reproached him for trying to interpret the coalition paper one-sidedly as the successful achievement of the Free Democratic Party and as a document whose political aim is a third zero solution. Genscher's weekend [6-7 May] exhortation that the CDU/CSU should not talk so much and so loudly about modernization met with blazing indignation. It is the "height of insolence," deputies like Mrs Geiger and Mrs Spranger said, that the very man who speaks most frequently and loudest about this topic should make such a request to the CDU/CSU.

New CSU Land Group Chairman Boetsch also expressed reservations about the coalition compromise. However, he finally said that the CSU recognizes its own ideas in it, because the nuclear component and its importance are stressed. A third-zero solution is out of the question for the CSU. The concern that Genscher's course might lead to political separation from NATO was openly voiced by several deputies, among them CSU Deputy Lowack. In the Bundestag Group Presidium session, new Defense Minister Stoltenberg was restrained but not without expressing concern, when he explained and defended the coalition paper. The rejection of "early" negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles by the Americans and the Britons has to be taken seriously, as must the Americans' hints that they might withdraw their troops from Europe if the nuclear protection is no longer sufficient. On the other hand, Deputy CSU Chairman Zimmermann reportedly warned his Land Group against "being taken in" by these threats. He has been familiar with such threats since he became a member of the Bundestag, he said. [passage omitted]

Missile Rift Termed 'Psychological Warfare'
*AU1005135689 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 10 May 89 p 4*

[Commentary by Josef Joffe: "Psychological Warfare Among Allies"]

[Text] What is the difference between "not now" and "soon"? The only controversial issue in the quarrel over missiles seems to be the date of talks that are to start with the Soviets on short-range nuclear missiles. In reality,

however, the quarrel goes much deeper; only on this assumption does it seem comprehensible why both sides—the Anglo-Americans on one side, and the Germans on the other—stick to their positions so stubbornly and in such an embittered manner.

It should be a matter of routine for diplomats who frequently draft communiqués to build a wordy bridge between “not now” and “soon” by the end of May, when the NATO summit will take place. They only need to proceed on the basis of the “present state of decisions”—a term that is very popular with diplomats—which excellently combined German and allied interests in June 1987 (see Reykjavik NATO communiqué). At the time, the alliance met the FRG's demand for a “comprehensive concept,” and a key sentence of the communiqué states that NATO wants “verifiable reductions” to “equal ceilings” in the sphere of short-range nuclear missiles (SNF)—but only “in connection with the establishment of a conventional balance.” This statement was not only signed by Bonn, it was also clearly influenced by Bonn.

In other words: Agreement had been reached to first concentrate on the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's historic superiority of tanks and guns, which 30 years earlier caused NATO to adopt the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile Bonn—there is no way of glossing this over—has deviated from this basis, but it should not be difficult to build a new basis in cooperation with the others. The NATO summit at the end of this month could decide, for example, to establish a committee of high-ranking officials (a special consultative group, in NATO jargon) which should think about a negotiation concept at this point.

In that case, Washington and London would have to soften their “not now” and the Germans their stubborn “soon.” Washington and London would have to develop more understanding for the concerns of the Germans who want to reduce the nuclear superiority of the Soviets which mainly threatens central Europe. Bonn, however, must not forget that it cannot dictate to the Americans, the British, and the French how they should protect their troops. The argument “no nukes, no troops” is only one aspect of psychological warfare among allies; Bush and Thatcher also depend on the wishes of their voters who do not always orientate themselves according to the facts of realpolitik.

The truth is, however, that the problems are much more serious. One of these problems is—and there is nothing to gloss over here, either—that over the past few weeks German foreign policy has lost a lot of the confidence that it enjoyed in Western capitals. It is not possible to pursue one policy on one day and a different one the next day without causing doubts and distrust. The comments of editorialists in Washington, London, and Paris, which contain terms like “German megalomania,” “Gorbimania,” and “betrayal of the West,” are not a reflection of reality but of deep-seated fears. These fears, however,

have already found their way to the offices of heads of governments, particularly in places where the approach is low-key: in Paris, for example.

Instead of discussing sensible ideas—including the reduction of short-range missiles—insinuations are made on both sides, such as: “What do the Germans really want—denuclearization and subsequently the dissolution of NATO?” People in our country suspect: “Do the others want to make Europe a nuclear battlefield?” Both questions are absurd: The FRG by no means wants to cut off its ties with the West, and the Anglo-Americans would not even think of sacrificing their 500,000 million soldiers and their relatives to a clearly limited holocaust. What is needed is sobriety. For another thing, it would also be a tragic irony if we established the same hostile images in the West that we are systematically dismantling in relations with the East.

Sobriety is all the more needed because the path of disarmament will be long and complicated. Marshal Akhromeyev, Gorbachev's military advisor, reminded us recently just how complicated it will be. The Soviet Union is not at all prepared to reduce its twelvefold superiority in the sphere of short-range missiles—unless NATO reduces its alleged superiority in the field of aircraft for nuclear strikes, which the marshal put at 1,300. NATO, however, indicates a 2,000-unit superiority of the Warsaw Pact in this field.

Such quarrels over figures make one thing obvious: The cold war may pass, but superpowers and their interests continue to exist. They also show that there is a snag, despite goodwill on all sides: If there is no agreement so far as to the quantity of weapons that both sides possess, a treaty that rids Europe of the military burden will not be ready for signing tomorrow. Just like Ostpolitik, disarmament policy requires a great deal of staying power, and therefore Bonn and its allies would be well advised to place more confidence in each other instead of leveling accusations against each other.

Soviet Ambassador on SNF Modernization Consequences for INF Treaty

STERN Interview

*AU1005121289 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 10 May 89*

[Text] Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, Soviet ambassador to Bonn, has warned of more far-reaching consequences if new U.S. short-range nuclear missiles were to be introduced in Europe. The Soviet Union considers this the destruction of the business basis of the treaty on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, among other things, said Kvitsinskiy in an interview for the illustrated weekly STERN that was prereleased today [10 May].

The NATO missile modernization issue will be discussed at the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May.

Editorial Criticizes Comments

AU1205111089 Hamburg DPA in German
12 May 89 p 2

[Bernt Conrad editorial: "Very Old Thinking"]

[Text] Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinskiy has the right to publicly comment on current political problems in the FRG. However, that in doing so he applies the stick of rhetoric as his predecessor Falin did in Brezhnev's time, and is trying to bring pressure to bear on the Federal Government, hardly demonstrates "new thinking."

Kvitsinskiy said that if NATO were to introduce a "Lance II system," "a big ugly and strange stain would appear on the new page of relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union that we have just turned." This warning is all the more amazing since the Federal Government is known to advocate no decision before 1992 on the production and deployment of updated Lance missiles. So why this threatening gesture? Does the ambassador think that a kick of the shinbone—in advance, so to speak—will do no harm? That is purely Brezhnev style.

Equally dubious are the disarmament policy arguments of the former missile negotiator (who ought to know better): "What is now to be introduced as 'Lance II,' is currently being scrapped in our country, because of the zero solution for intermediate-range missiles—the SS-23's," claims Kvitsinskiy. If NATO builds a missile that may have a range of 20-50 kilometers less than the SS-23, he says, "then it is a cheat."

The reality looks entirely different: In fact, the Soviets are indeed abolishing the SS-23 missiles; however, they are replacing them with SCUD missiles, which have a range of 300 kilometers. Is that not a "cheat"? In addition, Moscow has been replacing its not very accurate FROG short-range weapons with more reliable SS-21 missiles since the early eighties. Under Gorbachev, the stock of SS-21 launching pads has increased considerably. On the whole, the Soviets have a 16:1 superiority in this area.

The ambassador does not say a word about these facts. That does not demonstrate "glasnost," nor does it prove Gorbachev's repeatedly stated readiness to eliminate military asymmetries.

Politicians React to Latest Gorbachev Initiatives

Kohl: 'Step in Right Direction'

LD1205111589 Hamburg DPA in German 1026 GMT
12 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has described Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest disarmament proposals as a step in the right direction. In a statement from the chancellor, published in Bonn today, he said that, in the details made known so far, he sees it partly as a result of his demand to the Soviet Union to reduce its "extreme superiority," both in the sphere of conventional forces and in that of short-range nuclear systems.

Kohl stated that it remains of decisive importance to the Federal Government to achieve greater security with fewer weapons and fewer soldiers. It is important that the defense alliances in East and West should not be able to mount surprise attacks or invasions. "This requires growing mutual trust, and we want, in particular, confidence-building measures which give both sides a clear perception of the strength of the others."

Kohl said that the Soviet proposals, which are being carefully examined with the alliance partners, must be measured by this yardstick. The more rapidly the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact is removed, the better will be the prospects for agreement on short-range nuclear systems. "Therefore the Federal Government urges rapid progress in the Vienna negotiations."

Kohl once again expressed the conviction that full agreement will be reached on a comprehensive concept for the alliance by the time of the NATO summit at the end of May. The proposals of the governing coalition, which he submitted to the Bundestag on 27 April, provided a good basis for the discussion in the alliance.

Dregger Welcomes Missile Withdrawal

LD1205102889 Hamburg DPA in German 0930 GMT
12 May 89

[TEXT] Bonn (DPA)—Alfred Dregger, leader of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] Bundestag group, has welcomed Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement of the unilateral withdrawal of 500 short-range nuclear missiles. In Bonn today, Dregger said the Soviet Union is in this way complying a demand which the federal government and CDU/CSU have been making for several years. More extensive disarmament is still necessary, however, since the Soviet Union would still have at least a tenfold advantage.

Dregger said that the dismantling of 500 Soviet warheads does not alter the fact that Moscow has an "extraordinary superiority" in short-range nuclear missiles. This creates a particular threat to central Europe and especially to Germany. Dregger advocated equal, agreed, monitored upper limits at a level below NATO's current strength.

Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) told journalists that Gorbachev's proposal is a step in the right direction. He pointed out the fact, however, that the Soviet Union has been "building up huge stocks of arms" in the field of short-range missiles. The Soviets have 1,450 missiles while the West has only 88 Lance missiles. Stoltenberg called on Moscow to reduce its short-range missiles to the number possessed by the West. Then there could perhaps be negotiations on upper limits in this area.

Further Reactions

LD1205122589 Hamburg DPA in German 1122 GMT
12 May 89

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl today described Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament proposals as a step in the right direction. [passage omitted] In the view of Horst Ehmke, deputy leader of the SPD [Social Democratic Party] parliamentary group, Gorbachev has once again taken action while NATO argues. The disarmament proposals make allowances, not least, for important Western security interests. If Gorbachev is not taken at his word now, then the alliance will risk a further loss of credibility. [passage omitted]

In the view of the Green party, there is now no alternative for the Federal Government but to be prepared for a third zero option. With his initiative, Gorbachev had not only begun a discussion on the dismantling of short-range missiles, but has also given momentum for further zero options in artillery and aircraft bombs, said Alfred Mechtersheimer, a Green party Bundestag deputy. [passage omitted]

Bernd Wilz, the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] parliamentary group's defense spokesman, spoke on Saarland radio in favor of a unilateral disarmament proposal from NATO in the area of nuclear artillery. There should be "calm" consideration, here, of whether "we should remove further nuclear warheads, after having already scrapped 2,500 over the past few years." Nuclear artillery, given its short-range nature, is not in the interests of Germany, because it "could only strike German territory."

SPD's Bahr on 'Wintex' Concept, NATO's Future
AU0805194389 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
8 May 89 pp 22-26

[Interview with SPD security expert Egon Bahr by Richard Kiessler and Klaus Wirtgen; date and place not given: "We Are the First Battlefield"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr Bahr, NATO's latest "Wintex Cimex" exercise has shown a terrifying scenario: The nuclear war between West and East takes place almost exclusively in central Europe. Do you take such a concept seriously?

[Bahr] I have to take it seriously, because these exercises show what is to happen in reality. I have to take it seriously, because it shows that in an emergency there are no consultations that deserve this name. The nuclear powers act according to their interests. "Wintex" has confirmed that these are not our interests.

[DER SPIEGEL] By consultations you mean deliberations about whether nuclear weapons are to be used?

[Bahr] Yes, these deliberations were neglected. They will always be neglected, because consultations are nothing but a friendly talk—"if permitted by time and circumstance." Consultations are not the right to veto any decisions. No German chancellor will ever have the right to veto the use of nuclear weapons on our territory.

[DER SPIEGEL] The exercise proceeded from a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact states, to which the West retaliated with nuclear weapons. Is this premise realistic?

[Bahr] I am surprised by the almost childlike lack of confidence or the overconfidence of NATO, which plans such a course of events. I suppose that the Soviets read newspapers. Then for years they have been reading about which NATO trap they will fall into. They are to let their excellent conventional attack units "burn out" and, shortly before they are—perhaps—successful, there will be nuclear strikes, which of course not only "smear" us "to pulp," but also the Soviet attack units. And as a response the Soviets again use conventional armed forces. This is a ridiculous concept.

[DER SPIEGEL] Should NATO proceed from a nuclear first-strike by the Soviet Union?

[Bahr] In any case, I note that these exercises do not at all take into account the military plausibility of the Soviet side. In many points we, in NATO, practice worst-case thinking. But in this case it is the best of all possibilities: The evil Soviet Union is acting in our interest. This is completely unrealistic. I consider it conceivable that the Soviet Union would start with nuclear strikes if everything were to depend on it.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is NATO's motive for this—as you say, unrealistic—war game?

[Bahr] First, NATO's proclaimed right to nuclear first-strikes demands its "exercise." Second, it has always been done this way. Third, the concept comes from a time when NATO was superior in nuclear weapons and was able to make the decision about escalation. We, NATO, were able to decide in a sovereign way when to cross the nuclear threshold. However, this has not been the case for years; in the meantime, the Soviet Union has acquired the ability to make the decision on the use of nuclear weapons with small battlefield weapons, of which they have even more than we do. But NATO refuses to draw the consequences from this changed situation. It continues to proceed from the fact that the Soviet Union will exercise nuclear abstinence.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does the layout of this NATO exercise have any effect on the future disarmament policy of the Soviet Union?

[Bahr] I think that the Soviet Union was probably surprised by what has now been published about "Wintex"—much as we were. Like us, the Soviet Union probably expected that there would be one or two warning strikes—one over the Baltic Sea—and no war-head hits on the Soviet Union.

[DER SPIEGEL] Following the slogan: The nuclear war starts at sea?

[Bahr] In any case, with a nuclear warning. Now, in view of what has been published, it will think about how it has to react in case of war. Concerning other actions, I can imagine that the Soviet foreign minister will internally discuss some matters with his American counterpart; I do not expect any public Soviet reaction. I also do not expect any reaction concerning disarmament policy. This proceeds from the premise of preventing war and not preparing for it. The NATO strategy has to prepare for war. Therefore, no direct consequences for disarmament can be derived from "Wintex."

[DER SPIEGEL] But certainly there are consequences for the Americans' allies in Europe. The Americans claim that they will not permit the alliance partners to be subjected to different risks. Hamburg is reportedly as important for the United States as Boston. Does the "Wintex" exercise not contradict this thesis?

[Bahr] I would like the Americans to take this thesis seriously. In reality, we in the FRG are living under unequal security. We are the first battlefield, at least for a conventional war. We would also be the nuclear battlefield, even if America does not suspect this or does not have to fear any nuclear strikes.

[DER SPIEGEL] How can the risk be distributed equally?

[Bahr] For this purpose, the United States would have to guarantee with its full existence the common security in a case of an attack on the FRG, as we do with our full existence. This means that there must not be any nuclear weapons on our territory which might limit the war. The so-called nuclear umbrella must exist only under the undoubted inclusion and direct risk of the Americans through the use of their strategic weapons.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why should the Americans do this and voluntarily increase their risk? Furthermore, they say that they need the short-range missiles in order to protect their troops in Europe.

[Bahr] There are 250,000 Americans here. I can certainly say that these 250,000 Americans live under the same security as 60 million Germans. They should benefit from the same security advantage which we would enjoy without nuclear weapons.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the U.S. view, this would not be an advantage; the voices of those who say bring our boys home would be raised.

[Bahr] This would be an announcement that America no longer wants to share our risk and that the nuclear guarantee of the United States no longer applies. It would be an announcement that the risk-sharing no longer applies. This would mean decoupling. I do not think that America would be stupid enough to leave us at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

[DER SPIEGEL] Thus you equate the existence of short-range weapons in Europe with the Americans' decoupling from their alliance obligations?

[Bahr] I have always held the view that the strategy of flexible response is basically aimed at the following: A nuclear conflict must not escalate to "over-all nuclear war," this means to the use of strategic systems. The currently valid NATO strategy wants to limit the war to Europe. Sticking to the valid NATO strategy means decoupling.

[DER SPIEGEL] Thus the quarrel about the short-range missiles is in reality a quarrel about the alliance strategy of flexible response?

[Bahr] But of course—because America has been suffering from a trauma from which it has not recovered until now, ever since the Soviets developed the intercontinental missiles at the end of the 1950's. This meant that for the first time in its history America became vulnerable. As a reaction, intermediate-range and short-range missiles were deployed in Europe, thus minimizing the risks to America. After the treaty on the elimination of the intermediate-range weapons, we now have the situation in which the short-range systems are the last U.S. instruments which are capable of waging a nuclear war in Europe. If they are gone, America faces the need to accept the full risk of nuclear weapons from the very first

moment. The elimination of the tactical short-range nuclear weapons from European soil is the guarantee of an almost equal security risk—and this is the future of NATO in general.

[DER SPIEGEL] The American and British allies do not want to agree to early negotiations with the Soviets, because this might lead to a zero option for short-range weapons. The Soviets could offer a zero option now. Where is the difference?

[Bahr] You are right: We are afraid that the Soviets will now propose a zero option. Indeed, this cannot be prevented, not even by the so-called modernization, because this involves a new weapon.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Americans have indicated that they will not be in the least impressed by such a proposal by the Soviet Union.

[Bahr] Correct. I can understand this. The Russians have only one reason for not proposing a zero option now: They want the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces to continue. They do not want the American position on disarmament to be blocked. Because as a nuclear power the Soviets know the United States' actual reasons, therefore they can understand that America does not want to let go of this ace of potentially limiting a war to Europe. Thus the Russians will accept the goal of the negotiations explained by the West concerning a common ceiling at a lower level.

[DER SPIEGEL] As an intermediate result.

[Bahr] I hope that it will only be an intermediate result. I add: The Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] does not demand a zero option immediately, either. We, too, accept that the focus must be conventional disarmament. If this goal is achieved and we have a structure of conventional armed forces at an equal low level, then we really do not need nuclear weapons any more. I think that we will be able to win the Russians over to this idea.

[DER SPIEGEL] Perhaps Egon Bahr has succumbed to Gorbachev fever. The allies are afraid of a special German way and are therefore opposing Germany in the missile controversy.

[Bahr] This is a superficial argumentation. They try to make us afraid or put us on trial with this. In reality the question arises: Will the alliance, which has worked so far and which has not had to live through a serious crisis in its entire history, prove itself to be willing for and capable of disarmament at the moment where the threat from the East may disappear? So far, NATO has only shown that it is excellent in armament.

[DER SPIEGEL] As long as the threat worked....

[Bahr] The objective threat from conventional Eastern superiority cannot be disputed. If the alliance is willing to disarm, then the strategy of flexible response has to be changed. After all, it is not the Bible. Otherwise, we will slide into a profound crisis.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is the new military strategy to look like?

[Bahr] The new NATO strategy must be based on the principle of equal security. I do not need a strategy of nuclear response; the nuclear response is only given by the nuclear powers—in line with their criteria and their decisions. If you like, the nuclear weapons will resume the character of political deterrence, based on equal security.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is the FRG so sovereign that it can prevent the deployment of the new missiles against the will of the NATO partners?

[Bahr] Yes; without any restrictions, yes. Today states are generally distinguished solely by the fact of whether they have nuclear weapons or not. The sovereignty of the nonnuclear states is restricted to the extent that these nonnuclear states never decide on vital issues of the nuclear powers; the reverse, however, is true. The only sovereignty which nonnuclear states have lies in saying yes or no to the deployment on their territory.

[DER SPIEGEL] At the moment it looks as if the government and the opposition are pulling on the same rope in order to delay the decision on new short-range weapons. Do you see the current comrades still at your side if you make more far-reaching demands for a new NATO strategy?

[Bahr] No, I do not. Concerning the others, I see this as being much narrower and much closer to the view that these are weapons that threaten the existence of our state and our people, and we cannot accept them. From the chancellor's view this means: If I do not formulate our interests concerning this vital question for my people, I have to be driven out of Schaumburg Palace [the chancellor's office]. But I do not see that the coalition has reached the insight that the preservation of the NATO alliance particularly calls for the abolition of these weapons.

[DER SPIEGEL] Thus, in a future discussion about strategy, there will no longer be agreement?

[Bahr] Not only on this question. Contrary to the SPD, the coalition parties think that they cannot forego nuclear battlefield weapons.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you want to argue in the 1990 Bundestag election campaign concerning the missile question?

[Bahr] I do not yet know the results of the NATO session at the end of May. I do not know which formulations the FRG Government will be ready to make. We will not let ourselves be cheated and not accept any formula that postpones the decision on the missiles until 1992.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr Bahr, can you imagine that you will again work in an FRG Government, perhaps as the security adviser of a Social Democratic chancellor?

[Bahr] I not only imagine this, but I would desire this from the bottom of my heart. But you will have to ask the next chancellor in this respect.

Romania Alleged To Be Building IRBM Plant

MBB Company, Condor Project Said Involved
AU0805102389 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
8 May 89 pp 166-68

[Unattributed report: "The Same Plant Is Under Construction in Romania"]

[Text] The missile technology of the Munich weapons concern Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) has apparently also been supplied to the East Bloc from Argentina via Egypt and Iraq: In Romania a plant for intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads is allegedly under construction—on the basis of plans that were drafted with German help for similar plants near Cairo and Baghdad.

The meeting of the ruling Communist Party that ended on 14 April should have actually been a routine session. However, party leader Nicolae Ceausescu announced a sensation on the closing day:

His country is now in a position to produce nuclear weapons: "Technically, we are able to do that."

The dictator did not reveal why the socialist republic, which has been plunged into misery by its megalomaniac leader, should operate such a nuclear plant that involves enormous amounts of money. He did not disclose either how his military should use the weapons of mass destruction against an enemy in case of need: Romania's obsolete Air Force is hardly in a position to launch a nuclear strike, and the four dozen Soviet-made launchers for short-range missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads are more of a threat to Romania than to potential foes.

Another sentence of Ceausescu's speech, however, which did not attract much attention at the beginning, hints that Romania might already have made arrangements for the transport of future nuclear warheads. The egomaniacal dictator stated that Bucharest, in competition "with the best products that are manufactured worldwide," is able to produce "equipment and machinery of all types"—including intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, according to an insider.

A gigantic plant is currently under construction in Ceausescu's empire, similar to the ones in Iraq and Egypt (DER SPIEGEL 18/1989), an engineer specialized in missile technology and projects of this kind, who was involved in the construction of the Iraqi and Egyptian plants, reported a few days ago. His familiarity with the details, original plans, and business documents in writing are proof of the authenticity of his statements.

He learned details about the Romanian project from reliable sources: The manager, Wistuba, "who was also responsible for the production facilities in Iraq, repeatedly talked about his work at the Romanian plant."

According to the report, Wistuba arrived in Iraq in 1988 to "adjust a precision machine, by means of which missiles bodies [Raketenhuelen] can be manufactured with an accuracy of hundredths of millimeters." When he arrived, Wistuba stated that "this is the second time this week" that he "installed such a thing." He had "just done the same thing in Romania."

When asked about the plausibility of such a deal which is hardly believable, members of secret services nod their heads meaningfully. Some admit openly that they have already heard of the East-West missile deal. Bonn government officials see their worst fears confirmed.

Through sensational disclosures, Washington may try to burden the atmosphere of the upcoming talks of Soviet head of state Mikhail Gorbachev during his visit to the FRG, a West German diplomat warned last weekend: "Something is brewing here." As early as at the beginning of last week, officials feared that "West German missile aid for the Warsaw Pact may be uncovered."

U.S. Government representatives visited the responsible ministries in Bonn and the FRG Embassy in Washington "two to three times a week" during the past few years, warning against alleged illegal exports by West German companies to the East Bloc or to "unstable states in the Third World."

"They have vaults full of material implicating German companies," an official from a Bonn ministry stated, thus confirming hints by high-ranking U.S. politicians.

Last week, the former assistant secretary in the Defense Department, Richard Perle, complained in front of a Senate committee that over 100 U.S. complaints have been filed because of German participation in Pakistan's nuclear arms program. Concerning explosive German deals with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, Washington even filed 150 complaints, Senator Jesse Helms had pointed out earlier.

It has become clear now how the production facilities for the Condor missiles, which were first developed by the Munich weapons concern MBB for Argentina from 1979 on, apparently reached communist Romania via Egypt and Iraq—at a time when the Western alliance is divided

over how many new missiles NATO needs to be able to withstand in the future the alleged overwhelming military superiority of the Warsaw Pact.

According to internal MBB protocols mentioned by Mainz ZDF television network, the Munich company knew very well that military eggs should be hatched in the "nest of the Condors," as an Argentine paper called the production plant in Cordoba province which is partly located underground.

Despite the fact that Bonn forced MBB to abandon the Argentine deal in 1985, its subsidiary Transtechnica, which was especially founded for the "worldwide marketing of MBB know-how," continued to supply most sophisticated missile technology to Buenos Aires.

The deal was mediated by the Consen group—a complicated conglomerate of Austrian, Swiss, and FRG companies. Former MBB managers have held leading positions within Consen from the beginning.

MBB won contracts in the Middle East as early as in 1984, with the help of the Consen companies. Gigantic weapons research centers were established in Heluan in Egypt and in Mosul in northern Iraq (Saad 16 project) where missiles and chemical weapons are allegedly being produced (DER SPIEGEL 13/1989).

The Public Prosecutor's Office has initiated investigations against West German companies because of their involvement in Saad 16. MBB-Transtechnica, the main supplier of technology, was also searched.

Internal MBB documents contradict official reports, according to which Saad 16 is a civilian project. Explicit orders were given in Munich to carry out the delivery in small parts that allow no conclusions as to the entire project.

The aim of the MBB deal was also clear from the beginning: Entry into the market and production at a later stage.

The Consen group was also the main contractor of the—nearly identical—enormous production plants which were heavily protected and installed underground in Abu Saabl [spelling as published] near Cairo and in three places south of Baghdad (Project 395). "The same plant is under construction in Romania," an expert who was familiar with the project pointed out.

To coordinate the Egyptian project, for which the Egyptian Defense Minister was directly responsible, a special office of his ministry was opened at the Salzburg Consen branch. The Iraqi project 395, which was started a little later, was also promoted at the highest level. Dr Amir al-Dadhi [spelling as published], the son-in-law of the powerful Saddam Husayn, was personally responsible for this project.

The Consen group developed special camouflage tactics for the deal with Iraq: All deliveries reached the country via Cairo. Even the employees had to travel to Iraq via Egypt—usually without visas in order to leave no traces.

A large number of enterprises from the FRG was involved. It is still unclear, however, whether they were aware of the explosive nature of the deals:

—The Walter Thosthi Boswau (WTB) International AG company, a subsidiary of the German WTB, based in Zug in Switzerland, carried out construction work in Abu Saabl. Wilhelm Vullride, project manager of Saad 16 until 1985 and general manager of Consen since 17 January 1989, is allegedly a member of the supervisory board of WTB Internal.

—BBC Mannheim supplied all the electrical equipment to Iraq and Egypt, and the Siemens concern sold the switching computers.

—The foreign department of the air conditioning equipment manufacturer Nickel in Hamburg delivered equipment by means of which the temperature can be stabilized with an accuracy of fractions of degrees in fuel stores, mixing bunkers, and filling towers in order to prevent the self-ignition of the dangerous chemicals.

—The small Schaeftelmaier company from Aschau provided mixing plants for the preparation of propellants and special X-ray equipment for examining solid fuel stage containers.

Swiss, Austrian, and Italian enterprises were also involved. Many of them are allegedly also participating in the Romanian deal—possibly in a similarly obscure way as in the Iraq project.

When a bomb attack on a Consen manager at the beginning of May last year made it clear that, despite all efforts to keep the project secret, Baghdad's enemies must have learned of Project 395, security measures were tightened even more. A protocol of a crisis meeting of 6 May 1988, signed by project manager Titus Habian, contains the following passage: "Vacations in Europe should be avoided, if possible, until clarification of the matter by the company's leadership."

MBB also tried to cover up its activities as a result. According to an insider, "Iraqi engineers who had been trained for the production by MBB within the framework of Saad 16 appeared frequently" at Project 395.

The cold run tests, during which the completeness of the plants is examined, have been completed both in Egypt and Iraq. The hot run tests are scheduled for the coming weeks, as well as performance tests for machinery and devices. According to the agreement, the production start should then be supervised by MBB experts.

Money will only be provided "when the first missile that is capable of flying leaves the plant," a former project leader has disclosed.

According to secret service reports, two intermediate-range missiles are ready for testing in the Argentine "nest of Condors." U.S. pressure has so far prevented the first trial start.

Work in Romania has probably reached the same stage as in Iraq. Bucharest has already made arrangements for further cooperation with the Condor sponsor states:

At the end of 1987, Ceausescu granted a loan worth \$200 million to Egypt "for not further specified development projects" (NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG) on the occasion of a visit to Cairo. On 20 April this year Ceausescu's industry minister signed a cooperation agreement in Baghdad. His partner was the Iraqi minister for military industrialization.

Economics Ministry Has 'No Information'

LD0605145589 Hamburg DPA in German 1410 GMT
6 May 89

[TEXT] Hamburg (DPA)—According to the news magazine DER SPIEGEL, a gigantic assembly plant for medium-range missiles with nuclear capability is being built in Romania with Western technology.

The magazine reports in its latest edition that it is the same type of assembly plant which has been built for years with the help of numerous West German firms in Egypt and Iraq. The bunkered production plants, some of them underground, are said to produce Condor-2 missiles, with a minimum range of 10,000 kms, which were developed by the Munich arms firm MBB in the mid-1980's for Argentina.

A federal Economics Ministry spokesman said in Bonn Saturday [6 May] he had no such information. Bonn will on no account give permission for such deliveries.

The SPIEGEL article was prereleased to DPA in an edited version.

Officials Reject Report

AU0805142789 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
8 May 89 p 1

["DW" report: "Does Romania Produce Nuclear Weapons After All?"]

[Excerpt] Bonn/Bucharest—A spokesman of the Economics Ministry in Bonn has rejected yesterday's reports [7 May] which said that Romania is in a position to build intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads with the help of Western technology. Referring to a corresponding report published by the news magazine DER SPIEGEL, the spokesman stressed that he does not know of such information. Bonn would in no

case permit such deliveries. The Chancellor's Office announced that it has not received such information recently from German intelligence services. [passage omitted]

Further Transfers Of Missile Technology Reported

51003004z Vienna PROFIL in German
8 May 89 pp 29-31

[Article by Herbert Langsner and Alan George: "...And Tomorrow The Entire World"; first paragraph is PROFIL introduction]

[Text] Siemens, Brown Boveri, and other German firms are working on the Iraqi DOT rocket plant. Romania, too, probably received West German arms technology.

Among the 12 men sitting together in an office building on Palestine Street in Baghdad on 8 June 1988, the mood was depressed. Some simply feared for their lives, others feared for their money.

Work on a highly secret project was the link that bound them all: an industrial complex with the code name DOT, or simply "project 395"—both abbreviations for a plant whose purpose was the production of medium-range rockets capable of delivering an atomic warhead.

The chief engineer, Titus Habian, a technician from Linz, opened the "internal coordination meeting," as the minutes, which were prepared later, refer to the crisis meeting. According to the transcript, Habian "informed the group of current company problems," and he reminded everyone "on this occasion, of their duty to maintain the strictest secrecy" (even where the project's subcontractors were concerned).

He continued: "Vacation trips to Europe should be avoided whenever possible until certain matters were clarified by the firm's management," because in Europe, as Habian pointed out to those assembled, each one of them was in danger of losing his life.

The reason for all the excitement in Baghdad had been described just a week earlier, May 29 in BILD AM SONNTAG: "Bomb attacks on German businessmen" was the title of the cover story (see facsimile on page 31) [not reproduced]. One Ekkehard Schrotz, "a businessman from Heidelberg, Director of a mysterious export company with headquarters in Monaco" (BILD AM SONNTAG), was the target of the attack.

Schrotz, who was fortunate in Monte Carlo because the car bomb in his Peugeot exploded a few minutes too soon, is, indeed, on the Board of Directors of a particularly "mysterious" conglomerate of companies known as "Consen." The "Consen" group, a team of high-level arms experts, maintains a network of subsidiaries and affiliates in Germany, Austria, Monaco, and Switzerland (Ifat, Condor, Conchem, Desintec, Delta Consult, Delta

System, etc.). Under different company names in each case, the group is engaged in the construction of rocket facilities, as well as the sale of the requisite "know how." With "Consen" aid, such factories have already been built in Argentina ("Condor") and Egypt. Rocket specialists have been working on a third plant in Iraq under the project name DOT (PROFIL 17/89).

Those responsible for the attack on Schrotz, who represented themselves as "protectors of Islam" to the French news agency, Agence France Presse, were also aware of that fact. They claimed that Schrotz had been "condemned to death because of his crimes in the service of Saddam Hussein. He built rockets for Saddam Hussein." Yet, according to the protectors of Islam, who were evidently Iranian, Schrotz was not the only one. They said that "all collaborators in this crime" would be punished.

What was not published in BILD AM SONNTAG was the fact that a few days after the bomb attack on Schrotz, unidentified perpetrators broke into "Consen's" offices in Zug, Switzerland and rifled through the files. Among these files were lists of those firms and individuals who had played a part in the construction of the "Consen" rocket plants.

It was precisely this fact that was the cause of anxiety among the participants of the coordinating meeting in Baghdad. Some of them were employed by the Graz-based engineering firm Feneberg, the architectural and structural inspection firm involved with DOT, and some were employed by the Salzburg firm Delta Consult, one of the many subsidiaries of the "Consen" group.

In the final analysis, these attempts at intimidation on the part of the "protectors of Islam" were fruitless. The rocket factory, which consists of three facilities near Baghdad, was completed in spite of everything. The first operational test took place 6 weeks ago.

If Iraq's warlike chief of state Saddam Hussein now has rocket systems at his disposal, with which he can send nuclear warheads or poison gas bombs across distances of 1,000 km, he has Austrian, and primarily German firms to thank for it.

Similar to the Rabla affair, in which it became apparent that Germans were involved in the construction of what was suspected to be a poison gas factory in Libya, once again, prominent firms are on course for a substantial scandal—one which will probably have consequences involving criminal prosecution.

From documents available to PROFIL, it is apparent that Siemens-Germany, for example, worked on behalf of DOT. For 175 million schillings, the German electronics firm provided "switching devices, transformers, and other devices for the distribution of electricity" to DOT, as Siemens spokesman Horst Siebert admits when reference is made to the PROFIL documents. "But those

were standard products that could be used in any industrial plant." He claimed that naturally, Siemens had had no idea that the "current distribution and switching equipment" was intended to control rocket fuel mixing equipment.

The people at Brown, Boveri, Germany were just as much in the dark when they sent "cable, installation material, or switches" to Baghdad. Firm spokesman Wilfried Klewin provided assurances that "under no circumstances were the export regulations of the FRG violated, nor was the War Materiel Control Act breached."

Everyone acted in good faith. The chief executive officer of the Austrian construction firm Ilbau, Hans Peter Haselsteiner, swore that his company knows "nothing whatsoever about a DOT project." To be sure, Haselsteiner admitted that Ilbau shipped goods continually to various customers in Iraq, and that it might be possible that Ilbau products found their way to the DOT rocket factory.

To be sure, they have, as the DOT correspondence shows. "Ilbau people," an engineer who worked on the DOT construction site confirmed, "delivered and installed special doors and windows that had to be airtight and anti-static. The so-called blow-out walls came from Ilbau as well."

Blow-out walls are aluminum walls that are used in so-called resistance buildings. Three side walls and the roof of these resistance buildings, which are well-suited for explosion tests, are particularly massively constructed, while one component, the blow-out wall, is loosely-mounted on purpose. If something goes wrong during an explosion, the entire building does not collapse; only the blow-out wall is blown out.

The ex-DOT engineer knows that "whoever was on the DOT construction sites had to realize that an arms factory was under construction."

Each sensitive building, the largest are over 20 meters high, is protected with an earthen wall (see photo) [not reproduced]. These process buildings, (as they are called in the trade), are accessible only by means of subterranean tunnels.

In several process buildings, for example, rocket firing is tested.

The hollow body of the projectile is secured in a sort of gigantic vise, then the fuel is ignited. In this way, flight can be simulated, and calculations can be made to determine whether the rocket would fly the way it should under emergency conditions.

The technicians and assemblers from Siemens and Brown Boveri, thus could not have overlooked the fact that they were installing electronics for a military facility.

Yet the list of Germans involved in DOT can be expanded without any difficulty. One firm, Weiss Technik, provided hot and cold chambers. Installation took place a few weeks ago, and it was undertaken by a Weiss Technik subsidiary based in Lower Austria.

The Hamburg firm Nickel provided climate control technology, and a firm from Aschau called Schaeftlmaier provided electronic measurement and testing instrumentation.

Most of the DOT workers from Europe were old acquaintances, because in Egypt, where the "Consen" group built a plant for the Ministry of Defense that was the same as the one in Iraq, the same firms were involved as the ones now at work in Iraq. The major difference is that in Cairo, it was not the Austrian construction firm Ilbau, but the prominent German construction firm Walter Thosti Boswau that landed the job.

The technological heart of the "Consen" plants, however, came from the many-sided German national arms concern Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), which is currently the focus of a great deal of attention as a result of its possible merger with Daimler-Benz.

The MBB subsidiary Transtechnica already provided the technological equipment for the military research center SA'AD 16 in the Iraqi university city of Mosul. Since the beginning of March, the State's Attorney's office in Bielefeld has been looking into this case.

The "Consen" group, too, consists of former MBB technicians. Ekkehard Schrotz, the target of the attack in Monaco, had worked there, his "Consen" cohort Hermann Karl Schmidt had once worked for MBB, and the most recent "Consen" Director, Karl Adolf Hammer, was even the leader of the Armaments Technology division of the Munich-based armorer until 1987.

In addition, MBB, at first quite officially, then more quietly, was involved in the "Consen" rocket projects in Argentina and Egypt.

Wherever "Consen" was, it turns out, there, too, was Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm.

For this reason, what the former DOT worker said to PROFIL sounds quite plausible, namely, that technical progress was monitored by Iraqi specialists who had been, in turn, by their own admission, trained by MBB in Mosul (SA'AD 16) and in Germany.

In point of fact, documents that have also been made available to PROFIL show that MBB held training courses for Iraqis.

The fact that German and Austrian firms helped (and continue to help) the dictatorial—and until the summer of 1988, warring—regime in Baghdad with the construction of a high-tech rocket system, is a political time bomb.

As soon as rumors about a possible involvement on the part of MBB began to circulate (there was no mention at the time of Siemens or Brown Boveri) in connection with Iraqi rocket development, the German Federal Government was bombarded with questions from the Greens and the SPD [Social Democratic Party].

On April 19, Erich Riedl, Secretary of State responsible for such matters, answered a question about connections between MBB and the "Consen" group by saying: "It is impossible for the Federal Government to provide information about interconnections that may exist between two private firms in the course of their normal business."

The courts will now probably collect such information. Whereas the transfer of know how is on no account a punishable offense in Austria (for which reason "Consen" shifted its headquarters to Salzburg), German managers, according to the External Economic Law, must even run the risk of imprisonment if they provide militarily useful technology and machinery to sensitive states, such as Iraq.

"If, for example, a basically neutral computer is wittingly delivered for military purposes," Dieter Vogel, spokesman for the German Federal Ministry of the Economy, knew, "there could be problems for the firm."

Problems that would keep a few of the men at the firms of Siemens, Brown Boveri, or MBB quite busy.

They would also keep the politicians in Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany busy. Government insiders in Bonn fear that the United States intends to make German firms' arms exports to Iraq and other critical countries an issue in the near future, and it threatens to do so on the heels of the discovery of the German aid to Qadhafi's Libya in the matter of poison gas.

In the meantime, the next bomb is already ticking in Bonn.

The PROFIL informant, who spent more than 2 years on the "Consen" construction sites in Iraq and Egypt, claims to have heard quite often that Romania, too, was supplied with the same weapons plant as Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq.

If that is correct, it means that weapons technology of the NATO member state, the FRG, is being passed on to the Communist terrorist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu by "Consen" companies located in Austria.

And all this with the nearly compelling probability that it is happening with the full knowledge and cooperation of the MBB concern, which is jointly owned by the States of Hamburg, Bremen, and Bavaria.

The painful irony of fate is that while NATO argues about the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, German technicians are preparing to turn over an atomic rocket factory to Romania.

The fact that "Consen" is also building for Bucharest can hardly be denied any longer.

The PROFIL informant who also confirmed his information for the German magazine DER SPIEGEL, remembered: A "Consen" technician named Wistuba complained repeatedly on the DOT Iraqi construction site that he had "just come from Romania," where he had used "exactly the same machine." He meant a computer-controlled milling machine for super-exact production of hollow bodies for rockets.

Not only the gossip of the "Consen" people, but government offices in Bonn and Washington confirm that the lively trade in rockets with Ceausescu is more than just a rumor.

Finally, and this completes the chain of evidence—the Romanian Minister of Industry and the Iraqi Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization signed a treaty of cooperation between the two nations just barely 3 weeks ago on 20 April.

Just at a time when both rocket plants should be ready to begin operation.

If "Consen" did build in Romania, then it was probably not only with the aid of MBB technology, but, as was the case in Cairo and Baghdad, with the cooperation of other German firms.

Clear indications of experience in the matter of covering tracks are present. Thus, sensitive equipment for the Iraqi plant was not delivered directly to Iraq, but to politically respectable Egypt first, then to be transported via ship or airplane to its actual destination.

The DOT technicians usually traveled via the same circuitous route from Egypt to Baghdad—without a visa, of course. "We were always," the DOT engineer recalls, "taken past Iraqi immigration by Iraqi security people, and brought directly to the hotel."

None of the DOT crew members was officially registered. Whoever worked on the project was quasi not even present in Iraq.

The deal with Romania must have been like that, or similar to it: quite quietly and via detours that were intended to conceal the true location where the people and the machinery were going to be used.

The dam that "Consen" has erected around itself seems to be breaking, however. "Compared to what is going to confront us now," one German diplomat said, "the Libya affair was a joke."

FINLAND

Air Sampling, Analysis Methods for Chemical Disarmament

52002423 Helsinki KEMIA in Finnish No 1, 88 pp 1-4

[Article by Marjatta Rautio of the Chemistry Department, University of Helsinki, Helsinki: "Air Sampling and Analysis Methods Used in Chemical Weapons Control Project"; first two paragraphs are KEMIA summary, published in English]

[Text]

Methods for Air Sampling and Analysis Used by the Finnish Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament

Summary

During the last 3 years, the Finnish Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament has studied methods for air sampling and analysis, which could be used for the verification of chemical disarmament. Methods have been developed for collection of low-, medium-, and high-volume air samples. Sample preparation methods have been tested for agents. Thermal desorption and cold trapping have been used for low-volume samples, and liquid desorption and concentration for medium- and high-volume samples.

The samples are analyzed by high resolution gas chromatography, high pressure liquid chromatography with UV and enzymatic detection, tandem mass spectrometry, and retention spectrometry. Sampling and analysis methods have been tested in field experiments, where a 4-kg release of a simulant could be verified 200 km downwind from the release site.

The Chemical Weapons Control Project has developed and tested several different sensitive methods for sampling and analyzing [chemical] warfare agents taken from the air. Analytic devices that are also suitable for the analysis of other organic compounds, which demands great sensitivity and reliability, have also been modified and developed. These methods are applicable as is to environment analysis, for example, for the monitoring of [compliance with] air protection laws.

Established by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, since 1973 the Chemical Weapons Control Project, the CC Project, has been developing analytic methods with which the presence of chemical warfare agents can be readily and positively verified from even difficult samples of the environment. The project annually presents its research

report, the so-called "Finnish Blue Book," to the disarmament negotiators in Geneva, who are negotiating an agreement that will completely ban chemical weapons. Up to now, 11 reports have been prepared, comprising over 2,000 pages. The reports contain detailed identifying data on the toxins used in chemical weapons, their decomposition products, and the original elements of the syntheses for about 150 chemical compounds. The analysis methods by means of which the identifying data are collected are also presented in the reports. The reports are used as handbooks in the laboratories of the different countries that are conducting research on chemical weapons. They are translated into Chinese, among other languages, since [air] protection chemists in China are trained with their help.

The analytic equipment used on the CC Project meets high standards. There are several dual-channel Micromat 412's in the gas chromatography laboratory that were developed as a cooperative venture between the project and Finnish industry. Two of the chromatographs are equipped with thermodesorption devices, one of them a commercial device and the other developed by the laboratory, for which the inventor received a KTM [Trade and Industry Ministry] invention award (Figure 1).

In one of the two liquid chromatographs there is a diode row detector. An enzymatic detector for the specific and rapid detection of nerve gases and carbamates has also been developed for liquid chromatography. The gas and liquid chromatographs are connected to a computer that automatically compiles, interprets, and analyzes analytic data controlled by the laboratory automation system, LABOS, developed by the project.

The project's triple-quadrupole mass spectrometer and the Workers Health Department's big mass spectrometer capable of resolving compounds are in adjacent rooms so that, depending on the kind of problem, the instrument that is best adapted to solving it can be chosen. The development of NMR [not further identified] analytics is conducted with Oulu University's 400-MHz spectrometer, for which a multinuclear display unit to record phosphorus and fluorine levels and which can be adapted to the project's needs has been procured. As for the infrared spectrometer, these past few years we have been able to record spectra with the Neste Co.'s [state oil company] FT infrared spectrometer into which samples can also be fed via gas chromatography. The project's technological-scientific capability will be offered to an international control organization for its use once a treaty is concluded.

During the past 3 years, the project has developed methods for air sampling and analysis that are applicable to the monitoring of such a treaty. The treaty will, in addition to banning the use of chemical weapons, ban their development, manufacture, stockpiling, and shipment as well as order the destruction of existing stockpiles. The conclusion of this treaty will call for effective




Figure 1. Diagram of Thermal Desorption and Cold Trapping Arrangement¹

Key:

1. Dewar vessel filled with liquid nitrogen
2. Trap filled with Porapak N resin
3. Shutoff valve
4. Swagelock seal
5. Coated with glass wool
6. Air sample tube
7. Aluminum block
8. Heat resistor
9. Needle
10. Injector
11. Column
12. Detector.

monitoring. Each signatory nation will pledge itself to report to the treaty organization any information relating to chemical weapons, which information organization inspectors will verify on the spot by taking samples to be analyzed, among other procedures. The most important monitoring method will be on-the-spot inspections, the acceptance of which both superpowers have reached mutual agreement on. The inspectors will, however, verify only plants and stockpiles reported to the organization. How then can we be sure that a given country has not abandoned secret plants or stockpiles? The project has studied sampling methods that could be applied without constant remote monitoring or single samplings.²⁻⁴

Air Sampling Methods

The air sampling methods tested by the project can be divided into the collection of low- (1-100 dm³), medium- (1-10 m³), and high- (>1,000 m³) volume air samples.

For the low-volume air samples, a sampling of 100 mg of Tenax resin without aerosol filter, thermal desorption, concentration for cold trapping, and gas chromatographic analysis were chosen.⁴ The method was validated for nerve gases, mustard gas, and CS tear gas by determining the penetrating volume for sarin and soman, which disperse the most readily, and the desorptive power for all of them, their retention, how storage affects them, and the lower limits of detection. An air sample can be collected when there is a volume flow of about 30 dm³ at 0.1-2 dm³/min without nerve gas penetration. The compounds are 100 percent desorbed with the exception of VX, the adsorption of which is irreversible. The retention rates of the other compounds are over 80 percent. A week's storage in a refrigerator does not affect retention rates. The lower detection limits for sarin, soman, and tabun are 5-15 pg, or 100-700 pg/m³ as determined by ATD [not further identified], 70 pg for CS, and 20 ng for mustard gas (determined by FID [not further identified]). The compounds are identified by their retention indexes. Index standards are sprayed into the sample tube before collection of the sample. Deviations from standard values of from 0.2 to 0.6 index units were obtained for the five other gases in index repeatability tests except for sarin [with a deviation of] 2.3, in which a strong background matrix caused fluctuation.

A drawback of thermal desorption is the fact that an analysis that has already been made cannot be repeated, so that the result must be immediately reliable. The method is not applicable to heat-sensitive or polarized compounds that are not adsorbed in Tenax or from which derivatives are to be made before the analysis. Nor is the sample precleaned or fractionated.

The big advantages of the thermal desorption method are its sensitivity and speed. The sample can be analyzed without treatment, and the same tube can be used for collecting samples many times over. The retention rates are high.

Automation of the air sampling and analysis methods is at present being studied. Automated, they would also be especially applicable to types of organic compounds other than chemical warfare agents as a constant-operation air-monitoring method, for example, for monitoring air quality or, say, for monitoring industrial organic discharges. Cold trapping of thermal desorption units is also being further developed so that use of the liquid type or carbon dioxide would be avoided.

Medium-volume air samples are collected in a sample tube in which there is a fiberglass filter to collect aerosols and 2 grams of XAD-2 resin, two-thirds of which is in the collecting part of the tube and one-third in the reserve section. Each segment is lixiviated by means of a continuously lixiviating device, the solution is dispersed to 100 ml, and the sample is analyzed. A carefully

applied nitrogen dispersion has been observed to be the best dispersion method, one with which the highest retention rates have been repeatedly obtained.⁴

The sensitivity of this method is lower than with Tenax samples because the solution cannot be entirely dispersed. On the other hand, thanks to a longer sample-collection period and a larger sample volume, a higher degree of concentration can be obtained during the sampling phase. Medium-volume air samples are necessary along with Tenax samples in those cases where it is desirable to ensure the result of the analysis through methods other than gas chromatographic, for example, liquid chromatographic, enzymatic, or mass spectrometric methods. The lower detection limits for nerve gases are in the range of ng/m³.

The highest sensitivity to extremely faint samples is obtained with high-capacity sample collectors, with which air-sample size can be increased to over 1,000 cubic meters a day. High-volume air samples are in principle handled in the same way as medium-volume samples: filter, collection, and reserve sections separate from one another. Since there is resin in the collector, as much as 400 grams, considerably more solution is required, which is why both the desorption and concentration periods take several hours. The use of large amounts of solution and resin makes it necessary for them to be cleaned very carefully before using them to eliminate background material.²⁻⁴

Sampling has proved to be quantitative since the compound that is least readily retained by XAD resin, sarin, is found in only less than 1 percent of the reserve section when the collection period is 24 hours. Nerve gas retention rates are high, with the exception of VX, the rate for which was only about 30-40 percent in the sample treatment test, the same as for CS. Chemical warfare agents are desorbed quantitatively from resin, but VX is adsorbed in the walls of the dispersion retort during the dispersion phase, and this is why a large percentage of it is undetected during the determination stage. However, it was not noted that it decomposed due to the effect of the sample treatment. CS decomposes into CS epoxide and orthochlorobenzaldehyde as early as in the sample treatment phase. A retention rate of about 40-50 percent was obtained for mustard gas since it oxidizes in part into sulfoxide and is in part hydrolyzed because of the effect of impurities in the air.⁴ The lower limits of detection for nerve gases are in the range of about 10 pg/m³.²

Analysis Methods

In verification analysis, the most important requirement is reliability. We must be able to reliably identify chemical warfare agents in difficult background matrices even in small concentrations, but there must be no erroneous




Figure 2. Diagram of Two-Phase Gas Chromatograph and Retention Spectrum Produced by Column Cluster

positive findings since they could produce political consequences. Because of this, on the project a great deal has been invested in reliability of analysis. Several alternative methods have been developed to ensure reliability.

Chemical warfare agents are very different from one another in terms of their chemical structures. One has to be able to identify many types of compounds in the same sample in one test run. This requirement has led to a choice of analysis methods that do not involve a great deal of preparation of the sample. High-resolution liquid chromatography has been tested for the precleaning of large air samples.² Since precleaned fractions are used in gas chromatographic analysis, column life can be significantly extended.

In gas chromatographic analysis, compounds are identified through retention index monitoring using the M-standard series, which contains phosphorus, for ATD and ECD [not further identified] and a continuous-chain alkane series for FID as index standards. The reliability of the identification is considerably increased when two columns hardened in different phases are used. To add to its reliability, the Micromat gas chromatograph has been modified to make it a two-phase system to resolve overlapping compounds in the last column, sheathed with different phases in terms of polarity. If the index standards are also cut, indexes for the same determination are obtained with two different columns. The identification is verified by conducting the resolved surges to the cluster of columns formed by the six columns and recording the retention spectrum thus formed, or, more precisely, the gas/liquid-distribution spectrum (Figure 2).²⁻⁵

A sample from even a poor background matrix can also be analyzed with a gas chromatography tandem mass spectrometer (GC-MS/MS) in addition to a two-phase gas chromatograph by selecting a reagent gas for chemical ionization by means of which the sample is selectively ionized into as intensive as possible a parent ion. Collision conditions are chosen such that the daughter ion spectrum acquires two or three intensive ions. With this technique the identification is more reliable than it is by monitoring just one ion, and the sensitivity is

higher than it is by observing an entire mass number area. Through a multiexperiment program, the observable ions may change in accordance with retention periods, in which case all the compounds to be monitored may be identified in the same GC test run. If the sample is tested along with retention index standards, indexes are obtained in addition to daughter ion spectra from the same test run. High-resolution, selective ion monitoring has also been used on the project as an alternative method by selecting two ions to be tracked when the resolution is between 3,000 and 10,000.⁴

On the basis of acetylcholinesterase inhibition caused by nerve gases, an enzymatic analysis method has been developed [to detect] them. The intensity of the enzyme inhibition can be studied with enzymes extracted from various animals, in which case the "inhibition spectrum" formed by the correlations is characteristic of the compounds. "Inhibition spectra" can be used for identification when it is known that there is only one inhibitor in the sample. Furthermore, the method readily reveals unknown inhibitors as well. If there are several inhibitors in a sample, a liquid chromatograph in conjunction with both a diode row detector and an enzymatic analyzer may be used to distinguish them from one another. Since nerve gases have only a very low terminal absorption rate because of their structures, a UV detector does not readily detect them. When the effluent is fed into the enzymatic detector after leaving the diode row detector, only the inhibitors can be seen, and the sample's background matrix is omitted, which is why the sensitivity is at a level of about pg/ml.⁶ In the liquid chromatograph, agents are identified through retention index monitoring, the reliability of which is increased by the UV spectrum obtained with the diode row detector.⁴ Liquid chromatography is very well suited to the identification of poorly dispersed chemical warfare agents remaining in the aerosol filter.

FT infrared spectrometry has also been tested for the identification of nerve gases. Good-quality infrared spectra are obtained by injecting about 500 ng of nerve gases into a spectrometer via a gas chromatograph.




Figure 3. Sarin and Soman Concentrations in Air Samples as a Function of Time

Key:

1. Soman
2. Sarin
3. Time (hours)

Field Tests

The project has tested both sampling and analysis methods in field tests. Delayed sampling of nerve gases was tested by injecting 10 mg of sarin and soman into the ground with a pipette and collecting low- and medium-volume air samples over a period of 11 days. The original condition of the air was well mapped with Tenax samples by using a 10-minute collection period. Ten hours later we also started collecting medium-volume samples, which were analyzed with both gas and liquid chromatographs using an enzymatic detector. The results obtained with both collection methods corresponded very closely to one another, just as did the results for the medium-volume samples obtained with both analysis methods. Both nerve gases could still be detected over a week later, and soman would apparently have been detected even 2 weeks after injection with the pipette (Figure 3).

The latest large-scale field test involving chemical agents drifting over long distances was conducted last August at Padasjoki in collaboration with the Armed Forces. A mixture of three nontoxic simulants, similar to chemical warfare agents in terms of their physical properties, was dispersed into the air from an airplane at altitudes of 100 m and 200 m. On the ground there were sample collectors at eight different distances (between 5 and 200 km), and an Armed Forces aircraft collected samples at different altitudes about 150 km away from the area the mixture was released in. The sample-collection sites and collection times were chosen on the basis of meteorological forecasts made by the Meteorological Institute.

The Tenax samples were analyzed with a gas chromatograph equipped with desorption and cold trapping devices in a field laboratory that was set up in a barrack

close to the test area. Medium- and high-volume samples were shipped to the Helsinki University Chemistry Department for treatment and analysis. In the analyses, the presence of the nerve gas simulant, diisopropyl methylphosphonate, only 4 kg of which had been dispersed into the air, was verified in a sample collected from the surface of the ground 200 km away. The amounts of the simulants in the sample collected by the aircraft were so large that they could still have been detected even considerably farther away, perhaps over the Estonian coastline if it had been possible to collect samples there.

The results indicate that the establishment of an international network of air sample collection stations at intervals of about 400-500 km would serve as an effective deterrent to treaty violations. The core of the network could be formed by automatically operated stations from which analysis data recorded by gas chromatographs equipped with Tenax sampling and thermal desorption devices are transmitted over telephone lines to the headquarters of the monitoring organization. These stations would be complemented by well-equipped laboratories specially designed for large-scale sampling for the purposes of environment analytics, for example.

Collaborative Laboratories

The CC Project's main laboratory is located on the premises of the Organic Chemistry Section of Helsinki University's Chemistry Department, but it is administered by the Foreign Affairs Ministry Disarmament Office. The project has collaborative teams at the Universities of Helsinki, Oulu, and Jyväskylä. The Armed Forces Research Center and Technical Depot, the Workers Health Agency, the Customs Laboratory, the VTT [State Technical Research Center] Food Laboratory, the Meteorological Institute, and several Finnish industrial plants collaborate with the project. According to initial estimates, Finland will play an important role in the monitoring of a treaty banning chemical weapons.

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FRANCE

France To Continue Nuclear Testing in South Pacific

BK0805023689 Hong Kong AFP in English 0230 GMT 8 May 89

[Text] Wellington, May 8 (AFP)—French Prime Minister Michel Rocard has told New Zealand he is not in a position to change France's policy of nuclear testing in the South Pacific, New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer said Monday.

In a radio interview from New Caledonia, Mr. Palmer said he had a long and frank exchange with Mr. Rocard after attending the funerals Sunday of slain Melanesian independence leader Jean Marie Tjibaou and his close aide Yeiwene Yeiwene.

"He knew the sentiments of the region, and it may be that at some other time and in some other circumstances French policy could change," Mr. Palmer said, "but at the moment ... He was not in a position to change it, he told me."

"I pointed out to him that in my judgement it would damage their (France's) policies in New Caledonia, because the whole of the (15-member South) Pacific Forum countries are opposed to French testing in the Pacific.

"We believe that this should be a nuclear free area, and French testing is really anathema to everyone who lives here."

He said Mr. Rocard had told him that France was about to begin a further series of underground nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll.

Mr. Palmer is on a two-week South Pacific tour to Western Samoa, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea before returning home on May 20.

France has exploded over 100 nuclear devices since it took its test programme underground in 1975.

Nuclear Device Detonated on Mururoa Atoll in South Pacific

Australia, New Zealand Protest

BK1205020089 Hong Kong AFP in English 0143 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Wellington, May 12 (AFP)—France detonated Friday its first nuclear device for the year at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, seismologists reported here, and Australia and New Zealand promptly condemned the latest blast.

The test, the 104th since the French program began, is expected to be followed by at least two more detonations over the next three weeks if the series follows previous patterns, seismologists said.

New Zealand Disarmament and Arms Control Minister Fran Wilde said the blast strength was estimated to be 15 kilotonnes.

Ms. Wilde condemned the test and said that indications were the French were developing new weapon technology, but she did not elaborate. The last test program was partly aimed at improving the neutron bomb.

In Canberra, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "Our position is very well known. We deplore it, we are flatly opposed."

The explosion comes days after New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer strongly restated his country's opposition to testing in the region at a meeting with French Premier Michel Rocard in New Caledonia last weekend.

Mr. Rocard said at that time there would be no change of policy.

In the past, French testing has been conducted in series between April and June, and between October and December.

New Zealand Minister Comments

BK1205091689 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 12 May 89

[From "International Report" program]

[Excerpt] A short time ago, France conducted another underground nuclear bomb test at its Mururoa Atoll site—the fifth for this year. New Zealand scientists were among the first to monitor the shock waves from the explosion.

The New Zealand minister for disarmament, Ms Fran Wilde, told our reporter, Nicholas Stewart, that she condemned the French action, but there had been some indication that this year's series of nuclear tests might be the last.

[Begin recording] [Wilde] Well, we had a pretty good idea that this series would be starting again about now because this is the normal time. So, we were not surprised, but, of course, every time they do conduct one of the tests, we are very disappointed.

[Stewart] Have you sent a protest to France?

[Wilde] We have not sent a protest to France. I have [words indistinct] public statement, but our deputy prime minister met the French prime minister only last week up in Noumea at the funeral of Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene and he told Monsieur Rocard then that we were still very firmly opposed to the French testing program in the Pacific.

[Stewart] So you made these complaints. But, what realistically are you achieving by making the complaints.

[Wilde] Obviously, we would like the French to take heed of the opinions that are strongly expressed throughout the South Pacific that they should not be testing here. Monsieur Rocard told our deputy prime minister that it was beyond his power to change the testing program at the moment. I am not sure what he meant by the moment, whether that gives us a glimmer of hope, but we feel we cannot let the testing go unremarked upon even if the French do not appear to be listening to us, we still have a responsibility to say publicly what we think of them. [end recording] [passage omitted]

ITALY

Prime Minister de Mita Discusses SNF Issue, German Attitude

PM0905120089 Rome LA REPUBBLICA
in Italian 7-8 May 89 pp 2-3

[Interview with Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita by Eugenio Scalfari; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] Rome—"Who, in Europe or anywhere in the world, would ever have imagined changes and upheavals on this scale? Just a few years ago, and even a few months ago, this situation—so different, so dynamic, and so full of prospects for the future—would have been inconceivable. The factor that has set it in motion is called Gorbachev."

This open acknowledgment—nothing new for him, for that matter—marked the start of a lengthy conversation with our prime minister devoted to the foreign policy topics on which international attention is currently focused: NATO's new role, the short-range nuclear missiles problem, the harsh controversy between the United States and Britain on the one hand and the FRG on the other, the road to 1992, the European central bank, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

He seems at ease and to act confidently in foreign policy: He has consolidated friendships, forged new relations, and pursued a fairly consistent line of conduct. Nobody would have imagined that such a "local" figure so immersed in the not always edifying wrangles of Italy's strife-ridden political scene would have been more at home with Mitterrand and Kohl, Thatcher and Gorbachev than with Gava and Forlani. Is this a talent that has suddenly emerged? Or is it a case of his forcing the pace in the face of the day-to-day difficulties of a faltering coalition?

For the present we will confine ourselves to making this observation and proceed by putting the first question to the prime minister.

[Scalfari] You place great trust in Gorbachev. But are you sure he will succeed?

[De Mita] I am not at all sure that he will succeed. In any case, he is the first not to be sure. If Gorbachev's problems were confined to changing the Communist Party leadership or even the entire Communist Party and its role within Soviet society, perhaps my reply could be affirmative: He will succeed. But apart from the party, he also has to change the system, the mechanisms and the structures of the Soviet system. For instance, he must nurture the birth of the market and therefore of the entrepreneur. Until this new agent appears on the scene it will be impossible for Gorbachev to win the gamble on reform.

[Scalfari] Do you believe Gorbachev is aware of the need to create a real business world on Russian territory?

[De Mita] I would say so. Can you study to become a businessman? No less than 3,000 Soviet factory managers have begun visiting the FRG in turn to study how businesses work, who makes the decisions on the basis of what factors, and what risks are taken. But the West has the private ownership of enterprises behind it. Can similar results be achieved in such a different economic and legal context? Frankly I cannot say.

[Scalfari] But you are putting your money on Gorbachev.

[De Mita] How could I do otherwise? All of us who live in this other part of the world are putting our money on Gorbachev. Ronald Reagan was the first to do so when he actually began negotiations to dismantle the Euromissiles. The rest was an uninterrupted succession of actions, decisions, and accords.

[Scalfari] Nevertheless this is not the first time there have been periods of detente. They existed under Khrushchev and later even under Brezhnev.

[De Mita] They were periods of truce. Now the situation is profoundly different: Soviet foreign policy has become an essential element in the change that is desired in that country. They are moving, they want to move, toward a

different kind of development. This is the novelty. Gorbachev's foreign policy is at the service of his policy of domestic renewal. This alters the terms of the equation and the way in which we must look at it.

[Scalfari] How?

[De Mita] If we want to facilitate the radical transformation of the Soviet system that Gorbachev wants to achieve, we must help him by means of a suitable foreign policy. If we do not want that transformation, then the West's foreign policy toward the East must not help Gorbachev. We must be very clear on this point with ourselves and the people we represent.

[Scalfari] What is our allies' position?

[De Mita] Mitterrand, Kohl, Gonzalez, and we are in complete agreement: Negotiating arms reductions alleviates tension, creates the conditions for new balances, consolidates peace, and helps Gorbachev's policy of reform. So we must work harder and harder on these negotiations. None of us harbors any naive pacifist illusions. We are all convinced that peace must be preserved within mutual security and that defense systems must be maintained. Therefore NATO is still a valid instrument, and will remain so indefinitely. However, it is a purely defensive instrument, so the armaments can only be defensive—on both sides, obviously.

[Scalfari] What point has been reached in the controversy over short-range nuclear weapons?

[De Mita] Personally, I am sure that a joint solution will be found within NATO. The weapons currently deployed by NATO forces will become obsolete in 1996. The intention was that a decision on modernization would be made in 1992....

[Scalfari] So why has the issue arisen now, in 1989?

[De Mita] The British and American Governments raised the issue.

[Scalfari] Does the fact that it has been raised 3 years early imply a different policy?

[De Mita] I would say so. You see, the Italian position is that short-range nuclear missiles must be modernized if the balance of forces in conventional weapons in Europe remains unequal in the Soviet Union's favor, as at present. But if those balances are removed and there is real parity in conventional weapons, we could negotiate a considerable reduction of short-range nuclear missiles too. We hope that in 1992 the Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons will produce significant results. If so, it would be easier to decide to initiate nuclear negotiations too. However, to want to decide on this matter now can only lead to the conclusion of purely and simply carrying out the modernization. Germany does not accept this strategy and we believe it is right.

[Scalfari] The public is acquainted with the German Government's rationale, but since you have met with Chancellor Kohl recently, would you care to explain to us the reasons for Bonn's stance?

[De Mita] It is simple. Most of the short-range nuclear weapons are deployed by NATO forces stationed in Germany. The German stance is a rejection of weapons systems whose battlefield is on German soil. They maintain that it would have been more logical to dismantle short-range nuclear missiles first, and only subsequently to dismantle medium-range Euromissiles. But since a start was made with the latter, they do not see the reason for maintaining the former, which impinge solely on German territory.

[Scalfari] Do you agree with this reasoning?

[De Mita] I have already stated Italy's position: Achieve significant results in negotiations on conventional weapons; then see whether it is possible to negotiate with the East a reduction of short-range nuclear forces to an equal minimal level compatible with the demands of stability and of a credible and necessary deterrence. Of course these minimal deployments essential for the Atlantic alliance's defense strategy must be kept up to date and efficient.

[Scalfari] Does Kohl agree with these procedures?

[De Mita] I would say so. Other governments, too, are basically in agreement, but not Mrs Thatcher. She is the stumbling block.

[Scalfari] What are Mrs Thatcher's reasons?

[De Mita] The British prime minister is not confident that Gorbachev will succeed in his attempts at reform. Consequently she is against the idea of eliminating or reducing the tactical nuclear deterrent. But there is another—and, I believe, more compelling—reason: Mrs Thatcher fears a possible tide of American isolationism and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

[Scalfari] Do you not share these fears, Prime Minister?

[De Mita] When you enter a new phase it is pointless to hide your head in the sand. Novelty entails risks, which must be tackled prudently, but tackled nonetheless. It is both impossible and dangerous to preserve the old situation. I would like to recall a remark by Shevardnadze, which I consider revealing: "NATO's difficulty," the Soviet foreign minister said recently, "is that we have deprived it of its adversary."

[Scalfari] Prime Minister, I would like to ask you about the German question, which seems to me the central point of the entire situation. The "Gorbachev tornado" has radically altered Germany's attitude to Europe. However, the reunification of the German homeland could become a topical issue again, especially in a totally

nuclear-free Europe. The FRG has hitherto been the United States' most loyal ally but from now on its role could change. Is a Germany with one foot in the West and the other in the East a realistic prospect? If so, is it not perhaps also rather a disturbing one?

[De Mita] You are right, this is the nub of the issue: Germany's new role. But I would say more: There is a rebirth of central Europe, which had been eliminated by Yalta, by the cold war, by the barbed wire along the Austro-Hungarian border, and by the Berlin Wall. Before what you called the "Gorbachev tornado" the Urals actually coincided politically with the Wall. We had become accustomed to thinking that Germany and Europe ended there. And so had the Germans—or at least large proportion of the German leadership class. Now the situation has changed. A central Europe is reemerging. Obviously we cannot ignore this, and still less can Germany. Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are countries with a very strong European identity that are looking more and more to the West....

[Scalfari] This growing interest in the West beyond the Wall could cause a dramatic crisis....

[De Mita] It could do so if we regard these turbulent novelties with the idea of shifting the limits of Western Europe further and further east. We must guard against making such a mistake: It would be tragic. Rather, Europe must grow within the context of its diverse characteristics. As I was saying, we are witnessing the reemergence of a central Europe, which is different and separate from our Western community. There is a problem of joint security to be resolved, a problem of economic integration and cooperation, and a problem of cultural growth. I would venture to say that this latter is perhaps the most important aspect—a European culture that can reestablish its identity, foster exchanges, and rediscover shared roots.

[Scalfari] Germany could be tempted to become once more a central empire, as it defined itself a century ago.

[De Mita] I believe not. The German leadership class is very well aware that its new "Ostpolitik" has a much greater power of attraction the more Germany is integrated with the West and the more it represents it within the center of Europe. [passage omitted]

NORWAY

Editorial Calls for 'Asymmetrical' Cuts in Tactical Nuclear Arms

52002424 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
14 Apr 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Missiles"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact lands are proposing new talks with NATO, this time on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. This new move from the East comes only a

month after the talks on conventional forces got under way in Vienna. The bid has already received an eager response in several western countries where the "nuclear allergy" is most severe. And there is nothing really wrong with starting talks with the Warsaw Pact countries if certain facts are kept clearly in mind.

Among them are the following: The Warsaw Pact has 14 times as many short-range nuclear weapons as NATO. In spite of promises to make unilateral cuts the Warsaw Pact remains superior when it comes to conventional forces. The Soviet Union still has large arsenals of chemical weapons.

If the talks on the remaining nuclear weapons are to have any substance the principle of asymmetrical reductions should be followed completely, which means that those who have the most must cut the most. And with the big superiority the eastern allies have, they could demonstrate their sincerity by cutting their arsenals of short-range weapons to the NATO level—before any talks begin.

This is not an example of NATO simply making one demand after another without being willing to do anything in return while the Soviet Union constantly demonstrates its "peaceful intentions." One cannot get around the hard military facts and they give a picture that differs from all the well-publicized moves made by the East.

Foreign Minister Stoltenberg: No Need for NATO SNF Decision Until 1992

PM0205151989 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
27 Apr 89 p 10

[Report on interview with Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg by Morten Fyhn: "Norway Believes in Missile Unity"; date, place not given]

[Text] "Disagreement in NATO is natural, and the current disagreement goes no deeper than disagreements in the past," Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg said of the "missile war" within the alliance. Norway and Denmark support West Germany.

"I am not worried about the disagreement within the alliance. It is not the first time there has been such a disagreement. On almost all important issues it is natural that 16 democratic nations should have different views. This time too the task will be to reach a reunited position, and I believe this will be achieved at the 29-30 May NATO summit," Foreign Minister Stoltenberg told AFTENPOSTEN.

The current conflict within NATO is about two questions, both to do with short-range nuclear forces. As far as the discussion of whether these missiles should be "modernized" is concerned, the Norwegian position is that a NATO decision now in favor of modernization would send the wrong signal to Moscow at the wrong

time. According to Stoltenberg, there is also no need for NATO to reach a decision now in favor of modernization. "We can wait until 1992. Nothing need be done to the present missiles before 1996," the foreign minister said.

In the rather heated debate within NATO it is now chiefly Britain which is urging that a decision for modernization be reached this year. The United States seems to have gradually moved away from its original position of modernization in the near future. Of the other NATO nations Iceland—somewhat surprisingly—has expressed support for the British view.

"My impression is that things are probably moving toward agreement on a postponement of a decision for modernization," Stoltenberg said.

As far as the other controversial question affecting the same missiles is concerned—whether NATO should agree to talks with the Warsaw Pact on abolishing this type of weapon—the Norwegian view is very clear, according to the foreign minister: "We take the view that we cannot exclude any type of weapon from negotiations. Therefore, Norway is also prepared for negotiations on short-range nuclear forces. But we see such negotiations as closely linked to the negotiations in Vienna on conventional force reductions. We cannot, after all, negotiate away the land-based short-range nuclear missiles and go on living with the conventional imbalance," Stoltenberg said.

The foreign minister takes the view that it is natural to have parallel negotiations on short-range nuclear forces and conventional arms. At the same time he stressed that we should not get into the situation where missiles on land are negotiated away and where this leads to a buildup in sea-based weapons.

The United States and Britain, supported by the Netherlands and Portugal, initially adopted the position that they did not want to hear any suggestion of any negotiations on short-range nuclear forces. They are less categorical today, but still stress very strongly that there must first be results on the table in Vienna before anything can happen to the missiles. This is also the view of NATO's supreme commander in Europe, General John Galvin—a view which he expressed again in Oslo this week.

Yesterday Foreign Minister Stoltenberg had a telephone conversation with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Denmark's Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. The two were meeting in Copenhagen, and Genscher was able to note that he has both Norwegian and Danish support for the West German wish for negotiations soon on short-range nuclear forces. Belgium, Spain, and Italy take the same view.

SWEDEN

Foreign Ministry Aide: 'No Military Logic' for NATO SNF Modernization
PM0205150589 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Apr 89 p 6

[Mikael Holmstrom report: "Rearmament Plans Give the Wrong Signals"]

[Text] Linköping—"NATO is sending the wrong signals to the Soviet Union with its plans to modernize short-range nuclear arms in Europe," Foreign Ministry Under Secretary of State Pierre Schori said.

In Pierre Schori's view, after agreements reached on the scrapping of land-based short-range missiles in Europe—the so-called INF Treaty—it is important to complement these with new agreements:

"What we need is complementary disarmament. Not compensatory rearmament. In the present situation modernizing short-range arms is the wrong signal," Schori said, wondering whether these arms are necessary:

"We in the Swedish Government see no military logic in this modernization."

It is primarily the United States and Britain which want to modernize these arms. Asked whether Sweden has made its views known to these countries, Schori said:

"Our views are not unknown."

Yesterday Pierre Schori addressed the Technical Forum in Linköping. He stressed the risk inherent in the fact that air- and sea-based arms are not covered by the negotiations or agreements reached so far.

A Swedish-Finnish proposal on so-called incidents at sea will be put forward at the United Nations next month.

Compared with the major security policy speech he made in Storlien 29 January, Pierre Schori is now attaching greater importance to cruise missiles:

"We could have a situation in which people disarm in central Europe, leaving the Nordic area in a backwater. Sweden and Finland find themselves on the dividing line between the two power blocs, and they cover a great area and stretch a long way," Pierre Schori said.

"In the light of our nonalignment and our policy of neutrality we cannot of course accept the violation of international law that overflying our territory would represent."

In his speech Pierre Schori stressed more clearly than in the past that Sweden will push the question of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. For the past 2 years this question has been the subject of an inquiry by a committee of Nordic civil servants.

"We cannot accept that the question should be buried in a committee for decades. There is no longer any reason to listen to NATO's warnings that a nuclear-free zone could upset the disarmament negotiations in Geneva," Schori said, noting that he is striving for Nordic agreement on the issue.

Schori also touched on the current crisis in the Swedish Armed Forces:

"What we are discussing today is not rearmament but what is needed to maintain our defense capacity," Pierre Schori said.

"We cannot anticipate events and take out the profits of detente. As yet the fundamental circumstances determining Swedish security policy have not changed."

TURKEY

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on CFE Talks, SNF Issue

TA0305160389 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1540 GMT 3 May 89

[Text] Ankara (A.A.)—Foreign Ministry spokesman Inal Batu today declared that concurrent with the positive results expected from the current CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] talks in Vienna, Turkey is prepared to join in any reconciliation process that materializes within the North Atlantic Alliance aimed at starting talks with the Warsaw Pact.

Responding to a query on developments within NATO over short range nuclear weapons at his weekly Wednesday press conference, Batu said it was important that differences of views were reconciled with due consideration of the views of all the NATO allies and with a view to unity and solidarity within the alliance.

Ambassador Batu also said, "On the other hand I wish to underline here our conviction that safeguarding world peace and security can be achieved by balancing both conventional and nuclear weapons at the lowest level."

Batu also pointed to the fact that none of the allies have accepted the Warsaw Pact's proposal to liquidate short range nuclear weapons entirely.

Chief of Staff Endorses 'All Disarmament Efforts'

TA0805161989 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1535 GMT 8 May 89

[Text] Ankara (A.A.)—General Necip Torumtay, the chief of General Staff, said today that Turkey supports "all disarmament efforts."

Turkey, he said, believes that these efforts "make a great contribution to the establishment of trust and stability in the world."

In a statement to the Ankara Journalists' Association's BAYRAM newspaper, General Torumtay said that even though the Warsaw Pact's unilateral reduction of its conventional forces was a "very important development," he nevertheless thought that it would have little impact on NATO's corresponding southern flank forces, particularly those in Turkey, because the Warsaw Pact reductions were mainly in central Europe.

He went on to say that the assistance so far extended to Turkey of upgrading the standard of its military forces to those of NATO's developed countries, has been "inadequate."

Torumtay also said that the Turkish Armed Forces are confident that the Turkish nation is well on the way to what he called an "an excellent level of democratization."

UNITED KINGDOM

Thatcher Remains 'Firm' Against SNF Talks with USSR

LD0705132689 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1228 GMT 7 May 89

[By Tom McMullan, PRESS ASSOCIATION diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Mrs Thatcher is maintaining her firm opposition to any negotiations with the Soviet Union on short range nuclear weapons, government spokesmen said today. Neither Downing Street nor the Foreign Office would confirm that the prime minister has sent a message to President Bush making clear that if the NATO allies agree to such negotiations Britain will not take part. The message is said to have been sent in a series of diplomatic exchanges and telephone calls in the past week. The issue is due to be discussed at a NATO summit in Brussels at the end of this month.

A Foreign Office spokesman said: "NATO policy is a matter for all the NATO allies. The position of the United States and the United Kingdom on such negotiations is quite clear—no negotiations. "However it was notable that government spokesmen did not deny that Mrs Thatcher has made clear her position in a message to the White House. A boycott by Britain of such

negotiations would highlight the disarray within NATO. The implication of the Foreign Office statement is that Britain is ready to exercise a veto on a decision to arrange negotiations.

The Bush administration is now searching for a compromise formula which will enable the NATO allies to present a united front at the summit. This follows indications of West Germany's readiness to have negotiations with the Soviet Union in response to opinion polls in West Germany. These show that the German public is impressed by the good intentions of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Mrs Thatcher and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl failed to agree on the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons at a meeting a few weeks ago. Mrs Thatcher has made clear in public that the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons should be an essential part of NATO strategy. Negotiations on such weapons would defer any decision on modernisation.

The U.S. officials accept that a decision on modernisation could be delayed until the allies have worked out an agreed position.

Foreign Secretary Howe, FRG's Genscher Confer on Healing NATO Rift

LD1105180489 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1702 GMT 11 May 89

[By Tom McMullan, PRESS ASSOCIATION diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Sir Geoffrey Howe told reporters "watch this space" today after talks with the West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher aimed at healing the NATO rift over the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons.

But after a two-hour luncheon meeting with Mr Genscher, the foreign secretary refused to say how far this meant that any significant progress had been made.

Mr Genscher was equally reticent and indicated that it had been agreed neither side would make any substantial comment.

Mr Genscher asked at fairly short notice for the meeting with Sir Geoffrey.

In Germany, Mr Genscher has become most identified with German opposition to Mrs Thatcher's demands for modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons.

He is seen to be ready to negotiate with the Soviets on these weapons—a position also opposed by Britain.

The issue is beginning to cause political strains within the ruling West German coalition where Mr Genscher's Liberal FDP [Free Democratic Party] is the junior partner to the conservative CDU [Christian Democratic Union].

There has been speculation that his decision to fly to London indicates that he may be seeking to work out the terms of a compromise.

President Bush is actively seeking a compromise to ensure that at the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of this month the alliance does not present a picture of disarray.

Mr Genscher said: "We have had a useful exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest. We talked about questions relating to the European Community, international questions.

"We have talked about the recent threats coming from Iran. We have also talked about the preparations for the NATO summit. We will continue to be in close touch."

Asked if the gap was now narrowing between the two sides, he said: "In the interests of the good cause in which we are jointly working we will not go beyond what I have just said."

Sir Geoffrey told reporters: "We have discussed a number of things, several international questions including the threat from Iran, community matters the agenda for the forthcoming NATO summit.

"It was a useful meeting. We shall be keeping in close touch. We have been discussing those topics. Watch this space."

Officials said the meeting had been "straightforward and friendly".

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